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I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal statutes of limitations have long been a familiar part
of the American legal landscape.' They are legislative devices to
protect a defendant from the risk of erroneous conviction due to
stale evidence. They are also perceived as protecting society
from crime by promoting accurate results at trial and efficient
use of the prosecutor's resources. In addition, such statutes im-
ply that a lengthy passage of time after the commitment of a
crime makes .punishment unfair to the perpetrator and unpro-
ductive for society.
The concept that a defendant may be found guilty of an un-
charged lesser offense,2 instead of the offenses formally charged
1. See infra part fI.A (discussing the history, nature, and purpose of the
criminal statute of limitations).
2. For purposes of clarity, the term "lesser offense" is used throughout this Arti-
cle. This general term encompasses several seemingly more specific terms, such as
"lesser-included offense," "necessarily included offense," and "lesser-related offense,"
which reflect federal and state law variations of the general concept. See infra notes
297-315 and accompanying text. The state law definition of such an offense may
vary from broad to narrow, and the definitions may be either judicial or legislative.
In Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989), the Supreme Court established
the federal definition-a narrow interpretation of the term "necessarily included of-
fense," found in Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See infra
notes 300-14 and accompanying text. In contrast, most courts use the more tradition-
al term "lesser-included offense," yet determine the meaning of "included" according
to the law of the particular jurisdiction. That meaning may depend on the statutory
[Vol. 37:199
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in the indictment or information, is also a recognized and well-
established feature of the American criminal justice system.3 As
with the statute of limitations, both the defendant and society
are perceived to benefit from the doctrine of lesser offenses4 be-
cause its use avoids the stark choice between conviction or ac-
quittal on the charged offense, thereby permitting the alterna-
tive choice of conviction for a lesser offense that may reflect
more accurately the actual evidence at trial. This efficient use of
the criminal trial thus encourages more accurate results in a
single adjudicative event.
This Article considers the legal responses that occur when the
statute of limitations conflicts with the lesser offense doctrine at
trial. A recent example is illustrative.5
Late on the night of June 22, 1981, Candice Short was found
dead in her car in the parking lot of a suburban New Jersey
shopping mall. Her father and her husband John had begun to
look for Candice when she failed to pick up the Shorts' daughter
from the babysitter. Candice had been beaten and stabbed, pos-
sibly with a screwdriver. Her neck was crushed, causing death
by asphyxiation.6 Although there were superficial indications of
sexual assault and robbery, the police discounted both motives,
quickly focusing on her husband as a primary suspect Investi-
elements of offenses, the essential facts alleged in the indictment, or the facts devel-
oped at trial. See infra note 299 and accompanying text. "Lesser offense" is an ap-
propriate term for the general discussion in this Article because it does not suggest
any particular jurisdiction's choice of definition.
3. See infra part Ill.B.1 (discussing the history, nature, and purpose of the doc-
trine of lesser offenses at trial).
4. Lesser offense law may be embodied in a particular jurisdiction's statutes
(usually, the criminal or judicial codes), rules of criminal procedure, judicially created
law, or any combination of these.
5. The facts set forth in the following paragraphs pertain to the 1989 murder
trial of John Short in Passaic County, New Jersey. The facts are derived from the
opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and the petitions and briefs of the
parties filed in that court in State v. Short, 618 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1993), and from the
unpublished opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. State
v. Short, No. A-4556-88T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 1991), reprinted in
Supplemental Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 21a-34a,
Short, 618 A.2d 316 (No. 34, 132) [hereinafter Defendant's Brief].
6. Short, 618 A.2d at 317-18.
7. Supplemental Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Plaintiff-Respondent at 1-2,
Short, 618 A.2d 316 (No. 34, 132) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Brief]; Short, No. A-4556-
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gation disclosed that Candice and her husband did not have a
harmonious marriage and that John had recently become in-
volved with another woman.' The police could not corroborate
John's questionable alibi,9 and they expected to use some cir-
cumstantial evidence that they had discovered to induce a con-
fession.' ° That confession, however, was not obtained, and the
police investigation became inactive in November 1981 (perhaps,
in part, because of the death of the original investigating offi-
cer).11
In June 1987, six years after the crime, an agent of the county
prosecutor's office resumed investigation of Candice Short's ho-
micide. During the investigation, the prosecutor's office
reinterviewed a woman who, soon after the crime, had reported
to the police that she had seen a man and woman, with physical
descriptions matching those of the Shorts, arguing violently in a
car parked at the shopping mall on the evening of the homi-
cide. " In February 1988, John Short was indicted in Passaic
County, New Jersey, for the purposeful or knowing murder of
his wife. 3
At his trial, Short requested that the jury be instructed on the
lesser offenses of manslaughter. 4 The trial judge agreed that,
under the New Jersey law of lesser offenses, Short was entitled
to such an instruction. 5 However, unlike murder, which had no
limitations period in New Jersey, the state statute of limitations
for manslaughter offenses was five years.6 The judge was thus
88T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 1991) at 6-8, reprinted in Defendant's Brief,
supra note 5, at 26a-28a.
8. Short, 618 A.2d at 317-18.
9. Id. at 318.
10. See Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 7, at 2.
11. See Short, No. A-4556-8814 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 1991) at 8 n.2,
reprinted in Defendant's Brief, supra note 5, at 28a; Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 7,
at 2.
12. Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 7, at 2-3. When originally interviewed by the po-
lice, the witness had identified erroneously the color of Candice Short's car. See id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Short, 618 A.2d at 318. Under New Jersey law, three manslaughter offens-
es-passion-provocation manslaughter, aggravated reckless manslaughter, and reck-
less manslaughter-were possible lesser offenses of murder. Id.
15. Id.
16. State v. Short, No. A-4556-88T4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 1991) at
202 [Vol. 37:199
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faced with an apparent conflict between the state law of lesser
offenses arid the statute of limitations. The evidence could have
supported a jury's verdict of purposeful or knowing murder, as
charged in the indictment,'7 but a jury could also have found evi-
dence that John Short killed his wife with a passion-provoked or
reckless state of mind during a heated argument-manslaughter,
rather than murder." A 1988 indictment of Short for the same
manslaughter offenses clearly would have been time-barred
under New Jersey law, but to refuse him the opportunity to
receive a verdict on lesser offenses to which he would have been
entitled absent the statute of limitations would have deprived
him of a significant right at. trial.
This conflict between New Jersey's criminal statute of limita-
tions and New Jersey's lesser offense doctrine raised questions
of state procedural law and, arguably, federal constitutional law.
Did the state's statute of limitations prohibit an instruction on a
time-barred lesser offense, thereby leaving the jury with an all-
or-nothing choice of whether Short was guilty or not guilty of
murder-a choice between imprisonment and freedom? 9 Did
9, reprinted in Defendant's Brief, supra note 5, at 29a.
17. The Appellate Division rejected Short's challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence supporting his conviction for murder. Short, No. A-4556-88T4 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 15, 1991) at 12-13, reprinted in Defendant's Brief, supra note 5, at
32a-33a. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not certify that issue for appeal. See
Defendant's Brief, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that the only issue certified for appeal
was the charge to the jury concerning the effect of the statute of limitations on the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter).
18. Under the New Jersey law of lesser offenses, the fact that Short presented an
alibi defense at trial (thus denying any participation in the homicide) did not pre-
clude a lesser offense instruction based on reckless commission of the homicide or
commission with reasonably provoked heat of passion. Short, 618 A.2d at 319 (noting
that Short's primary defense was that he was not present when his wife was mur-
dered and that he argued in the alternative that the evidence only supported a con-
viction for manslaughter).
19. The prosecution did not seek the death penalty in its case against John Short.
See id. at 318. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Id.
Lesser offense doctrine is intrinsically bound up with the constitutional doctrine
of double jeopardy. See infra note 314. Even without a statute of limitations prob-
lem, convicting Short of murder would have barred his trial and conviction for the
lesser offense of manslaughter. Similarly, convicting him of the lesser offense of
manslaughter would imply an acquittal on the greater offense of murder, thus bar-
ring retrial for that offense. See, e.g., Bradley E. Kotler et al., Project, Twenty-Third
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
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the state statute of limitations prevent a judgment of conviction
by the trial court on the time-barred lesser offense (and, is this
question meaningfully different from the prior question)? Did it
matter whether the defendant or the prosecutor requested the
lesser offense instruction, or whether the court gave the instruc-
tion sua sponte? ° Did the conflict between these two state
criminal law concepts become a matter appropriate for consider-
ation under the United States Constitution because a defendant
is entitled to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
Short reflects both the complexity of the conflict between the
statute of limitations and the doctrine of lesser offenses at
trial21 and the many theoretically possible approaches to its
resolution.' One possible approach is jurisdictional. Under this
approach, the trial judge would refuse to instruct the jury on an
otherwise appropriate,' time-barred lesser offense because the
criminal statute of limitations presents a legislatively created
subject matter barrier to the trial court's limited authority. A
second possibility is nonjurisdictional. This approach would call
Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 597, 979-80 & nn.1514-16 (1994) (noting that- double
jeopardy bars successive prosecutions for both greater and lesser-included offenses).
20. Both the prosecution and the defendant may request a lesser offense in-
struction under most circumstances. See infra note 313 and accompanying text. Some
jurisdictions hold that the trial court should instruct sua sponte if the lesser offense
instruction is appropriate. See infra note 355. In Short, the defendant requested the
instruction. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
21. The Short trial is a common example of the conflict that is the subject of this
Article. The case was unusual, however, because no explanation for the six-year
delay in completing the homicide investigation is given in the record. Short, 618
A.2d at 318. Indeed, the investigator from the county prosecutor's office who took up
the case apparently discovered no new evidence. See Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 7,
at 2-3. As will be seen from other examples in this Article, lengthy periods of time
between a crime and its prosecution more commonly occur because the evidence nec-
essary to complete the investigation and to formally charge the defendant is not
available. See, e.g., State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 (Vt. 1994); see also infra notes
182-85 and accompanying text (discussing Delisle).
22. For many state courts, the conflict between the statute of limitations and less-
er offense law will be an issue of first impression, but decisional law concerning ei-
ther of the two competing legal concepts may constrain how a trial judge resolves
the conflict.
23. Whether such an instruction is appropriate depends on the particular
jurisdiction's definition of a lesser offense and its rules for applying the lesser of-
fense doctrine. Both definition and application are central issues of disagreement in
lesser offense law. See infra notes 296-335 and accompanying text.
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for a judicial finding that the statute of limitations is merely an
affirmative defense that is waived implicitly when a defendant
requests a lesser offense instruction or, conversely, that it is not
waived if the record fails to reveal the defendant's explicit,
knowing, and voluntary waiver. A variation of this waiver-based
approach would be for the trial court itself to give the defendant
the option to waive the statute of limitations defense in order to
qualify for an otherwise appropriate, time-barred lesser offense
instruction and verdict.
A trial judge also might instruct the jury on the elements of
the applicable lesser offenses, but also then inform it that the
statute of limitations does not permit a guilty verdict on those
offenses.24 Yet another possibility would be for the trial judge to
give the appropriate, time-barred lesser offense instruction with-
out mentioning the statute of limitations. The judge could then
refuse to convict or enter judgment on a guilty verdict for a
lesser offense because the statute of limitations had run. Each of
these attempts to resolve the conflict has been considered in
either federal or state courts.2
To further complicate the analysis, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the failure to give the jury an appropriate lesser
offense instruction may raise due process issues. In addition,
the Court has held that if a defendant is legislatively denied
such a lesser offense "third option" in a capital offense trial,
such a denial will invalidate both the conviction and sentence
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.27
This Article will attempt to resolve the quandary created by
the conflict at trial between criminal statutes of limitations and
otherwise appropriate lesser offenses. The Article will suggest
and justify a solution that both state and federal courts should
adopt in noncapital cases, while considering the validity and
24. In Short, the trial judge chose this option for instructing the jury. As a result,
the state supreme court reversed Short's murder conviction. Short, 618 A.2d at 318,
322; see infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
25. See infra part ].F.
26. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-14 (1973); see infra notes 48-59
and accompanying text.
27. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43 (1980); see infra notes 84-89 and ac-
companying text.
205
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scope of the Supreme Court's constitutional approach to the
conflict in capital cases.
Part II of this Article explores the development of the conflict
between criminal statutes of limitations and lesser offenses at
trial through a discussion of federal and state cases, all of which
have failed to satisfactorily resolve the conflict. Part III consid-
ers the conflict from the perspective of the history, nature, and.
purposes of both the criminal statute of limitations and the
doctrine of lesser offenses. Both Parts II and III conclude that
judicially applied labels of jurisdiction and federal due process
are inappropriate pathways to solving the conflict. Part IV pres-
ents a solution that is in accord with the goals of fair and effi-
cient criminal adjudication, including the proper role of the jury,
the equal treatment at trial of criminal defendants who have
committed the same offense, and the appropriate place of state
criminal statutory and procedural law in our federal constitu-
tional system. This solution proposes (1) that the criminal stat-
ute of limitations is not jurisdictional and can be waived by a
defendant; (2) that although a court may enter a judgment and
sentence upon a conviction of a time-barred offense if there is a
proper waiver, the Constitution does not require a lesser offense
verdict option absent such a waiver; and (3) that a defendant's
failure to waive the statute should not preclude the judge from
instructing the jury on the elements of an'otherwise appropriate,
time-barred lesser offense as a defensive theory, but should pre-
clude the court from giving the jury the option to return a ver-
dict on that offense.
II. THE CRIMINAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LESSER
OFFENSES-DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT
A. Prelude: The Problem of the Jurisdictional Label
Labels are indispensable tools for lawyers. They enable a bun-
dle of concepts to be expressed efficiently and are an essential
part of the shared language of the profession. Over the-years,
however, a widely used legal label may constrain the growth of
the law in a particular area. The label 'jurisdiction" has played
a significant role in the development of both the law of criminal
statutes of limitations and the doctrine of lesser offenses, but
206 [Vol. 37:199
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neither area is 'Jurisdictional" in its nature or purpose. Judicial
efforts to apply or avoid jurisdictional barriers have influenced
profoundly attempts to resolve the conflict between the criminal
statute of limitations and the doctrine of lesser offenses.
Courts have refused to allow juries to consider an otherwise
appropriate lesser offense because the statute of limitations has
been construed to remove the court's authority over time-barred
offenses. The criminal statute of limitations has thus retained
an unwarranted elevation over the lesser offense doctrine in
several states due to some courts' tenacious adherence to the
statute's jurisdictional label. Courts have also prohibited juries
from considering an otherwise appropriate lesser offense because
the jurisdiction for that offense was assigned by statute to an-
other court. The need to resolve this particular jurisdictional
dilemma led the Supreme Court to give the lesser offense doc-
trine a patina of constitutional status. Constitutional due pro-
cess thus arose as yet another label that would significantly
confuse judicial attempts to resolve the conflict between the
doctrine of lesser offenses and the statute of limitations.
B. The Jurisdictional Label and the Criminal Statute of
Limitations
For many years, courts and treatise writers accepted without
challenge the idea that, unlike a civil statute of limitations, a
criminal statute of limitations was jurisdictional-a legislative
declaration limiting the power of a court that is dependent on
the legislature for its substantive authority.' Neither the par-
28. See, e.g., Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964) (explain-
ing that the criminal statute of limitations is jurisdictional and therefore noticeable
for the first time on appeal); Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d 99, 108-09 (6th Cir.
1960) (stating the general rule that unlike a civil statute of limitations, a criminal
statute of limitations is construed as a bar to prosecution, not as a statute of repose
going to remedy only); Spears v. State, 160 So. 727, 728 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (con-
cluding that the failure to indict for the lesser offense within the statutory limita-
tions period rendered the court without jurisdiction to try that lesser offense); People
v. McGee, 36 P.2d 378, 379 (Cal. 1934) (finding that the more desirable rule is that
the criminal limitations statute is jurisdictional); State v. Steensland 195 P. 1080,
1081 (Idaho 1921) (stating that the time within which an offense is committed is a
jurisdictional fact in all cases subject to limitation); 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 92, at 628-29 (15th ed. 1993) ("Although a statute of
207
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ties nor the court could create jurisdiction over the offense be-
cause the statute of limitations, in effect, had removed it.' In
cases in which the trial court had no jurisdiction over a lesser
offense because the statute of limitations had run on that of-
fense-but not the greater offense charged in the indictment or
information-the defendant could not be convicted of the lesser
offense. °
As pointed out by one early-twentieth-century treatise writer,
this jurisdictional approach had the collateral effect of prevent-
ing a prosecutor from avoiding the statute of limitations if the
state's evidence supported a verdict on the lesser time-barred
offense, but not the greater offense charged. 1 Also, under the
limitations in a civil case is merely one of repose, a statute of limitations in a crim-
inal case is jurisdictional in nature, creates a bar to a criminal prosecution, and can
be asserted at any time .... "); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 225 (1981) (deter-
mining that a failure to comply with the limitation statute for the lesser offense is a
defect going to the very jurisdiction of the court); C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Convic-
tion of Lesser Offense, Against Which Statute of Limitations Has Run, Where Statute
Has Not Run Against Offense with Which Defendant Is Charged, 47 AL.R.2D 887,
890-91 (1956) ("It has been held that the necessity of compliance with the limita-
tions statute, despite the indictment for the larger crime upon which no statute has
run, goes to the very jurisdiction of the court.").
29. See Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Waivability of Bar of Limitations Against
Criminal Prosecution, 78 A.L.R.4TH 693, § 3 (1990) (citing cases in which the ac-
cused was prohibited from waiving the criminal statute of limitations).
30. See, e.g., Fuecher v. State, 24 S.W. 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (reversing
judgment because motion for arrest of judgment should have been granted to defen-
dant convicted of time-barred lesser offense of assault instead of the charged murder
offense); 11 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 39.164 (3d ed. 1989) (stating that
"an accused in a timely prosecution for a felony cannot be convicted of a lesser-in-
cluded offense which is barred by the applicable limitations"); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.5(a) (1984) (stating that convictions
for a lesser offense on which the statute of limitations has run have been consistent-
ly held as barred by the statute of limitations). But see WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.5(a) (2d ed. 1992) (acknowledging, in a
more recent volume, the possibility of waiver of the statute of limitations by a de-
fendant); Christen R. Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense
Doctrine, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 445, 472 & n.176 (1984) (stating the majority rule
that a defendant cannot be convicted on a time-barred lesser offense); 21 AM. JUR.
2D Criminal Law § 225 (1981) ("In short, one cannot be convicted of a lesser offense
on a prosecution for a greater crime . . . commenced after the statute has run on
the lesser offense.").
31. The effect of the statute cannot be avoided by charging a crime not
barred, and convicting of an offense which is included in the charge, but
which was barred. Thus, where a person is indicted for murder, for
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jurisdictional concept, whether the defendant or the prosecutor
requested consideration of the time-barred lesser offense at trial
could make no difference because neither party can confer juris-
diction on the court when the legislature has not chosen to do
so. For example, in Chaifetz v. United States,32 even though the
defendant requested a time-barred misdemeanor instruction, the
court of appeals upheld the district court's refusal to so instruct
on jurisdictional grounds, finding that which party requested a
time-barred lesser offense instruction was "immaterial."  A tri-
al court could not instruct the jury on a time-barred lesser of-
fense,' a jury could not return a verdict on such an offense, 5
and a court could not lawfully enter a judgment or sentence on a
lesser offense within the jurisdictional bar of the statute of limi-
tations.36
C. The Jurisdictional Label and the Lesser Offense
Just as statutes of limitations-labeled 'jurisdictionaF--create
barriers to a jury's consideration of otherwise appropriate lesser
offenses, so do other statutes that are more clearly jurisdictional
in nature. This situation commonly occurs when an indictment
charges an offense that is withih the statutory jurisdiction of the
trial court, but an otherwise appropriate lesser offense is statu-
torily consigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of another court.
Such a barrier to the consideration of lesser offenses arises, for
example, when jurisdiction is divided statutorily between a trial
court of general jurisdiction and a family or juvenile court with
which no limitation is prescribed, and is found guilty of assault with
intent to murder, which was barred when the indictment was found, a
motion in arrest of judgment should be sustained.
WILLUim L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF CPMINAL PROCEDURE 153 (2d ed. 1918) (cita-
tion omitted).
32. 288 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd in part, 366 U.S. 209 (1961).
33. Id. at 136.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see, e.g., Blackmon v. State, 101 So. 319 (Fla. 1924) (appioving a charge
that informed the jury that a verdict on any lesser offenses of murder was not per-
missible because the statute of limitations had run on those offenses).
36. Chaifetz, 288 F.2d at 135 ('The rule is well established that, when an accused
is on trial for a felony (not barred by limitations), he cannot be convicted of a less-
er-included offense if the latter offense is barred.").
209
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exclusive jurisdiction over particular offenses or offenders. A
similar situation arises when a federal district court has limited
jurisdiction over offenses committed on an Indian reservation,
but the tribal authority has exclusive jurisdiction over an offense
that may be a lesser offense of that charged in the district
court." Again, the salutary purposes of the lesser offense doc-
trine would be frustrated by an application of the concept of
jurisdiction.
One apparent solution to this particular type of jurisdictional
conflict is for the court to look to the creative concept of ancil-
lary jurisdiction, a "label within a label,"" or to construe the
trial court's jurisdictional statute broadly to encompass tradi-
tionally appropriate lesser offenses at trial. 9 Such an analysis
should, of course, include a judicial evaluation of the purposes
served by both the statutory division of jurisdiction- and the
doctrine of lesser offenses at trial. As will be discussed in the
next section, however, the Supreme Court did not choose to so
limit its analysis in Keeble v. United States," but created, in
dictum, a constitutional component of the lesser offense doctrine
that has confused lesser offense law for over two decades.
37. See, e.g., Kills Crow v. United States, 451 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1971) (disapprov-
ing jury instruction for lesser-included offense of simple assault even though district
court had statutory jurisdiction of the greater offense of aggravated assault under
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 999 (1972), over-
ruled sub silentio by Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973); Douglass v.
State, 466 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ind. 1984) (approving guilty plea to lesser offense than
that charged in trial court where juvenile court would have jurisdiction of that of-
fense if originally charged).
38. See, e.g., Slater v. State, 606 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1992) (recognizing superior
court's "derivative jurisdiction" over lesser offense within exclusive jurisdiction of
family court).
39. See, e.g., Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1200-06 (Del. 1992) (en banc) (in-
terpreting state statutory scheme to permit trial court to maintain jurisdiction over
defendant tried as an adult for first-degree murder, even though jury found defen-
dant guilty of lesser offense of second-degree murder-an offense that would have
been, if originally charged, within the jurisdiction of the family court); Kimball v.
State, 678 P.2d 675 (Nev. 1984) (finding that the trial court, which had original
jurisdiction over the gross misdemeanor charge, also had jurisdiction to convict and
sentence defendant for lesser misdemeanor offense, even though that offense, if origi-
nally charged, would have been within jurisdiction of justice's court); State v.
Saulnier,. 306 A.2d 67 (N.J. 1973) (same).
40. 412 U.S. 205 (1973); see infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
210
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D. Challenges to the Jurisdictional Label-In re Winship,41
Keeble v. United States, and United States v. Wild42
The seeds of the quandary that is the subject of this Article
were planted in the 1970s. Earlier conflicts between the criminal
statute of limitations and the lesser offense doctrine were re-
solved by adhering to the jurisdictional label of the limitations
statute, precluding an otherwise appropriate lesser offense in-
struction, verdict, or conviction. After the 1970s, however, the
easy reliance on the jurisdictional solution became unacceptable
in the federal courts and began to crumble in the state courts as
well. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court infused the concept of con-
stitutional due process into the doctrine of lesser offenses at
trial. This infusion argued against a jurisdictional interpretation
of a federal statute that apparently precluded a lesser offense
instruction.
Although In re Winship is one of the most significant crimi-
nal due process cases of the past quarter century, this status is
not due to the Supreme Court's statement there that every ac-
cused is protected against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.44 That standard of proof was already well-
established throughout the country.45 Rather, Winship was im-
portant because it opened fact-finding in state criminal trials to
federal judicial review under the aegis of the Due Process
Clause.4" Winship thus cleared the way for the Court's 1979
holding that federal district courts must consider habeas corpus
petitions from state prisoners who allege that they were not
convicted upon evidence that would convince a rational trier of
fact of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.47
41. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42. 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
43. 397 U.S. 358.
44. Id. at 364.
45. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). In fact, the context of Winship's holding
was a nonjury adjudication of delinquency in New York Family Court. Id. at 360,
368. The application of a fundamental criminal procedural right in that context was
an important part of Winship's holding.
46. See id. at 364.
47. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). As the Court noted, "[a]fter
Winship the critical inquiry . . . must be not simply to determine whether the jury
was properly instructed [using the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt], but
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In 1973, Winship's Due Process holding led the Supreme
Court, in Keeble v. United States,48 to decide whether a verdict
of a jury that did not receive an appropriate lesser offense in-
struction was subject to attack for failing the reasonable
doubt/due process standard.
Keeble was a Native American who got into a violent argu-
ment on an Indian reservation with his brother-in-law over the
mistreatment of Keeble's sister.49 The brother-in-law died of
exposure after Keeble severely beat him." Under the Major
Crimes Act of 1885 (the Act),51 federal district courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over a specific list of serious offenses com-
mitted by an Indian on a reservation." Other lesser crimes not
listed in the Act remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
tribe.53 Keeble was charged and, after the trial judge denied his
request for a lesser offense instruction for simple assault, con-
victed in district court for assault with intent to commit serious
bodily injury.54 The judge refused the instruction because the
lesser offense was not specified in the Act and, therefore, was
to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 318.
In more recent years, the Court has directed its attention to clarifying the pre-
cise definition of the reasonable doubt standard itself. Winship, in retrospect, made
further federal involvement in state jury process inevitable. See, e.g., Victor v. Ne-
braska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (holding that state court instruction defining reason-
able doubt did not violate Due Process Clause); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39
(1990) (per curiam) (holding that state court instruction defining reasonable doubt
did violate the Due Process Clause). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078
(1993), the Court unanimously held that a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt
instruction is never harmless error because the jury simply will not have reached a
"verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" as required by the Sixth Amendments
jury trial guarantee. Id. at 2082. This constitutional restraint, as well as the Due
Process Clause, served to control jury decisionmaking in criminal cases in both state
and federal courts.
48. 412 U.S. 205 (1973).
49. Id. at 207.
50. Id.
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1153, 3242 (1994)).
52. Keeble, 412 U.S. at 206.
53. Id. at 209-10.
54. This charge is immaterially different from one of the offenses listed in the
Act. Id. at 206.
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not within the statutory jurisdiction of the trial court. 5 Silently
brushing aside the jurisdictional argument of the three
dissenters,56 the majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan (the author of the majority opinion in Winship), agreed
with the petitioner that the Act did not require that he be de-
prived of an instruction on a lesser-included offense.57 But, in
achieving this statutory construction, Winship's due, process con-
cept was pushed in an unexpected direction by Justice Brennan:
True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reason-
able doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no
lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theo-
retical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant
is entitled to a lesser offense instruction-in this context or
any other-precisely because he should not be exposed to the
substantial risk that the jury's practice will diverge from
theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some
offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of con-
viction. In the case before us, for example, an intent to com-
mit serious bodily injury is a necessary element of the crime
with which petitioner was charged, but not of the crime of
simple assault. Since the nature of petitioner's intent was
very much in dispute at trial, the jury could rationally have
convicted him of simple assault if that option had been pre-
sented. But the jury was presented with only two options:
convicting the defendant of assault with intent to commit
great bodily injury, or acquitting him outright. We cannot say
that the availability of a third option-convicting the defen-
dant of simple assault-could not have resulted in a different
verdict. Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the
55. Id.
56. As Justice Stewart stated in dissent:
"It needs no citation of authorities to show that the mere consent of par-
ties cannot confer upon a court of the United States the jurisdiction to
decide a case." Were the petitioners motion for an instruction on simple
assault to be granted, and were a jury to convict on that offense [an
issue the majority did not reach], I should have supposed until the
Court's decision today that the conviction could have been set aside [on
motion of the defendant] for want of jurisdiction.
Id. at 217 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 214.
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the
right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser
included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction
of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction
would raise difficult constitutional questions."8
Thus, finding impetus, if not compulsion, in the Due Process
Clause, the Court elevated the stature of the lesser offense doc-
trine and diminished jurisdictional concerns.59
Jurisdictional concerns for the nature of the statute of limita-
tions were similarly weakened in the federal courts by the D.C.
Circuit in 1977 in United States v. Wild.6" Because the federal
statute of limitations"' was about to expire, Wild, an official of
Gulf Oil Corporation under investigation for illegal corporate
campaign contributions, offered to execute a written limitations
waiver to forestall immediate indictment.62 The waiver, drafted
by Wild's counsel, was accepted by attorneys for the Watergate
Special Prosecution Force in the anticipation that Wild would
further their investigation. That result did not occur, and Wild
was later indicted for unlawful cash contributions to two mem-
bers of the United States Senate, including the contribution that
58. Id. at 212-13.
59. Later court of appeals decisions held that once such a lesser offense instruc-
tion was given in a Major Crimes Act case, as required by Keeble, the district court
would have power to convict and sentence a defendant found guilty of the lesser
offense, even though that offense was not listed in the Act. United States v. John,
587 F.2d 683, 688 (5th Cir.) (alternative holding) (holding that the Supreme Court
had recognized implicitly that federal courts have jurisdiction to convict and punish
for a lesser offense of the crimes enumerated in the Act), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 925
(1979); Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 849 (1974). Making no reference to these decisions, the Supreme Court noted in
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), that it had "assumed" such jurisdiction to
convict in Keeble, id. at 454 n.5. In United States v. Walkingeagle, 974 F.2d 551
(4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1818 (1993), the court, relying on the impli-
cations of Keeble, held that the trial court had jurisdiction under the Act to convict
and sentence for a lesser-included misdemeanor offense not specified in the Act, even
if the trial court granted a pre-verdict judgment of acquittal on all of the
government's felony charges under the Act, id. at 554.
60. 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977). The author of this
Article was a member of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force team that tried
and briefed Wild.
61. The particular statute of limitations involved was three years and was then
found at 2 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. V 1975).
62. Wild, 551 F.2d at 420.
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was the subject of the waiver agreement and for which the stat-
ute of limitations had expired. 3 Wild's trial counsel successful-
ly moved to dismiss the count of the indictment based on the
time-expired payment, as the district court agreed that the stat-
ute of limitations was jurisdictional and could not be waived by
the parties.' Distinguishing its earlier decisions that seemed to
indicate the opposite,65 the court of appeals refused to find that
the statute of limitations presented a jurisdictional bar to the
prosecution of the time-barred federal offense.6 After consider-ing the policy behind the statute of limitations, 7 the court stat-
ed:
It seems to us, too, that if a defendant may waive certain
constitutional rights, he should certainly be capable in this
instance of waiving a statutory right such as the statute of
limitations .... If the strong policies behind these rights [the
right to counsel, the protection against double jeopardy, and
the trial venue right] are not violated by a rule permitting
them to be waived by a defendant, we cannot find that the
limitation statute's policy is violated here ... .
63. Id. at 421.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 422; see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C.
Circuit precedent most relied on by the appellant, Chaifetz v. United States, 288
F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd in part, 366 U.S. 209 (1961)).
66. The court of appeals relied on United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168 (1872), for
its holding that the federal criminal statute of limitations was not jurisdictional.
Wild, 551 F.2d at 421-22. In Cook, the Court held that a criminal defendant's de-
murrer to an indictment based on the statute of limitations was inappropriate and
that, instead, the statute must be raised as a defense that the government may
rebut by showing either that the offense did in fact occur within the statutory peri-
od or by showing the factual presence of a tolling exception. Cook, 84 U.S. at 177-
80; see also Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917) (holding
that the criminal statute of limitations is a defense that must be asserted at trial).
67. Quoting language from Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970),
see infra note 263 and accompanying text, the court saw the policy behind the stat-
ute of limitations to be the protection of the defendant from a stale prosecution and
the encouragement of law enforcement officials to act promptly, Wild, 551 F.2d at
424. The court also found it persuasive that Professors Moore and Wright, in their
treatises on federal practice and procedure, agreed that under the preferred reading
of Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the criminal statute of
limitations was waived if not raised at or before trial. Id.; see infra note 262 and
accompanying text.
68. Wild, 551 F.2d at 424-25.
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Although the Wild holding was limited to a situation in which
the defendant made a counseled written waiver of the statute of
limitations before its expiration,69 in retrospect it appears that
the general notion of the statute as a bar to the jurisdiction of
the trial court received a fatal blow, at least in the federal
courts.70 Several state high courts have also cited Wild in re-
cent cases in which they held that their state statutes of limita-
tions were not jurisdictional and that a defendant could waive
the statute.' Once the jurisdictional barrier is overcome, it is
easy to reach the conclusion that a defendant is entitled to a
requested lesser offense instruction on an appropriate but time-
barred offense.
However, what if a state court, relying on state precedent and
its view of legislative intent and public policy, rejects the ap-
proach of the majority of the federal circuits and continues to
find that the state statute of limitations is an absolute jurisdic-
69. Id. at 425.
70. See, e.g., Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305, 307-08 (lst Cir.)
(holding that a guilty plea to a time-barred offense implicitly waives the statute of
limitations and stating that "every circuit that has addressed it has held that the
statute of limitations is a waivable affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional
bar"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 581-
82 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that the statute of limitations is an affirma-
tive defense that is waived if not raised at trial and stating that "[s]ome courts
have reasoned that the statute of limitations limits the court's subject-matter juris-
diction] . .. [but t]his position . . . has been rejected by the majority of the circuits
and commentators"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1268 (1992).
71. See, e.g., State v. Littlejohn, 508 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Conn. 1986) (holding that
defendant should have been permitted to plead to substitute information charging
time-barred offense because statute of limitations is affirmative defense subject to
voluntary and intelligent waiver); Brooks v. State, 584 A.2d 82, 86 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (holding that statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is an affirma-
tive defense that was waived by defendant's failure to raise it at trial); Conerly v.
State, 607 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Miss. 1992) (upholding guilty plea to time-barred of-
fense because better rule is that statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and may
be waived by counseled guilty plea); State v. Lambrechts, 585 A.2d 645, 646-47 (R.I.
1991) (finding that defendant's request for an instruction on a time-barred lesser
offense was an election not to rely on affirmative defense of statute of limitations);
State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 886-87 (Tenn. 1993) (finding that statute of limi-
tations is not jurisdictional and may be the subject of a knowing waiver by defen-
dant who pleads guilty to a time-barred offense, but that record did not support
such a waiver).
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tional bar? 2 Does Keeble's due process language foretell consti-
tutional doom for such a state law position when it forecloses an
otherwise appropriate lesser offense instruction? In addition, if a
defendant can waive the statute of limitations on a time-barred
lesser offense because the jurisdictional label is abandoned, may
a court then force the defendant to make such a waiver in order
to obtain an instruction on the time-barred offense-thus per-
mitting judgment and sentence on the lesser offense verdict? In
the 1980s, the Supreme Court's decisions concerning lesser of-
fense instructions in state capital cases heightened the quandary.
E. Lesser Offenses and the Supreme Court's Capital
Cases-Beck v. Alabama,73 Spaziano v. Florida,74 and Schad v.
Arizonas
1. Beck v. Alabama-Legislative Preclusion of Lesser Offenses
If Winship's due process requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt76 necessarily implied that an appropriate lesser
offense option must be submitted to a jury, then that constitu-
tional imperative surely would b6 a significant factor in resolv-
72. See, e.g., Eckl v. -State, 851 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Ark. 1993) (concluding in dictum
that statute of limitations is jurisdictional in the sense of not being subject to waiv-
er in a criminal case); People v. Chadd, 621 P.2d 837, 847-48 (Cal.) (finding that the
statute of limitations, being jurisdictional, compels reversal of conviction for time-
barred offenses despite fact that defendant pleaded guilty to those offenses and did
not attack conviction below), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981); People v. Ognibene,
16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 97, 98-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding defendant's request for a
time-barred lesser offense instruction properly denied because court cannot enter
judgment of conviction for such an offense); Cane v. State, 560 A.2d 1063, 1065-66
(Del. 1989) (per curiam) (stating in dictum that statute of limitations is jurisdictional
in nature and confers substantive rights that a defendant may not waive, as distin-
guished from an affirmative defense); State v. Sullivan, 541 A.2d 450, 454 (R.I.
1988) (holding that defendant's request for an otherwise proper, time-barred lesser
offense instruction was correctly denied by trial court because no conviction was
possible on that offense); State v. Seagraves, 837 S.W.2d 615, 618, 621 (Tenn. Grim.
App. 1992) (finding that trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to try
appellant for time-barred lesser offense and that defendant may raise issue for first
time on appeal).
73. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
74. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
75. 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
76. In re Vmship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying
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ing a conflict between the lesser offense doctrine and the statute
of limitations. Seven years after Justice Brennan conjectured, in
Keeble, on the due process implications of the lesser offense in-
struction," his words were quoted in full and relied upon by
the majority in Beck v. Alabama."8
At the time of Beck's trial for the capital offense of intention-
ally killing a robbery victim, Alabama's death *penalty statute
prohibited the trial judge from giving a noncapital lesser offense
instruction.79 Instead, the statute required the trial court to
give the jury only the choice between convicting on the charged
capital crime or setting the defendant free.8" Beck testified at
trial that he had participated in a planned robbery, but that his
accomplice in the robbery unexpectedly killed the victim."' Felo-
ny murder, which does not require an intentional killing, was
traditionally a noncapital lesser-included offense of the charged
capital offense under Alabama law." The trial judge in Beck,
relying on the death penalty statute, refused to give the other-
77. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973); see supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
78. 447 U.S. 625, 634-35 (1980).
79. ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a) (1975). This provision is set out in Beck, 447 U.S. at
628-29 n.3.
80. Beck, 447 U.S. at 628-29. Under Alabama law, if the jury found the defendant
guilty, it was required to impose the death penalty. Id. at 629. The trial judge could
accept or reject the sentence after a hearing on aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. Id.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), decided four years before Beck, ad-
dressed a Louisiana death penalty statute. In a three-Justice opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court, Justice Stevens concluded that the Louisiana death penalty
statute was unconstitutional because it took a position opposite that of the Alabama
statute later considered in Beck. Id. at 335-36. In Louisiana, the trial judge was
required to give lesser offense instructions for second-degree (noncapital) murder and
manslaughter in every case where the jury was trying a charge of first-degree (capi-
tal) murder, regardless of whether there was any evidence to warrant such an in-
struction. Id. at 334-35. That procedure had the effect of inviting the jury to choose
acquittal over a death sentence (which was then mandatory upon conviction under
Louisiana law) in an arbitrary and capricious disregard of both their oath and the
judge's instructions on the law of the charged offense. Id. at 335. The Stevens pli-
rality view carried the judgment of the Court over the five remaining justices be-
cause the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall stated that the
death penalty was unconstitutional. Id. at 336-37 (Brennan, J., concurring and Mar-
shall, J., concurring). None of the opinions of the Court referred to Keeble.
81. Beck, 447 U.S. at 629-30.
82. Id. at 628-29.
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wise appropriate lesser offense instruction.'
Beck argued on appeal that he should have been permitted
the lesser offense instruction of (noncapital) felony murder, rath-
er than face the death-or-complete-acquittal choice that the Ala-
bama statute gave the jury.84 The Supreme Court agreed and,
relying on the lesser offense discussion in Keeble, held that
Alabama's unique statutory procedure violated due process."
Pointing out that the federal courts and every state court that
had considered the issue recognized a right to a lesser offense
instruction when the evidence warranted it, 6 the Court stated:
While we have never held that a defendant is entitled to a
lesser included offense instruction as a matter of due process,
the nearly universal acceptance of the rule in both state and
federal courts establishes the value to the defendant of this
procedural safeguard. That safeguard would seem to be espe-
cially important in a case such as this. For when the evidence
unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a
serious, violent offense-but leaves some doubt with respect
to an element that would justify conviction of a capital of-
fense-the failure to give the jury the "third option" of con-
victing on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to
enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction.
Such a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the
defendant's life is at stake. As we have often stated, there is
a significant constitutional difference between the death pen-
alty and lesser punishments . 8.7.."
Finding the Alabama statute unconstitutional, the Court
struck down not only Beck's death sentence, but also his convic-
tion on the merits.' The Court reasoned that the unavailability
83. Id. at 628-30.
84. Emphasizing the stark choice, the judge told the jury that if it acquitted Beck
of the charged offense, "he 'must be discharged' and 'can never be tried for anything
that he ever did to [the victim] Roy Malone.'" Id. at 630 (citing Case Record at 743).
85. Id. at 635-38.
86. Id. at 636-37. The Court noted judicial decisions from 46 states that held that
a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when the evidence
warrants it, but also noted that states had differed on "the quantum of proof' neces-
sary to give rise to a right to such an instruction. Id. at 636-37 n.12.
87. Id. at 637.
88. Id. at 642-43, 646.
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of a "third option" verdict, to which the defendant otherwise
would have been entitled, made the jury's conviction unreliable
and its decision of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt uncertain. 9
Although the Court specifically refused to decide whether the
Due Process Clause would require a court to give a lesser of-
fense instruction in a noncapital case," and although the Court
placed its decision squarely in its line of capital cases requiring
procedural rules that do not diminish the reliability of fact-find-
ing because of the special nature of the death penalty,9 it is
not surprising that commentators have interpreted Beck's rea-
soning to apply to noncapital verdicts as well.92 However, in the
fourteen years since Beck, the Court has yet to make that exten-
sion of Winship's notion of due process. Such an extension would
be unlikely and imprudent.
89. Id. at 642-43. Two years after Beck, in Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982),
the Court reversed a Fifth Circuit habeas corpus decision that found a Beck viola-
tion when the defendant was denied a lesser offense instruction under the Alabama
statute later invalidated in Beck. The Court held that the Alabama statute did not
prejudice this defendant because his own evidence at trial-the defendant confessed
his intentional murder to the jury-could not possibly have supported a lesser of-
fense instruction under generally applicable Alabama law. Id. at 608, 611-12. The
Court explained that although Beck stated that a lesser offense preclusion statute
would introduce a level of uncertainty that could not be tolerated in capital cases,
the holding of the case was that the court must permit the jury to consider a ver-
dict of guilt of a lesser-included noncapital offense in every case only if "the evi-
dence would have supported such a verdict." Id. at 610 (quoting Beck, 447 U.S. at
627).
90. Beck, 447 U.S. at 638 n.14.
91. Id. at 638, 642-43. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Hopper,
characterized Beck as an Eighth Amendment decision that was concerned with chan-
nelling jury verdicts in death cases rather than as a due process decision. Hopper,
456 U.S. at 611 ("Our holding in Beck, like our other Eighth Amendment decisions
in the past decade, was concerned with insuring that sentencing discretion in capital
cases is channelled so that arbitrary and capricious results are avoided."); see supra
note 89.
92. Blair, supra note 30, at 464-65 (stating that the due process rationale of Beck
should apply in noncapital cases because the integrity of the jury's fact-finding pro-
cess is involved); Edward G. Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Lesser Includ-
ed Offense Doctrine, 50 ALB. L. REV. 263, 291-92 (1986) (noting that lesser-included
offense instructions perform exactly the same function in capital and noncapital
cases by reducing the risk of erroneous jury verdicts and that there is no reason to
limit the KeeblelBeck analysis to capital cases); Dianne S. McGaan, Note, Beck v.
Alabama: The Right to a Lesser Included Offense Instruction in Capital Cases, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 560, 582-83 (stating that Beck's reasoning concerning a fair fact-finding
process should be applied to noncapital cases).
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In Beck, the Court chose to elevate the lesser offense doctrine
to constitutional status by building upon Keeble's intuitive prem-
ise that a jury cannot be relied upon to follow the court's in-
structions-requiring proof of every element of the charged
greater offense beyond a reasonable doubt-when the evidence
reveals the defendant's commission of a lesser crime upon which
the jury does not have a verdict option.93 The problem in Beck,
however, was that the Alabama legislature removed the jury's
otherwise appropriate lesser offense options in capital cases
while requiring the jury's sentence of death to follow a guilty
verdict.9 This result was a unique and constitutionally faulty
reaction by Alabama to the Court's disapproval of unguided jury
discretion in imposing the death penalty expressed in Furman v.
Georgia." Why the Court did not choose to respond to that is-
sue solely in terms of the narrow context of the Eighth
Amendment's application in capital cases is unclear. In any
event, it would seem inappropriate to extrapolate from the hold-
ing of Beck to another capital case in which the trial court, ap-
plying state lesser offense law of general applicability, found
that a lesser offense option was improper under that law, even
93. In Keeble, Justice Brennan cited no authority for his conclusion that a "third
option" lesser offense results in a more rational jury verdict. Keeble v. United
States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973). It would be difficult empirically to test that hy-
pothesis, which, at its core, expresses a distrust in the jury's ability to follow the
trial court's instructions to acquit if the originally charged offense is not proven to
the jury's satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. Statistical data concerning the
presence or absence of a noncharged lesser offense instruction and verdict option in
a completed prosecution is not readily available. Relevant data could be developed by
an original study of jury verdict forms. Perhaps a statistical correlation would ap-
pear between the number of defendants acquitted of the offense(s) in the indictment
or information when there was a "third option" and the number of defendants con-
victed of such originally charged offenses when there was not a lesser offense option.
Just what conclusions could be drawn from such a correlation would then remain to
be seen.
94. Beck, 447 U.S. at 639-40. The Court rejected Alabama's argument in support
of its capital case statutes, which prohibited any lesser offense instruction and made
a jury sentence of death mandatory-subject to the judge's undisclosed final sentenc-
ing authority-in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Beck, 447
U.S. at 639-43. The Court stated, "[tihus, the Alabama statute makes the guilt de-
termination depend, at least in part, on the jury's feelings as to whether or not the
defendant deserves the death penalty, without giving the jury any standards to
guide its decision on this issue." Id. at 640.
95. 408 U.S. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
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though that ruling left the jury with no options other than to
convict or to acquit on the charged capital offense. Therefore, at
most, the Due Process Clause after Keeble and Beck informs, but
does not solve, the quandary of the conflict between lesser of-
fenses at trial and the statute of limitations, even in capital
cases.
2. Spaziano v. Florida9 6 -Does Due Process Require
Waivability?
The Court's puzzling opinion in Spaziano v. Florida, its first
consideration of the conflict between lesser offense doctrine and
the statute of limitations,97 renews the connection between due
process and lesser offenses that was born in Keeble and applied
in Beck, but Spaziano's result seems to turn away from that
connection's implications.
Spaziano was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-
degree (premeditated) murder of a Florida woman, whose body
96. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
97. The Supreme Court originally refused to grant certiorari to Spaziano after the
Florida Supreme Court upheld his conviction but remanded his death sentence.
Spaziano v. Florida, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981) (denying certiorari). Justices Marshall and
Brennan dissented from the Court's refusal to hear the case not only because they
believed the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, but also because they believed that "[tlhe principles underlying Keeble
and Beck would seem to apply with just as much force where the statute of limita-
tions on the lesser-included offenses has run." Id. at 1039 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun also dissented from the certiorari denial in order to consider the
lesser offense issue. Id. at 1041 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
One year before, the same two Justices had joined Justice Blackmun (who
would later write the opinion for the Court in Spaziano) in dissenting from the
Court's denial of certiorari in a Florida death penalty case, Holloway v. Florida, 449
U.S. 905 (1980). Holloway was sentenced to death after his conviction by a Florida
jury that was not instructed on lesser noncapital offenses because the state statute
of limitations had run on those offenses. Id. at 906; see infra note 108 and accompa-
nying text. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun said:
I am inclined to the view that petitioner retains his right to a lesser-
offense instruction. The Court's decisions in both Keeble and Beck imply
that affording jurors a less drastic alternative may be constitutionally
necessary to enhance or preserve their essential factfinding function.
Whether the trial court properly may enter a judgment of guilt should
the jury convict for a [time-barred] lesser included offense seems to me a
separate, legal matter with which the factfinder need have no concern.
Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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had been disposed of in a garbage dump." The state's primary
witness was a sixteen-year-old boy whom Spaziano had taken to
the dump and shown the bodies of two women whom Spaziano
claimed to have raped, tortured, and murdered.99 The Supreme
Court granted Spaziano's second petition for certiorari,' 0
which raised two issues: (1) whether, under Beck, the conviction
and sentence violated the Constitution because the jury was
precluded by the trial court from considering time-barred, but
otherwise appropriate, noncapital lesser offenses, and (2) wheth-
er the trial judge's override of the jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment, as permitted by Florida law, was unconstitution-
al.'0' Justice Blackmun wrote the Court's opinion affirming
Spaziano's conviction and death sentence, deciding both issues
against the appellant. The Court was unanimous on the statute
of limitations/lesser offense issue, with Justice White, joined by
then-Justice Rehnquist, expressing a significant qualifica-
tion.0
2
A point of particular interest is that the trial judge told
Spaziano at the close of the evidence that he would instruct the
jury on four noncapital lesser homicide offenses if Spaziano
would waive the statute of limitations as to those offenses.0 3
98. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Spaziano (No. 83-5596) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
99. Id. at 2.
100. See supra note 97 (discussing the earlier denied petition).
101. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 98, at i. At the time of the murder, the Florida
statute of limitations for all noncapital offenses was two years, with no limitations
period for capital offenses. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.465 (West 1973). Later, the statute
was changed to eliminate the limitations period for life felonies and to extend the
period for other felonies. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
Spaziano was indicted two years and one month after the murder. Spaziano, 468
U.S. at 450 & n.1.
102. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467 (White, J., concurring). In Spaziano, Justice
Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. He accepted the majority's view of
the statute of limitations issue without comment, but dissented on the constitution-
ality of the jury override. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan joined in Justice Stevens's opinion. Id. Previously, Justice Brennan
had written a concurring opinion in Beck and had joined both Justice Marshall's
dissent to the original denial of certiorari in Spaziano and Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent to the denial of certiorari in Holloway. Justice'lMarshall, who had dissented
from the first denial of certiorari in Spaziano, and had joined Justice Blacknun's
dissent to the denial of certiorari in Holloway, also joined Justice Stevens's opinion.
Id.; see supra note 97.
103. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 450. Florida law at the time of the 1976 trial required
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Spaziano refused to do so.1"4 Accordingly, the judge instructed
the jury only on capital premeditated murder. 5 In the Su-
preme Court of Florida, Spaziano argued that Beck required the
reversal of his conviction and sentence because the jury was not
given the option of a noncapital lesser offense verdict. 6 The
court rejected his argument, stating:
The Beck v. Alabama decision did not involve lesser included
offenses for which the statute of limitations had run ....
Whatever the implications of Beck v. Alabama may be, we do
not find it requires the jury to determine the guilt or inno-
cence of lesser included offenses for which the defendant
could not be convicted and adjudicated guilty."°7
The Florida court thus clearly grounded its holding on state
law that required the statute of limitations to act as a bar to
conviction on time-barred lesser offenses and that precluded a
that the jury be instructed on all noncapital lesser-included offenses even if there
was no evidence to support a conviction for those offenses. Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 98, at 8 n.2 (citing Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968)). This rule was
the type that the Court prohibited in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); see
supra note 80. Petitioner also argued that the evidence at trial did, in fact, support
an instruction on the lesser offenses (noncapital attempted first-degree murder, sec-
ond- and third-degree murder, and manslaughter) because doubt remained about
whether petitioner had premeditated the murder, even if the state proved that he
did the killing. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 98, at 7-15. The state disputed this
conclusion in its brief. Brief of Respondent on the Merits at 6-23, Spaziano (No. 83-
5596) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
104. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 450. The State's brief suggests that Spaziano refused
the lesser offense options because he desired an all-or-nothing verdict. Respondent's
Brief, supra note 103, at 13. In a colloquy with the trial court, Spaziano concluded,
"I understand what I'm waiving [the option of the lesser noncapital offenses]. I was
brought here on first-degree [capital] murder, and I figure if rm guilty of this, I
should be killed." Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457 n.6.
105. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 450; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 98, at 9 n.4 ("There
are only two verdict alternatives in this case. The alternatives are, not guilty, or, in
the alternative, guilty of murder in the first degree as set out in the indictment.").
106. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 452-53. Spaziano made this argument in his first appeal
to the Florida Supreme Court. The appeal resulted in a remand for a rehearing on
the sentence because the defendant did not have access to confidential information
in the presentence report relied on by the trial court. Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d
1119, 1122-23 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981). The court decided against
Spaziano on the statute of limitations issue, id. at 1122, and both Justices Marshall
and Brennan thought that the decision should be granted review, Spaziano, 454 U.S.
1037 (denying certiorari); see supra note 97.
107. Spaziano, 393 So. 2d at 1122.
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jury instruction on those offenses. The court did not even consid-
er the trial judge's waiver option. The significant question that
arises, therefore, is whether the Supreme Court of the United
States, in affirming Spaziano's conviction, accepted the jurisdic-
tional argument of the Florida Supreme Court or affirmed only
because the trial judge-apparently in contravention of Florida
lawl--gave Spaziano the option to waive the statute of limi-
tations and receive a lesser offense instruction."9 The implica-
tions of the question are important. If Spaziano stands for the
proposition that the Constitution.. requires a trial judge in a
capital case to give the defendant the choice between the statute
of limitations and an otherwise appropriate lesser offense in-
struction, even if state law bars judgment on the time-barred
offense, then Spaziano would elevate the lesser offense dictum of
Keeble (through Beck) to a constitutional level, overriding a
state's law of limitations in capital cases and perhaps in
noncapital cases as well.
Several commentators have read Spaziano to hold that it is
not error for a state trial court to refuse a time-barred lesser
noncapital offense instruction if the capital case defendant is
given the option to waive the statute of limitations but rejects
it.' However, given the language of Justice Blackmun's opin-
108. The Florida Supreme Court did not state that the statute of limitations was a
waivable defense in Florida until 1984. Tucker v. State, 459 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla.
1984). In Tucker, the court nonetheless refused to find such a waiver merely because
the defendant had requested a lesser offense instruction. Id. The court stated that a
waiver of the statute is valid only if the record reflects that the waiver was "know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily made" for the defendant's benefit after consulta-
tion with counsel and did not handicap the defense or contravene any public policy
reasons for the statute. Id.
109. Although certiorari was denied from the first Spaziano decision, 454 U.S. 1037
(denying certiorari), the Supreme Court did grant review of the second decision, 464
U.S. 1038 (1984) (granting certiorari). The affirmance by the Supreme Court would
thus seem to support the quoted position from the Florida Supreme Court's first
Spaziano opinion.
110. The Court consistently refers to what Beck "requires," rather than discussing
specific constitutional rights. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455-56.
111. See, e.g., 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 202(a) n.2 (Supp.
1995) ("The Supreme Court has held that a trial court need not present the issue of
such a [time-barred] lesser included offense to the jury unless the defendant has
waived the statute of limitations barring his prosecution for the lesser offense.");
Jodi L. Short &.Mark D. Spoto, Project, Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal
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ion,"' the concurring opinion of Justice White,"' and the pro-
cedural posture of the case as described above, a reading of the
case that focuses on the waiver option as essential to the Court's
decision appears to be incorrect.
Because Spaziano did not accept the trial court's offer of a
waiver option, which, under the Florida Supreme Court's posi-
tion, would have been irrelevant because waiver of the statute of
limitations was not possible under state law, the question still
remains as to what, if anything, the Constitution would require
if a defendant offers to waive the statute in order to receive an
instruction on a time-barred lesser offense, but the trial court
refuses to give that instruction because state law does not per-
mit conviction or judgment on the time-barred offense. In other
words, should Spaziano be read as holding only that the Consti-
tution does not require a state court to ignore its state law of
limitations and instruct on lesser offenses for which there can-
not be a conviction? Under such a reading, which reflects the
position of the Florida Supreme Court, the precise issue is the
effect of the statute of limitations upon a time-barred lesser
offense under state law, not the trial court's or the defendant's
offer of a waiver option at trial. In this light, consider these
words of Justice Blackmun:
Petitioner would have us divorce the Beck rule from the rea-
soning on which it was based. The element the Court in Beck
found essential to a fair trial was not simply a lesser in-
cluded offense instruction in the abstract, but the enhanced
rationality and reliability the existence of the instruction
introduced, into the jury's deliberations. Where no lesser in-
cluded offense exists, a lesser included offense instruction
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO.
L.J. 597, 1219 n.2370 (1994) ("The Supreme Court has held that a defendant is not
entitled to have the jury instructed about a lesser included offense for which the
statute of limitations has expired, unless she chooses to waive her statute of limita-
tions defense."); Thomas, supra note 29, at 696 ("In Spaziano v Florida, [sic] it was
held that in capital cases, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to waive the stat-
ute of limitations for lesser-included noncapital offenses so that the jury may be in-
structed on such offenses.") (citation omitted).
112. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 449; see infra note 114 and accompanying text.
113. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467 (White, J., concurring); see infra note 118 and ac-
companying text.
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detracts from, rather than enhances, the rationality of the
process. Beck does not require that result.
... Requiring that the jury be instructed on lesser includ-
ed offenses for which the defendant may not be convicted,
however, would simply introduce another type of distortion
into the factfinding process.
... Beck does not require that the jury be tricked into
believing that it has a choice of crimes for which to find the
defendant guilty, if in reality there is no choice.114
This reasoning is all the Supreme Court in Spaziano needed
to resolve the issue on appeal, and it was all that the Florida
Supreme Court did hold. Such a position permits the state's
view of the statute of limitations-in effect, whether the statute
is jurisdictional in nature or, instead, a waivable defense-to
determine the outcome, and limits Beck to the unique situation
in which a statute precludes an otherwise appropriate lesser
offense instruction only in a capital prosecution." Justice
Blackmun, however, did not choose to stop at this dispositive
point. He went on to ask, if "the jury is not to be tricked,"
whether Beck then required a lesser offense instruction, with the
defendant being forced to waive the statute of limitations, or, al-
ternatively, if the defendant should be given a choice whether to
have the benefit of either the statute or the instruction, but not
both."6 Justice Blackmun then expressed the Court's prefer-
ence for giving the defendant the choice."
In their concurring opinions, Justices White and Rehnquist
refused to join this portion of the majority opinion, labeling it
dictum."' Common sense supports their limited view of the
114. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455-56.
115. The holding of Spaziano is thus that under the Constitution, a state trial
judge in a capital case need not instruct the jury on a lesser offense that is other-
wise appropriate, but for which the conviction would be time-barred under state law.
See State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 646 (Vt. 1994) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("The
Court held [in Spaziano], in factual circumstances similar to this case, that the due
process clause does not require that a lesser-included-offense instruction be given if
the lesser-included crime is time-barred.").
116. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 456.
117. Id.
118. I join the Court's opinion and judgment except for the dictum on page
456 of the opinion indicating that Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980),
requires a state court in the trial of a capital case to permit the defen-
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case, for a broader reading must be premised on the question-
able proposition that there existed either an established view of
the state statute of limitations that permitted waiver of the
defense and conviction for a time-barred offense or a federal
constitutional imperative for the same view. It is also apparent
that Spaziano was given a Hobson's choice rather than a fair
and meaningful option. In order to potentially save his life
through the "third option" instruction so valued by the Court,
Spaziano had to give up his state law substantive right not to be
convicted of offenses for which the prosecutor could not have
charged him originally because the statute of limitations had
run on those offenses.
3. Schad v. Arizona'1 -- The Single Noncapital Option
The fact that Beck and Spaziano have limited application,
even within the context of capital cases, became even clearer in
Schad v. Arizona. In Schad, the defendant was found with a
murder victim's car and personal possessions.2 6 At his trial for
first-degree capital murder, which encompassed both premed-
itated and felony murder under the Arizona statute,' Schad,
claiming he was only a thief, not a murderer, requested a lesser
offense instruction for robbery.'" The trial judge refused, but
did give an instruction on the lesser noncapital offense of sec-
ond-degree murder." The jury found Schad guilty of first-de-
gree murder, and the court sentenced him to death.'24 In a
five-to-four decision on the issue,' the Supreme Court upheld
dant to waive the statute of limitations and to give a lesser-included-of-
fense instruction as to an offense that would otherwise be barred.
Id. at 467 (White, J., concurring).
119. 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
120. Id. at 628.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 629.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court and delivered its opinion
on the lesser offense issue. On that issue, he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. at 645-48. Justice White wrote a
dissenting opinion, which included the lesser offense issue, which Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. at 652, 660-62 (White, J., dissenting).
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the Arizona Supreme Court's decision that Beck did not require
the robbery instruction." Speaking for the majority, Justice
Souter rejected the argument that the Constitution required
that the jury in a capital case be instructed on every lesser
noncapital offense supported by the evidence.' Looking to
both Beck and Spaziano, he stated that the Court's goal was "to
eliminate the distortion of the factfinding process that is created
when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing choice between
capital murder and innocence. "' The noncapital second-degree
murder instruction operated to alleviate the due process concern
about jury irrationality and to validate the jury's capital murder
verdict.
After Beck, Spaziano, and Schad, the Constitution would thus
appear to require a state court to provide a lesser offense option
to the charged offense only if the charged offense is punishable
by death and, even within the class of capital offenses, only if
state law prevents the jury from considering lesser offense op-
tions in that special class of cases alone, or only if the jury is not
presented with at least one other possible alternative noncapital
verdict supported by the evidence. If, however, the statute of
limitations generally operates to prevent such a verdict under
state law, Spaziano does not appear to constitutionally mandate
a state to provide a waiver option, even in capital cases. Finally,
the Supreme Court's decisions in capital cases involving lesser
offenses certainly do not require, or even convincingly presage,
extending Keeble's due process dictum to the trial of noncapital
cases in either federal or state courts.'30 The solution to the
126. Id. at 647-48. The Court also upheld the Arizona court's decision that the
trial court did not err by failing to require the jury to specify, or to unanimously
agree upon, which theory of first-degree murder permitted by the
statute-premeditated killing or felony murder-underlay its guilty verdict. This
decision was announced in an opinion by Justice Souter that only three others
joined. Id. at 627 (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 646-48.
128. Id. at 646-47 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455 (1984), and cit-
ing Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 609 (1982)); see supra note 89.
129. Id. at 647-48 (stating that the contention that the reliability of the verdict
was diminished by the refusal to grant the robbery instruction is based upon the
irrational assumption that the jury would choose capital murder over second-degree
murder if it were unconvinced that the petitioner was guilty of either).
130. In Gilmore v, Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993), the petitioner was charged and
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conflict between the statute of limitations and an otherwise ap-
propriate lesser offense thus remains to be discovered outside of
the United States Constitution.
F. The Conflict Illustrated in the Federal Circuits and the States
In the context of a federal statutory decision, Keeble stated the
basic logic for elevating a lesser offense instruction to an essen-
tial ingredient of a rational jury verdict,'3' but provided no em-
pirical evidence or other support for that reasoning.'32 In the
special situation of the death penalty, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to find that same logic to be a matter of constitutional
imperative, at least to the extent of prohibiting a lesser offense
preclusion statute.13 When, however, at least one additional
noncapital verdict option for the jury existed other than acquit-
tal or conviction of the capital offense,1 4 or when a state stat-
convicted of noncapital murder. In the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, he had
argued successfully that the Illinois pattern jury instructions deprived him of due
process by allowing the jury to find him guilty of murder without deciding whether
the elements of the lesser offense of passion-provoked manslaughter were met. Id. at
2114. His habeas corpus case was limited to the question of whether the decision
that favored his due process claim in Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.
1990), was based on "new" constitutional doctrine under the rule of Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989). Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2116. In the course of reversing the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court stated:
Outside of the capital context, we have never said that the possibility of
a jury misapplying state law gives rise to federal constitutional error. To
the contrary, we have held that instructions that contain errors of state
law may not form the basis for federal habeas relief.
I . . n this case, . . . petitioner argues that the challenged instruc-
tions prevented the jury from considering evidence of his affirmative de-
fense. But in a noncapital case such as this there is no counterpart to
the Eighth Amendment's doctrine of "constitutionally relevant evidence" in
capital cases.
Id. at 2117-18 (citation omitted).
131. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973) (stating that when the
prosecution has not established every element of the charged offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and there is evidence that the defendant committed some lesser of-
fense, if a verdict option is not given for that offense, a defendant should not be
exposed to the substantial risk that the jury will not perform according to theory
and acquit); see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 93.
133. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
134. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
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ute of limitations barred conviction of the applicable noncapital
lesser offenses," then the enhanced jury rationality provided
by the lesser offense option either was not necessary"' or did
not exist.
37
The law's development away from constitutional restraint has
left the conflict between lesser offenses and statutes of limita-
tions unresolved for both federal and state appellate courts. Al-
though United States v. Wild'1t  and its progeny have all but
destroyed the jurisdictional label of the statute of limitations in
the federal circuits and weakened the hold of that concept in
several state courts as well-often through a switch to the re-
placement label of a waivable "affirmative defense"' 39-this
change in the traditional view of the statute of limitations still
leaves significant issues that arise from the concept of waiv-
er.'4° Perhaps the most important of these issues is whether a
135. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); supra notes 114-18 and accompa-
nying text (reciting the argument in support of this reading of Spaziano). Some com-
mentators read the case more broadly, finding the Court's opinion to require a state
trial court to give a capital defendant, otherwise entitled to a time-barred lesser of-
fense instruction, the choice of waiving the statute of limitations regardless of wheth-
er state law treats the statute as waivable or nonwaivable. See supra note 111.
136. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 646-48.
137. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455-56.
138. 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Schledwitz, No. 92-6314, 1993 WL 533559, at *2
(6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1993) (stating that defendant could, and did, agree to waive the
federal statute of limitations), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994); Acevedo-Ramos v.
United States, 961 F.2d 305, 307-08 (1st Cir.) (explaining that the fact that every
circuit court to address the issue has held the statute of limitations to be a
waivable affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar supports a finding that
defendant's waiver of the statute of limitations can be inferred from his guilty plea),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1992); United States v. Arky, 938 F.2d 579, 581-82 (5th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (concluding that at trial on a conspiracy charge, objections
not made concerning failure to prove or to charge jury on overt acts barred by stat-
ute of limitations are waived because statute is an affirmative defense and not juris-
dictional), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1268 (1992); State v. Littlejohn, 508 A.2d 1376,
1381-82 (Conn. 1986) (finding that defendant could plead guilty to time-barred of-
fense because the better view is that the statute of limitations is a waivable affir-
mative defense and not jurisdictional); State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 886-87
(Tenn. 1993) (finding that defendant may make knowing and voluntary waiver of
statute and plead guilty to time-barred offense because statute of limitations is not
jurisdictional).
140. In the appellate courts, the most pervasive of these issues is whether such a
waiver should be inferred from a defendant's entry of a guilty plea to a time-barred
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defendant should be compelled to choose between the statute of
limitations and a lesser offense instruction, even if the necessity
of that choice is not dictated by constitutional doctrine or by the
legal labels of jurisdiction and affirmative defense.
Before proposing a solution to this and other issues involved
in the conflict between the statute of limitations and the lesser
offense doctrine, this exploration of the conflict will conclude
with a discussion of some recent judicial attempts to resolve it.
Since Wild was decided in 1977, only two federal circuits have
reviewed federal convictions that directly involved a conflict be-
tween the statute of limitations and the lesser offense doctrine.
Both of these cases illustrate the federal courts' progression from
the certainty of the jurisdictional solution to the complexity of
waiver.
1. The Conflict in the Federal Circuits
In United States v. DeTar," the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the district court because the judge had refused
to give an otherwise appropriate lesser offense misdemeanor in-
struction"' to a defendant who was indicted and convicted for
felony tax evasion.'43 Because the federal statute of limitations
offense or from a defendant's request for a time-barred lesser offense instruction.
Compare Acevedo-Ramos, 961 F.2d at 309 (concluding that statute of limitations is
deemed waived when defendant pleads guilty, even without express waiver) and
Arky, 938 F.2d at 581-82 (finding that defendant waived affirmative defense of stat-
ute of limitations by not raising objections at trial) and United States v. Karlin, 785
F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that defendant's failure to assert that statute
of limitations barred conviction on charged offense either before or during trial
waived that defense), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987) and Conerly v. State, 607 So.
2d 1153, 1158 (Miss. 1992) (concluding that defendant's guilty plea to an offense
that is time-barred on its face operates to waive the affirmative defense of the stat-
ute of limitations) and State v. Yount, 853 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en
banc) (finding that defendant waived statute of limitations defense to lesser offense
by requesting jury charge and was estopped from attacking conviction on that lesser
offense) with United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating
that although the defendant may agree to waive the statute of limitations, absent
explicit agreement, defendant's waiver of the statute cannot be inferred) and
Pearson, 858 S.W.2d at 886-87 (concluding that defendant's knowing and voluntary
waiver of statute of limitations cannot be inferred from fact of guilty plea alone).
141. 832 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1987).
142. Id. at 1114.
143. Id. at 1112, 1114. Detar was charged with violating 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988).
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had expired for the lesser offense,'" the court of appeals faced
the issue of whether the expired limitations period saved the
conviction because the defendant did not explicitly waive the
statute of limitations at trial and arguably was not entitled to
the requested lesser offense instruction. Following the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Williams,' the DeTar
panel held that by simply requesting the lesser offense instruc-
tion, the defendant had implicitly elected not to rely on the stat-
ute of limitations to bar conviction and judgment on the request-
ed lesser offense and, therefore, the instruction should have
been given.46 The Ninth Circuit refused to follow a 1984 deci-
sion by the Florida Supreme Court that, in direct contrast, af-
firmed the trial court's refusal to give a time-barred lesser of-
fense instruction because the defendant's mere request for the
instruction, without an explicit waiver of the statutory bar, did
not require the instruction to be given.'47
In Williams, the defendant had been indicted in federal court
for first-degree (capital) murder, but was convicted for second-
degree (noncapital) murder, a time-barred lesser offense for
which he had requested an instruction, but for which he had not
explicitly waived the statute of limitations. 4" Relying on Wild,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the
statute of limitations was jurisdictional, entitling him to a rever-
sal of his conviction of the lesser offense, despite his request at
trial.
Both DeTar and Williams are questionable decisions. In hold-
ing that the defendant waived the statute of limitations, Wild
certainly supports the nonjurisdictional approach to the conflict
between the statute of limitations and an otherwise appropriate
DeTar, 832 F.2d at 1112.
144. Id. at 1114. The six-year limitations period was the same for both offenses
(violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and § 7203), but the conduct of the latter of-
fense-failure to pay tax when due-was outside of the period, while the conduct for
evasion was still within the period. Id.
145. 684 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983).
146. DeTar, 832 F.2d at 1115.
147. Id. The court of appeals refused to follow Tucker v. State, 459 So. 2d 306, 309
(Fla. 1984). DeTar, 832 F.2d at 1115.
148. Williams, 684 F.2d at 297, 299.
149. Id. at 299-300.
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lesser offense, but Wild does not support the conclusion that a
defendant in any statute of limitations context-whether in pre-
indictment negotiations, post-indictment plea bargaining, or
during trial through the request for a lesser offense instruc-
tion-should ever be found to have waived the statute of limita-
tions without an explicit, knowing, and voluntary waiver." ° In
addition, Williams may have a deeper flaw in its reliance on
Wild's finding of waiver of the statute of limitations. Wild con-
cerned the waiver of the statutory bar to indictment itself and,
sub silentio, to conviction and judgment on the charges con-
tained in that indictment.'"' The case did not concern the
defendant's entitlement to a jury instruction about a lesser of-
fense. In contrast to the issue in Wild, which was the validity of
an initial criminal charge in conflict with the statute of limita-
tions, the right to a jury instruction on a lesser offense at trial is
not necessarily intertwined with the possibility of a guilty ver-
dict on the time-barred offense or the entry of judgment on that
verdict by the court.
2. The Conflict in the States
Should a defendant be able to obtain the opportunity for a
rational verdict represented by a lesser offense instruction only
by waiving, either explicitly or implicitly, the right not to be
convicted or sentenced on the time-barred lesser offense? More-
over, even if waiver is found to be irrelevant because of a court's
adherence to the jurisdictional view of the statute of limitations,
does this mean that the defendant should be deprived of a time-
barred lesser offense instruction, or that the instruction still
may be given, but no conviction or judgment may be entered on
the time-barred offense? Three state high courts that have re-
cently considered directly the conflict between the limitations
statute and lesser offenses at trial have taken an approach de-
cidedly different from the waiver-based analysis of the Ninth
150. Cf. United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 425 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that the de-
fendant validly waived the statute of limitations for his own benefit after consulta-
tion with counsel and with a full appreciation of the legal significance of the waiv-
er), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
151. Id. at 421.
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Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and several states.
The facts of the New Jersey (noncapital) murder trial in State
v. Short'52 were set out in the Introduction to this Article.
153
In that case, apparently struggling with the conflict between an
appropriate lesser offense instruction on manslaughter offenses
and the expired five-year statute of limitations on those offens-
es, 5 the trial court instructed on the lesser offenses but, over
defendant's objection, told the jury that if it found Short guilty
of manslaughter, he would be acquitted by the court because the
statute of limitations had run.' The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed Short's murder conviction' 5 because "blurors
who believe that a defendant has killed his wife are hardly like-
ly to return a verdict of manslaughter knowing that defendant
will go free if they do." 15 7 The court then held that "[tihe [trial]
152. 618 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1993).
153. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text.
154. In 1988, after the statute of limitations had ran on manslaughter offenses
arising from the homicide of Mrs. Short, the New Jersey legislature amended the
state criminal code to remove all time limitations for manslaughter. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:1-6 (West Supp. 1994); Short, 618 A.2d at 321.
155. Short, 618 A.2d at 318, 320. The New Jersey Supreme Court's characterization
of the instruction may not be entirely accurate. Neither the majority nor the dissent-
ing opinions actually quote the instruction. The trial judge said, in pertinent part:
"The defendant cannot be found guilty of lesser included offenses such as man-
slaughter, aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter because the Statute of
Limitations has rum with respect to those offenses" Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 7, at
7 (quoting jury instruction from trial transcript). However, the trial judge continued:
The law says that a homicide which would otherwise be murder is man-
slaughter when the killing is committed in the heat of passion resulting
from a reasonable provocation.
... Now accordingly because of the Statute of Limitations if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant purposely or knowing-
ly caused the death of Candice Short or that he purposely or knowingly
caused serious bodily injury to her which resulted in death, but you have
a reasonable doubt as to whether he did so in the heat of passion upon
a reasonable provocation, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Defendant's Brief, supra note 5, at 27-28 (quoting jury instructions) (citations
omitted).
156. Short, 618 A.2d at 324. Three of the seven justices concurred in part and
dissented in part. Their position was that a defendant must waive the statute of
limitations defense in order to have the jury consider the option of a verdict on the
time-barred lesser offense. Id. at 326 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
157. Id. at 322. Although neither the opinions of the court nor the parties' briefs
ever explicitly state the fact, the jury apparently was given a verdict option, as well
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court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included of-
fenses without telling it that the statute of limitations had run
or that defendant would go free if the jury convicted him of
those offenses and acquitted him of murder."'58
Did the appellate court mean that if the trial court had cor-
rectly instructed the jury (i.e., not mentioned the statute of limi-
tations when it instructed on the lesser manslaughter offenses)
and if the jury then had found Short guilty of manslaughter
rather than murder, the trial court could have entered judgment
and sentenced Short on the time-barred lesser offense? Surely
not. The court never discussed whether Short waived the statute
of limitations by requesting the lesser offense instruction and, in
fact, strongly implied that such a waiver would not be permissi-
ble under New Jersey law.'59
Explicitly rejecting what it saw as contrary precedent in
Spaziano, and accusing the United States Supreme Court of
overlooking "the fundamental injustice entailed in forcing a de-
fendant to choose between two critical substantive rights,"'6
the New Jersey court concluded that
[a] defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be conditioned on
his or her giving up a vested right to a statute of limitations
defense, and a defendant's vested right to a statute of limita-
tions cannot be conditioned on his or her giving up the right
to a fair trial.161
Dismissing the dissent's argument that its rule would lead to a
trick on the jury'62 -a result disparaged in Spaziano-the
court stated that the jury's duty is to determine criminal culpa-
as an instruction, on manslaughter. See id. at 320 (stating that the trial court in-
structed the jury that any verdict of guilt it returned on the manslaughter charges
would not result in a conviction); id. at 324 (concluding that the jury should not
have been told of the sentencing implications for the verdicts available to it).
158. Id. at 322.
159. Id. at 320-21 (stating that the statute of limitations is tantamount to an abso-
lute bar to prosecution and that the court was unable to conclude that the legisla-
ture intended to weaken that bar with respect to unindicted lesser-included offenses).
160. Id. at 323.
161. Id. (citing Tucker v. Florida, 459 So. 2d 306, 312 (Fla. 1984) (Boyd, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Muentner, 406 N.W.2d 415 (Wis.
1987)).
162. Id. at 323-24.
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bility, not ultimate punishment. 6 3 Although the trial court
could not enter judgment on the time-barred lesser offense,
Short had a right to the option of a jury verdict on that offense
under New Jersey law.' Short could not be forced to make a
choice, and the jury could not be told of the consequence of the
time-barred verdict that resulted because the statute of limita-
tions had run on the lesser offenses that were otherwise avail-
able under state law.6 ' John Short could have his cake and
eat it too:
We conclude that defendant was entitled to instructions on
lesser included offenses, that the jury should not have been
told of the sentencing implications for the verdicts available
to it, and that defendant was entitled to the benefit of the
running of the statute of limitations for the lesser included
offenses."
The court in Short relied heavily on State v. Muentner.67 In
that case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Muentner's
request for an instruction on a time-barred lesser offense, for
which he was then convicted,' did not empower the trial
court to enter judgment on that offense.'69 Muentner thus be-
163. Id. at 324. The general principle that the jury's proper role in a noncapital
case is "to apply the law as [instructed] regardless of the consequence,' and that
'punishment .. . should not enter [its] consideration or discussion" was central to
the Supreme Court's decision in Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2423
(1994) (quoting the district court's instruction to the jury) (first alteration in origi-
nal). In Shannon, the Court held that a federal district court is not required to in-
struct the jury regarding the consequences of a "not guilty by reason of insanity"
verdict under federal statutory law. Id. at 2428.
164. Short, 618 A.2d at 324.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 406 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. 1987).
168. Id. at 418. The defendant, a bank president, was charged with two felony
counts of falsifying entries with intent to deceive bank examiners and for the felony
of receiving a kickback for making a loan. Id. at 417. Over the state's objection, he
requested and received an appropriate lesser misdemeanor offense instruction for the
false entry counts. Id. The jury acquitted the defendant of both felonies and convict-
ed him on two counts of the lesser-included misdemeanor. Id. at 418. The statute of
limitations in Wisconsin was six years for the felonies charged and three years for
the lesser misdemeanor. Id. at 417.
169. Id. at 423. A single justice dissented, stating that the court had sanctioned a
"loophole" that permitted a defendant to request a time-barred lesser offense instiuc-
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came a free man, having been acquitted on the charged felony
counts and convicted instead on the lesser time-barred misde-
meanors for which the trial court could not enter judgment.
At Muentner's trial, the state argued that because the defen-
dant expressly refused to waive the statute of limitations,
17
the instruction should not have been given on the lesser of-
fense.17' Relying on the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in United
States v. Williams, 2 the judge ruled that the request for the
instruction constituted a waiver.73 However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found that not only did a request for a time-
barred, otherwise appropriate lesser offense instruction not
amount to an implicit or constructive waiver,1 74 but that, under
state law, whether or not the defendant made the request, 75
the statute of limitations precluded entry of a judgment on the
time-barred offense.'76 That jurisdictional doctrine did not,
however, prevent the jury from returning a verdict of guilty on
the offense for which the statute had run.1
77
tion while refusing to waive the statute of limitations. This loophole then permitted
the defendant to escape punishment after a guilty verdict on the requested offense
because the jury was not aware that the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 423-24.
170. When asked by the trial court if he would waive the statute of limitations as
a condition of receiving the lesser offense instruction, Muentner stated that he would
not do so. Id. at 419.
171. Id. at 417.
172. 684 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); see supra
notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
173. Muentner, 406 N.W.2d at 418 n.6. Under Wisconsin law, the statute of limita-
tions deprives the court of personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction. See id. at 419.
On appeal, that peculiarity was part of the State's unsuccessful argument that the
statute of limitations can be waived under Wisconsin law. Id. at 418.
174. Id. at 419.
175. Id. at 420 n.8.
176. Id. at 420 (holding that "when the statute of limitations runs on a crime, the
court loses personal jurisdiction over the defendant . . . [and] loses the 'power to
proceed to judgment) (citing State v. Polhlhammer, 245 N.W.2d 478 (Wis. 1977)).
177. Id. The court stated that "although the jury may return a verdict convicting
the defendant of the [time-barred] misdemeanor offenses, when submitted, the court
is precluded from entering a judgment of conviction." Id.
One might argue that Muentner did not hold that the Wisconsin statute of limi-
tations acts as a jurisdictional bar to conviction, even if a defendant were to explicit-
ly elect to waive the statute. This view may arise from the fact that the court dis-
cussed at some length its prior decision in State v. Pohlhammer, 254 N.W.2d 478,
and stated that Pohlhammer "suggests that the statute of limitations defense may
be waived; however this must be an express waiver." Muentner, 406 N.W.2d at 419.
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Because the trial court in this case did, in fact, give the time-
barred instruction requested by the defendant even though the
defendant refused to waive the statute of limitations, the appel-
late court opinion could have ended simply with a holding that
the defendant did not waive the statute of limitations. l" In-
stead, the court proceeded to state that the judgment of convic-
tion must fail because the trial court lacked the power to enter
it.' The high court, however, reached beyond this holding to
state that the statute's barrier to conviction should not be seen
to preclude the trial judge from giving the lesser offense instruc-
tion.30 Having made this critical jump, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin apparently felt it necessary to turn aside the
(nonbinding) concern that the United States Supreme Court
expressed in Spaziano. Although Muentner was based on state
law, its rejection of the Supreme Court's "trick on the jury" ra-
tionale in Spazicno is clear:
We also note that Spaziano's conception that when a stat-
ute of limitations runs on a lesser included offense it thereby
no longer "exists," does not comport with Wisconsin law and
the relationship between the jury and judge in Wisconsin
In addition, however, the court also extensively cited language in Pohlhammer that
strongly indicated that the Wisconsin limitations statute is a jurisdictional bar to the
power of the court. Id. at 419-20 (finding that the court in Pohlhammer held that
the defendant could challenge his guilty plea to a time-barred offense because he did
not explicitly waive the statute of limitations). In any event, the significant point is
that because the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Muentner that the defendant was
entitled to both a lesser offense instruction and a jury verdict option on the time-
barred lesser offense, but that the trial court was powerless to enter judgment on
that verdict, id. at 419-21, 423, a Wisconsin defendant need not waive the statute of
limitations in order to get both an instruction and a time-barred verdict. Therefore,
no defendant in Wisconsin will ever waive the statute because nothing is to be
gained by such a waiver.-
178. Id. at 419 ("We hold that a request for a lesser included offense instruction
does not amount to any 'implicit' or constructive waiver of a statute of limitations
defense.").
179. Id. at 420 (explaining that the effect of the running of the statute of limita-
tions on a crime in Wisconsin is not to prohibit the trial court from instructing the
jury on the elements of the crime, but to prohibit the court from entering a judg-
ment of conviction on the time-barred offense).
180. Id. at 421 ("It may be argued that . . . [s]ince a statute of limitations defense
arguably precludes conviction, a trial court should therefore not instruct on a time-
barred offense. We disagree.").
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
criminal trials. In Wisconsin, the running of a statute of limi-
tations on a particular offense does not mean the offense
ceases to exist. A jury may still find, as a matter of fact, that
a defendant is guilty of the offense. The consequence of the
statute of limitations running on that offense is to preclude
the entering of a judgment of conviction for that offense.
The jury here was not "tricked into believing that it ha[d]
a choice of crimes, for which to find the defendant guilty,"
when, "in reality there [was] no choice." The jury did have a
choice of crimes and did find the defendant guilty. Here, the
jury was given a chance to deliberate and make findings as to
what crime was committed. When the jury returned the
guilty verdicts it had completed its job.'8'
The July 1994 opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court in State
v. Delisle'82 is the most recently reported judicial attempt to
resolve the conflict between the statute of limitations and the
doctrine of lesser offenses at trial. Delisle is factually similar to
Short in many respects and is likewise a classic presentation of
the controversy that is this Article's study.
After a woman was found murdered,183 the police considered
Delisle to be a suspect.' However, the police classified the ho-
micide as unsolved until approximately fourteen years after the
crime, when they developed enough evidence to charge him with
first-degree murder. 85 Although the defendant offered an alibi
and denied the killing, the State's evidence at trial supported
the conclusion that the defendant committed the homicide by
strangulation after an argument with the victim, with whom he
was having a deteriorating love affair.'86 Under Vermont law,
these facts provided sufficient support for a voluntary man-
slaughter (heat of passion) lesser offense instruction.'87 Delisle
requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser offenses of
181. Id. at 423 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984)).
182. 648 A.2d 632 (Vt. 1994).
183. Eight months after her disappearance, Laurie Gonyo's body was found
wrapped in a tarp in a river. Id. at 634.
i84. Id.
185. Id. The charges were brought shortly after the defendant's son, who was only
11 years old at the time of the murder, implicated his father. Id.
186. Id. at 634-35.
187. Id. at 637-38.
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second-degree murder, on which the statute of limitations had
not run, and voluntary manslaughter, on which the statute of
limitations had run three years after the crime.18 The trial
court agreed to charge the jury on the lesser offense of second-
degree murder, but refused to charge the jury on manslaughter
unless the defendant waived the statute of limitations.'89 The
defendant refused, and the jury was not given the option to con-
vict him on the lesser offense. 9 ° On appeal, the defendant
urged that he was entitled to the manslaughter verdict option
without being forced to waive his rights under the statute of
limitations.'91 The defendant argued that the court could not
have entered judgment on that verdict even if it had been re-
turned by the jury.9"
Furthermore, putting a new twist on the classic case, Delisle
had also asked the trial court, in the alternative, to at least in-
struct the jury members on the definition of manslaughter and
to tell them that they must acquit him of the charged offense of
first-degree murder if they found the facts to prove only man-
slaughter.9 ' The defendant argued that the trial court's refus-
al of the alternate request alone was reversible error.'94 The
Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reversed Delisle's second-
degree murder conviction on that basis.'95
After discussing Spaziano, Beck, and Short at some length,
the Vermont court set forth its own solution to the quandary of
the conflict between the statute of limitations and lesser offenses
at trial:
We conclude, therefore, that the rights of defendants and the
integrity of the system would be best maintained by provid-
188. Id. at 637.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. This alternative would not give the jury the option to find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter because the statute of limitations for a manslaughter convic-
tion had expired.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 641 ("In this case, the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's
alternative proposed instruction, which would have informed the jury that defendant
must be acquitted if found guilty of manslaughter.").
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ing defendants with the choice of (1) foregoing an instruction
on the time-barred, lesser-included offense, or (2) obtaining
an instruction informing the jurors that, because the passage
of time precludes prosecution for the lesser offense, they must
acquit the defendant if they conclude that the evidence would
support a conviction of the lesser crime only. We believe that
the latter instruction can be given in a straightforward, un-
derstandable manner aided, if necessary, by the use of inter-
rogatories."'5
The court thus explicitly approved an instruction like that
given by the trial court in Short-'9 -an instruction that the
New Jersey Supreme Court found to be reversible error because
the court informed the jury of the running of the statute of limi-
tations on the lesser offense. 9 ' The Vermont court held that
giving the defendant an option of a time-barred lesser offense
definitional instruction was not dependent upon the defendant's
waiver of the statute of limitations'99 and did not distort the
process by tricking the jury.00 The court explained that the
jury would be told not only of the elements of the lesser of-
fense-actually in the nature of a defense to the greater charged
offense-but they would also be instructed that the statute of
limitations precluded the possibility of its verdict on the lesser
196. Id. at 639-40 (citation omitted). Such a "defensive" use of a time-barred lesser
offense instruction was also approved in Padie v. State, 557 P.2d 1138, 114142
(Alaska 1976) (Padie 1), in which the court found that the jurisdictional nature of
the statute of limitations precluded a conviction on the time-barred lesser offense,
even though the defendant had requested that option. The court in Padie I did not
state whether the expired statute of limitations should be mentioned to the jury
during the course of such an instruction. In a later decision, Padie v. State, 594
P.2d 50 (Alaska 1979) (Padie II), the Alaska Supreme Court cited United States v.
Wild, 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977), in rejecting the
labels of both jurisdiction and affirmative defense, Padie II, 594 P.2d at 56-57. The
court held that the defendant could make a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
statute of limitations for the purpose of entering a bargained-for plea of nolo conten-
dere to the same time-barred lesser offense considered in Padie L Id. Delisle did not
cite either of the Padie opinions.
197. See supra note 155 for the relevant portion of the jury instruction that the
trial judge gave in Short.
198. Delisle, 648 A.2d at 640 ("We note that a similar instruction was explicitly
rejected by a majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Short.").
199. Id.
200. Id.
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offense.2"'
The Vermont Supreme Court did not, however, consider
whether Delisle could have moved beyond a mere defensive in-
struction to a lesser offense verdict and judgment if he had
waived the statute of limitations, as the trial court had demand-
ed.2°2 The Vermont solution, to the extent that it reaches un-
der the facts of the case, thus still falls far short. It permits the
defendant who wishes to have a time-barred but appropriate
lesser offense instruction to receive one, and does so without
forcing the defendant to waive the statute of limitations in order
to receive the instruction. However, the defendant still faces the
formidable obstacle of a jury that is instructed that the statute
of limitations bars conviction on the lesser offense and, thus,
that no verdict option exists for that offense. More importantly,
the defendant apparently does not even have the option of ex-
plicitly waiving the state's statutory barrier to conviction and
judgment on the time-barred lesser offense option.0 3
In sum, there is a confusing whirl of judicial solutions to the
conflict between the statute of limitations and lesser offenses at
trial.0 4 Lacking an applicable constitutional standard, courts
201. Id. at 640-41.
202. Id. at 637. The court did not have to reach this issue because Delisle refused
to waive the statute of limitations in the course of his demand for a time-barred
lesser offense verdict option. Id.
203. Justice Johnson, in his concurring opinion, refused to join the majority's
"flawed compromise" resolution of the statute of limitations issue. Id. at 645. Look-
ing to the text of the Vermont statute and to state precedent, he noted that "in Ver-
mont, the statute of limitations is not simply an affirmative defense that defendant
may waive if he chooses." Id. at 646 (Johnson, J., concurring). Further, Justice John-
pon explained that "essential to the Spaziano analysis is the assumption that the
statute of limitations on crimes is waivable as a matter of state law, whereas in
Vermont, such is not the case." Id. at 647 (citation omitted).
Considering the public policy aspect of the statute, Justice Johnson strongly
disapproved of the court's solution. He opted instead for a rule similar to that of
Short, which permits the jury to be instructed on the time-barred lesser offense
without any mention of the statute of limitations; such a rule also permits a jury
verdict on that lesser offense, but does not permit the court's judgment thereon. Id.
at 647-48.
204. This confusion appears most dramatically when the same court reaches appar-
ently conflicting decisions, without reconciliation, within a short period of time. Com-
pare State v. Sullivan, 541 A.2d 450, 454-55 (R.I. 1988) (holding that defendant's
request for an otherwise proper time-barred lesser offense instruction was correctly
denied by the trial court because no conviction was possible on that offense) with
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have retreated into local precedent, legal labels, and partial an-
swers. On the one hand, some courts view the statute of limita-
tions as jurisdictional, thus precluding any time-barred lesser
offense instruction 5 or, alternatively, precluding only a judg-
ment on a time-barred lesser offense verdict. On the other
hand, other courts see the statute of limitations as an affrma-
tive defense, a label that in turn raises the primary question of
whether the defendant must waive the defense in order to ob-
tain a lesser offense instruction, °7 which also raises the sec-
ondary question of whether such a waiver may be inferred from
the defendant's request.2° Finally, one state high court has
adopted a rule that permits a time-barred lesser offense instruc-
tion only if the jury is informed that the statute of limitations
does not permit its verdict on that instruction,"9 while, in con-
State v. Lambrechts, 585 A.2d 645, 648 (R.I. 1991) (holding that defendant's request
for an instruction on a lesser offense for which he was then convicted acted as an
election not to raise an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations).
205. See, e.g., People v. Ognibene, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(relying on People v. Diedrich, 643 P.2d 971 (Cal. 1982), to explain that defendants
are not entitled to instructions on time-barred lesser offenses even if the statute of
limitations is waived because the statute of limitations is jurisdictional and a court
cannot convict for such an offense); Cane v. State, 560 A.2d 1063, 1065-66 (Del.
1989) (holding that the defendant may not waive the statute of limitations' absolute
jurisdictional bar to prosecution of a time-barred lesser offense); Gurley v. State, 348
N.E.2d 16, 20-21 (Ind. 1976) (ruling that defendant's request for an instruction on
time-barred lesser offenses was properly denied because defendant could not have
been convicted on those offenses).
206. Both Short and Muentner precluded only a judgment on a time-barred offense
verdict. See supra notes 159, 169, 175-77 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., State v. Keithley, 463 N.W.2d 329, 331-32 (Neb. 1990) (holding that
defendant was not entitled to a time-barred lesser offense instruction because he
specifically refused to waive the statute of limitations).
208. Cf. State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Tenn. 1993) (explaining that in the
context of a guilty plea, the better rule is to treat the statute of limitations as
waivable, rather than jurisdictional, but to require that the waiver be knowingly and
voluntarily made). Compare State v. Leisure, 796 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Mo. 1990) (en
banc) (finding that defendant's request for a lesser offense instruction upon which he
was convicted was a sub silentio waiver of the statute of limitations for that offense)
with Eaddy v. State, 638 So. 2d 22, 24-25 (Fla. 1994) (holding that the defendant
met the requirement of knowing and voluntary waiver of the statute of limitations
through counsel's statements on the record at trial and that he was entitled to an
instruction on time-barred lesser offenses).
209. State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 637 (Vt. 1994); see supra notes 196-201 and
accompanying text.
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trast, another high court has found reversible error if the same
information is told to the jury.210 In the face of this variety of
approaches, policy has not been an effective guiding force. Per-
haps this is because both the statute of limitations and the doc-
trine of lesser offenses at trial have divergent defendant-oriented
and public-oriented purposes and, thus, produce confusion on
this level of analysis as well. 1'
No current judicial resolution of the conflict between the stat-
ute of limitations and the lesser offense doctrine seems satisfac-
tory. It does not seem fair to force a defendant who was indicted
for a greater offense to relinquish the protection of the statute of
limitations in order to have the benefit of an appropriate lesser
offense option at trial while other defendants, engaging in the
same offense conduct at the same time, but not charged with a
greater offense, are exonerated by the state. Nor, from another
point of view, does it seem efficient 1  to permit a defendant to
request a lesser offense verdict, which is known to be time-
barred by every participant in the trial process but the jury, and
then to walk away free of conviction or punishment when that
requested verdict is, in fact, returned.
Current statutory solutions also seem unsatisfactory. Courts
have not construed the general provisions in state statutes and
criminal procedure rules that provide for the conviction of defen-
dants for lesser offenses as intending conviction for time-barred
lesser offenses.213 Nonetheless, at least four states-Arkansas,.
Maine, North Dakota, and Utah-have enacted permissive legis-
lation that specifically eliminates the otherwise applicable peri-
od of limitations for lesser offenses at trial. Maine did so as
210. State v. Short, 618 A.2d 316, 324 (N.J. 1993); see supra notes 157-58 and
accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Delisle, 648 A.2d at 640 (commenting on the dual purposes of the
lesser offense doctrine); State v. Muentner, 406 N.W.2d 415, 419 n.7 (Wis. 1987)
(commenting on the dual policies of the statute of limitations).
212. 'Efficient" is used here to mean the most effective use of the costly procedure
of a criminal trial and the optimal promotion of the criminal justice system's overall
goals through the most appropriate adjudicative result.
213. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 225 (1981) (explaining that the rule that
one cannot be convicted of a lesser time-barred offense is not changed by statutes
providing that, on indictment for certain offenses, the accused may be found guilty
of certain lesser offenses).
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follows:
The defense established by this section [the general statute
of limitations] shall not bar a conviction of a crime included
in the crime charged, notwithstanding that the period of limi-
tation has expired for the included crime, if as to the crime
charged the period of limitation has not expired or there is no
such period, and there is evidence which would sustain a con-
viction for the crime charged.1
These straightforward legislative solutions may raise a serious
constitutional issue if they are construed to permit cofnviction of
a time-barred lesser offense when the defendant refuses to waive
the statute of limitations. Well-established constitutional doc-
trine states that a legislative lengthening of a crime's limitations
period is an ex post facto law as to a defendant for whom the
original statute has already expired.215 These permissive legis-
lative provisions arguably fall within the reach of the ex post
facto prohibition. These statutes each apparently invite the state
to make the request for a time-barred lesser offense conviction
option without the acquiescence of the defendant and thereby
avoid the defense of an expired limitations period.216 In con-
214. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 8(7) (West 1964); see also ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-1-109(d) (Michie 1993) (stating the same substantive content with slight textual
variation). Utah's legislature has similarly provided:
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a
lesser offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of
the lesser and included offense against which the statute of limitations
has run shall not be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-305 (1995); see also N). CENT. CODE § 29-04-02 (1991)
(stating that a three-year statute of limitations for felonies other than murder does
not prevent a person prosecuted for murder from being found guilty and punished
for any included offense).
215. See 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 1.6 (1991 & Supp. 1993);
cf. United States v. Taliaferro, 979 F.2d 1399, 1405-06 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the application of an extended statute of limitations period to offenses occurring
prior to the legislative extension, when the prior and shorter statute of limitations
has not run as of the date of the extension, does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause); United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839, 843-44 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); Falter
v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425-26 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 590
(1928).
216. Cf. Blair, supra note 30, at 475 n.186 (arguing that a coerced waiver of a
statute of limitations defense in order to obtain a lesser offense instruction is analo-
246 [Vol. 37:199
1995] THE LIMITATIONS-LESSER OFFENSES CONFLICT
trast to these permissive provisions, a restrictive approach is
taken in a Louisiana statute.217 This provision, which specifi-
cally applies the statute of limitations to lesser offenses at trial,
is ambiguous as to the defendant's right to waive the protection
of the statute.
As a matter of policy, the permissive statutory approach is
undesirable because it permits the state to avoid the defendant's
substantive right under the statute of limitations not to be pun-
ished for a time-barred offense without consent, thereby violat-
ing both the individual and the societal justifications for the
law. 18 The restrictive approach of the Louisiana law is also
undesirable if it precludes the defendant from making an in-
formed waiver of the statute of limitations in order to have the
option of conviction of an otherwise proper time-barred lesser
offense.
A necessary step towards resolution of the conflict between
the statute of limitations and the lesser offense doctrine that
will better accommodate all the competing concerns is to careful-
ly distinguish among the basic procedural concepts of the trial
court's jury instruction, the jury's verdict, and the court's judg-
ment of conviction (and sentence) based upon that verdict. In
addition, the substantive doctrines in conflict must also be con-
sidered because their particular natures and policies must also
play an important role in any meaningful solution.
III. HISTORY, NATURE, AND PURPOSES OF THE DOCTRINES IN
CONFLICT
A. The Criminal Statute of Limitations
Whether the criminal statute of limitations is subject to waiv-
er, or whether it is a legislative limit on the power of the court
that is not subject to waiver by a party, is the central issue in
resolving the conflict between the statute of limitations and the
gous to an ex post facto law). A constitutional challenge to provisions such as these
has yet to be reported.
217. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 574 (West 1981) (MThe time limitations appli-
cable to the offense for which a person is prosecuted apply to a conviction or pun-
ishment for a lesser and included offense.").
218. See infra notes 263, 270-76 and accompanying text.
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lesser offense doctrine.219 Moreover, even if the criminal stat-
ute of limitations is determined to be subject to a defendant's
waiver in a particular jurisdiction, a secondary state or federal
law question remains as to whether a defendant should be
forced to waive the statute's protection in order to obtain the
benefit of a time-barred lesser offense instruction to the jury.
The defendant's ability to waive the criminal statute of limita-
tions is one of the essential components of this Article's proposed
solution to the conflict." ° Whether the statute is waivable
should not depend on ambiguous text21 or precedent unsup-
ported by policy, but" on the history, nature, and purposes of the
limitations statute itself.
219. Although the Court in Spaziano, in its dictum, seemed to assume that a state
defendant can waive the statute, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984), that
issue surely must be a matter of the law of the particular jurisdiction-just like pro-
cedures in criminal trials and substantive definitions of crimes-and not an issue
uniformly resolved by federal constitutional law. See supra notes 114-15 and accom-
panying text.
220. See infra part IV.
221. For example, in his concurring opinion in State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 (Vt.
1994), Justice Johnson found that the state statute of limitations could not be
waived by the defendant because, in part, the statute provided that prosecutions
commenced after the limitations period had run were "void." Id. at 646 (Johnson, J.,
concurring); see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4503 (1982).
Because general criminal statutes of limitations are so common in this country,
see infra note 223, and because the historical continuity of such statutes is so deep,
see infra notes 222, 233, it is difficult to see why slight and inconclusive variations
in formalistic text should be read to imply that the legislature intended for the de-
fendant to be able to waive the statute in one state and not another.
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1. The History and Nature of the Statute
The fact that the federal government 222 and almost every
222. The general criminal statute of limitations governing prosecutions by the fed-
eral government is found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282 (1988). Section 3281 provides:
"An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be found at any time with-
out limitation except for offenses barred by the provisions of law existing on August
4, 1939." Id. § 3281. Section 3282 provides: 'Except as otherwise provided by law,
no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless
the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after
such offense shall have been committed." Id. § 3282.
Both provisions are direct descendants of an enactment of the second session of
the First Congress, approved on April 30, 1790. There, as part of "[a]n Act for the
Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States," the Congress provided:
And be it further enacted, That no person or persons shall be prose-
cuted, tried or punished for treason or other capital offence aforesaid,
wilful murder or forgery excepted, unless the indictment for the same
shall be found by a grand jury within three years next after the treason
or capital offense aforesaid shall be done or committed; nor shall any
person be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offence, not capital, nor
for any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute, unless the indictment
or information for the same shall be found or instituted within two years
from the time of committing the offence, or incurring the fine or forfei-
ture aforesaid: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to
any person or persons fleeing from justice.
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119.
In 1876, the three-year limitations period for capital offenses, willful murder
and forgery excepted, was extended to most federal crimes. Act of Apr. 13, 1876, ch.
56, 19 Stat. 32. In 1939, all capital offenses were removed from the limitations peri-
od. Act of Aug. 4, 1939, ch. 419, 53 Stat. 1198. In 1948, the limitations provisions
for capital offenses (no limitations period) and noncapital offenses (three years) were
first codified in their current sections. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683,
827-28 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3282 (1988)). In 1954, Congress enacted the
current general limitations period of five years for noncapital offenses unless other-
wise excepted. Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1214, § 10(a), 68 Stat. 1142, 1145, amended
by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-299, 75 Stat. 640, 648.
The 1790 criminal statute of limitations, quoted above, governed fines and for-
feitures for violations of penal statutes, as well as criminal offenses. See infra note
234. The statute of limitations that now governs civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures
is found at 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988). The limitations period provided there is also
five years. Id.
As explicitly provided for in the current general federal criminal limitations
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988), Congress has enacted other provisions that pertain
to specific offenses. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3293 (Supp. V 1993) (extending the five-
year statute of limitations to ten years for certain violations involving financial insti-
tutions including, inter alia, false entries, bank fraud, mail and wire fraud, and
criminal violations of RICO). Although several such specific limitations provisions are
placed within Chapter 213 (Limitations) of Title 18 of the United States Code, see 1
CORMAN, supra note 215, § 1.6 n.25, changes may appear elsewhere in the federal
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state2o have statutes of limitations restricting the time period
in which the government may charge a defendant is peculiar. No
jurisdiction has held that criminal statutes of limitations are
mandatory; they are solely a matter of legislative choice. 4 Ac-
criminal code, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (Supp. V 1993) (statute of limitations
that precludes prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse of a
child under age 18 extended until the child reaches age 25), or in other locations in
the federal law where criminal penalties are provided, see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6531
(1988) (limitations period for criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code is
three years, six years for specific offenses listed as exceptions).
Other sections within Chapter 213 of Title 18 provide, inter alia, that no limita-
tions period is applicable to fugitives, 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1988), that the limitations
period is suspended for specified white collar offenses when the United States is at
war, id. § 3287, and that an additional short limitations period is available to per-
mit a renewed indictment or information when the original felony charge has been
judicially dismissed and the statute of limitations has expired, id. §§ 3288, 3289
(Supp. V 1993).
223. The textual approaches and limitations periods of state provisions vary. See 2
ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 202(a) n.1 (Supp. 1995) (listing state criminal statutes
of limitations). South Carolina and Wyoming do not have any such statutes. Id. Ken-
tucky, Maryland, and North Carolina only limit the time period for prosecuting mis-
demeanors. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050 (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-106 (1989 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-1
(1983). Virginia and West Virginia do not limit the prosecution of any traditional
felonies. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-
9 (1992). Mississippi excludes many, but not all, major felonies from limitations.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 (1994).
Arizona's limitations periods begin with the state's actual or due diligence dis-
covery of the offense. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-107 (1989). Nevada also begins the
running of the limitations period with "discovery" of the offense, but only if the
crime is committed "in a secret manner." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.095 (Michie
1992). Both are unlike the usual general statute of limitations that begins to run
with the commission of all the elements of the offense. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
800 (West 1985) (prosecution shall be "commenced within six years after commission
of the offense"); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30-10(2)(b) (Consol. 1986) (criminal prosecu-
tion for any other felony must be commenced within five years "after the commission
thereof).
State statutes of limitations are frequently amended, usually to extend the limi-
tations periods. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-3-5 (1982 & Supp. 1994) (adding offenses
for which there are no limitations periods); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106 (1988 &
Supp. 1994) (extending period for rape and aggravated sodomy). Like the federal
government, see supra note 222, many states have amended their limitations provi-
sions in recent years to lengthen the period for prosecution of abuse offenses against
minors. For examples, see 2 ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 202(a).
224. Commentators have consistently described criminal statutes of limitations as
"not a matter of right but of legislative grace." 1 TORCIA, supra note 28, § 92 &
n.42 (citing cases). Courts and commentators have not suggested that such statutes
are constitutionally required as a matter of due process because they are fundamen-
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cordingly, the time periods in these statutes can be changed at
the will of the legislature or can be eliminated entirely."
Statutes of limitations in this country commonly vary in their
manner of designating covered crimes' and also vary,
sometimes quite dramatically, in the limitations periods they
provide.' Nearly all statutes of limitations exclude limitations
tal to the American system of justice. The Supreme Court has, however, praised
both criminal and civil statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Toussie v. United States,
397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (stating that criminal statutes of limitations are to be
liberally interpreted in favor of repose because they protect individuals and have a
salutary effect on law enforcement); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215-16
(1953) (discussing how the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287,
created an exception to a longstanding congressional "policy of repose" that is "fun-
damental to our society and our criminal law"); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135,
139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored
in the law."); Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 341 (1805) (stating that restricting the
fine and forfeiture penalty provision of the 1790 federal statute of limitations to
criminal prosecutions would be "utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws") (Mar-
shall, C.J.); see also supra note 222 (discussing the development of federal statutes
of limitations).
225. Such statutes may be applied retroactively to lengthen the limitations period
for a committed crime without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause as long as the
time period of the original provision has not yet expired for the particular defendant
for that offense. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
226. For example, before John Short was prosecuted, New Jersey's legislature elim-
inated the limitations period for manslaughter. State v. Short, 618 A.2d 316, 321
(N.J. 1993). The court found the pre-amendment statute prevented Shorefs conviction
and judgment on the time-barred lesser manslaughter offense. Id. ("As it happens,
the Legislature has amended the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice to remove all
time bars for the offenses of aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter. Of course,
no one has suggested that the amendment be applied retroactively to defendant's
case.") (citation omitted).
227. For example, the federal statute has a single general limitations period for all
noncapital offenses. See supra note 222. A single general limitations period is not
typical in state statutes, which commonly differentiate between degrees of offenses,
see, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 29-2901.13 (Baldwin 1993) (providing different peri-
ods for felonies other than murder, for misdemeanors, and for minor misdemeanors),
or provide limitations periods for specific offenses, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 41-
628.26 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (listing specific groups of offenses by section num-
ber and providing different limitations periods for each group, followed by a catch-all
limitations period for offenses not listed).
228. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.24 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) (provid-
ing a ten-year limitation period for kidnapping, extortion, assault with intent to
murder, and conspiracy to murder) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106 (1988 & Supp.
1994) "(providing a general limitations period of two years for all crimes except mur-
der, certain sex offenses, and certain crimes by public employees). The most common
long limitations period for felonies (other than capital offenses, noncapital murder,
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periods for capital offenses and noncapital murder, 9 and
many do not limit the time for prosecution of other major of-
fensesY ° The recent trend in both federal and state statutes of
limitations is the legislative lengthening of the limitations peri-
ods for specific offenses, particularly child abuse offenses and
financial crimes." 1 Criminal statutes of limitations are thus
flexible instruments of legislative policy and often reflect the
social concerns of the particular time and locality.
The current general federal criminal statute of limitations can
be traced directly to an enactment of the First Congress." 2
Most states had statutes of limitations at the beginning of the
Republic, many of those laws having early- or mid-eighteenth-
century colonial ancestryY3 However, how criminal statutes of
abuse offenses against minors, and other selected felony offenses) is six years. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 800 (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62-625:8 (1986 &
Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29-2901.13 (Baldwin 1993). The most common
limitations period for felony offenses in general, however, is three years. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-401 (1986 & Supp. 1994); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720,
para. 5/3-5 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 56-802.3 (West 1994); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 556.036 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-110 (1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 5-29-04-02 (1991).
229. 1 TORCIA, supra note 28, § 92 ("It is commonly provided that a prosecution for
murder or for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment may be com-
menced at any time.") (citations omitted). New Mexico, an exception among the
states, provides for a limitations period of 15 years for all capital and first-degree
felonies. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8 (Michie 1994).
230. 1 TORCIA, supra note 28, § 92; see, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, para.
5/3-5 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (stating that a prosecution for murder, involuntary man-
slaughter, reckless homicide, treason, arson, or forgery may be commenced at any
time); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 (1994) (excluding murder, manslaughter, arson,
burglary, forgery, counterfeiting, robbery, larceny, rape, embezzlement, false pretens-
es, and abuse offenses against children from limitations period).
231. See supra notes 222-23.
232. See supra note 222.
233. For quotations and summaries of statutes of limitations, including criminal
statutes, see J.K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND
SUITS IN EQUITY AND ADMIRALTY (Boston, Little Brown 6th ed. 1876); WILLIAM
BALLANTINE, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (Albany, Packard & Co.
1829); H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN
EQUITY (4th ed. 1916). Some examples of eighteenth-century criminal statutes are
those of New Jersey (1796; capital offenses, except murder, three years, and all
other noncapital offenses, two years), BALLANTINE, supra, at 469-72; New York (1788;
all crimes except murder, three years), id. at 472-79; and Vermont (1797; all crimes
except murder and arson, three years, but theft, robbery, burglary, and forgery, six
years), id. at 515-17. The General Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania enacted
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limitations originated in this country and why they became so
widespread is an interesting historical mysteryY4 Criminal
a statute of limitations in 1684 providing that crimes against the governor for any
hostility toward him or for incitement against him must be prosecuted within six
months of the commission of the offense. Act of Assembly, May 10, 1684, CHARTER
TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 166, 173-74 (1879).
234. In contrast to the British common law, present-day civil law systems on the
European Continent have general criminal statutes of limitations similar to those of
their antecedent Roman-law-based criminal justice codes. See, e.g., Developments in
the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1950) [hereinafter
Developments]; Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Bar-
rier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 631 (1954). To trace the origins of
American criminal statutes of limitations, it is important to acknowledge that the
civil law, as well as the English common law, influenced how criminal procedure
developed in the American colonies. Note, supra, at 631.
The Common Law as it came more and more to be the accepted law of
the Colonies was already strongly influenced by the Natural Law move-
ment [which is a source of Roman Law influences] .... After the Revo-
lution, the work of Story and Kent and the popularity of French and
classical examples, made Roman Law terms and doctrines more familiar
than they were in England.
MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY § 79 (1936).
The fact that another facet of our criminal justice system with strong colonial
roots, the public prosecutor, was also foreign to English common law provides a his-
torical analogy to the criminal statute of limitations. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 20-21 (1958) (observing that in England, until
1879, the Attorney General was the only person who could be described as a public
prosecutor); RADIN, supra, § 135 (stating that criminal trials in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century England were to a large extent conducted by private prosecutors,
as opposed to public ones, although such trials were "pleas of the crown"); MURRAY
L. SCHwARTz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIIINAL JUSTICE 5 (1962) (stating that the origin of the general
purpose public prosecutor in America is a historical mystery); W. Scott Van Alstyne,
Jr., Comment, The District Attorney-A Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125
(discussing the possible Dutch origin of eighteenth-century American colonial public
prosecutors with extensive responsibility for the investigation and trial of general
criminal offenses, a civil law notion never of general significance in England).
Although all criminal offenses were against the "king's peace," 1 SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 44 (Lawyers' Literary
Club 1959) (2d ed. 1898), the notion of private prosecution is not at all strange
when viewed in the context of the history of English criminal law. The injured party
and selected members of the community who were made aware of the wrong (the
inquest and, later, the grand jury) were responsible for bringing charges for common
law wrongs. Prosecution of the offense was left to the injured party or other inter-
ested person and to the court. See 1 SIR JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 4, 419, 422, 427 (London, MacMillan 1883). "In all other
countries the discovery and punishment of crime has been treated as pre-eminently
the affair of the Government . . . . In England it has been left principally to indi-
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statutes of limitations were not a part of the English common
law. 5 Parliament did exercise the power of limitation for
criminal offenses, but very sparingly, and only in a very small
number of crimesY6 Many Americans, who take criminal stat-
viduals who considered themselves to have been wronged. .. ." Id. at 419. In addi-
tion, civil and criminal law were not completely distinct because forfeitures, fines,
and other economic penalties were often involved in common law prosecutions. See 2
JOSEPH CHrrrY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 727-39 (photo. reprint
1978) (London, Valpy 1816) (regarding common law forfeiture); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS,
A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 259-80 (photo. reprint 1978) (Cornhill,
Nutt 1721) (regarding penalties recoverable by information). Parliament thus fre-
quently provided in "penal" statutes that an injured party or a disinterested "com-
mon informer" could benefit by obtaining or sharing in specified penalties by bring-
ing an "information" in the name of the Crown, much as in present day American
qui tam suits. See ISAAC 'ESPINASSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ACTIONS ON PENAL
STATUTES 5-16 (Exeter, N.H., Lamson 1822).
Laws with provisions for both state punishment and private benefit also were
not uncommon in America. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 16, 1 Stat. 112,
116 (making general larceny in places within federal jurisdiction and embezzlement
of United States military property punishable by public whipping not exceeding 39
stripes and fine not exceeding the fourfold value of the property stolen, "the one
moiety to be paid to the owner of the goods, or the United States, as the case may
be, and the other moiety to the informer and prosecutor").
As early as Elizabethan times, actions to recover these types of penalties were
severely limited in time of initiation by act of Parliament. An Act Concerning In-
formers, 1588-89, 31 Eliz. ch. 5 (Eng.). The first federal criminal statute of limita-
tions contained a clause limiting the time for "any fine or forfeiture under any penal
statute." Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119. Thus, the blending of
civil and criminal actions for crimes and the coupling of private interests with that
of the Crown in the enforcement of both penal statutes and common law offenses
might, in part, explain the stunted development of both the public prosecutor and
the criminal statute of limitations in England. The Continental systems, which his-
torically have emphasized the role of the state rather than the injured party in the
investigation and prosecution of crime, however, seem, in these limited respects, to
be more analogous to the American system both today and in the late eighteenth
century.
235. See, e.g., 1 CHITTY, supra note 234, at 160; ROBERT E. ROSS & MAXWELL
TURNER, ARCHBOLD'S PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 55 (1938);
1 TORCIA, supra note 28, § 92; WOOD, supra note 233, § 28. According to one nine-
teenth-century English treatise writer:
With regard to limitations as to time, it is one of the peculiarities of
English law that no general law of prescription in criminal cases exists
amongst us. The maxim of our law has always been "Nullum tempus
occurrit regi," and as a criminal trial is regarded as an action by the
king, it follows that it may be brought at any time. This principle has
been carried to great lengths in many well-known cases.
2 STEPHEN, supra note 234, at 1-2.
236. In the early nineteenth century, Chitty listed only treason (three years), not
254
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utes of limitations for granted, are surprised to learn that today,
unlike civil law countries, England's law is still unreceptive to
criminal limitations statutes. 7
In addition to the mystery of the statutes' origin in the United
States, the puzzling fact remains that many early American
statutes of limitations had, and still do have, very short time
periods during which the crime and its perpetrator must be
discovered and prosecution instituted."8 America, of course,
was much smaller in the eighteenth century, and communities
were more tightly knit. The victim would most likely know the
offender, particularly if a traditional common law offense was
involved. This, however, was not always the case. In the eigh-
teenth century, no professional police force was responsible for
the investigation of crime." In addition, many people lived far
from civilization and were isolated for months at a time. The
fear of invasion and sudden death from an unknown intruder
must have been a stark reality of life in the rural cabin or the
frontier settlement. Many crimes must have gone unsolved or
unprosecuted beyond the limitations periods. Nonetheless, the
first federal criminal statute of limitations had a period of only
two years for most felonies, and several states had similarly
short limitations periods.24°
attending church and sacrament (one year), all penal 'statutes (two years), and two
other miscellaneous statutory offenses. 1 CHITTY, supra note 234, at 160-61.
237. See, e.g., PHILIP S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 191 (12th ed. 1989)
(stating that the most important statutory exceptions are for summary offenses,
which have a six-month limitations period); Note, supra note 234, at 630 n.4 (listing
treason, income tax offenses, perjury, sex crimes against children, and statutory
summary offenses as the exceptions).
The absence of criminal limitations statutes does not preclude an English trial
court from entertaining a defendant's motion that the prosecution should be dis-
missed because the Crown's unexcusable delay in bringing the charge caused preju-
dice in the particular case. See 11(i) LORD IAIMSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE,
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1 786 (4th ed. 1990). Nonetheless, "[t]he jurisdiction
to decline to allow criminal proceedings to continue should be used sparingly." Id.
(citation omitted).
238. See supra notes 222, 228, 233.
239. Police, THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2181 (5th ed. 1993) (stating .that the
colonies maintained constables, surviving today as rural sheriffs, that regular police
forces did not appear in the states until after 1844, and that on the frontier, vigi-
lance committees functioned as police).
240. See supra notes 222, 233. Perhaps such short periods can be explained by the
255
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No such mysteries surround the history and purpose of civil
(noncriminal) statutes of limitations. To understand criminal
limitations statutes, one must briefly consider and contrast their
civil counterparts. 241 Early English limitations statutes, dating
from the thirteenth century, applied only to real property. At
first, such statutes were temporary in nature; their periods
barred claims only for a given number of years from a fixed ref-
erence point, usually an event in a particular sovereign's
life.242 Not until the end of the fifteenth century were those
limitations periods expressed as a given interval between the
accrual of the -claim and the commencement of the action.243
Not until the first quarter of the seventeenth century did the
first significant English statute of limitations of general applica-
tion state definite limitations periods, not only for real actions,
but also for most personal actions in debt, contract, and
torts.244 This statute, An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for
Avoiding of Suits in Law of 1623 (Limitation Act),245 supersed-
American colonists' particular fear of state oppression, which was fanned by experi-
ences with a hostile England. Short limitations periods, however, continued in both
federal and state statutes of limitations well after the Revolution. The American
legislative choice of time for criminal statutes of limitations was more likely original-
ly influenced by the periods in the Continental statutes and by the short periods for
personal injury and qui tam penal actions in England, even though English law did
not provide a general model for criminal statutes of limitations. See supra note 234.
Once those short periods became established in American law, they tended to be-
come fixed.
241. There are several significant treatises on the law of statutes of limitations.
See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 233; BALLANTINE, supra note 233; CORMAN, supra note
215; WOOD, supra note 233. The nineteenth-century works in this group all trace the
history of the English law of limitations in detail, and each contains a valuable
appendix outlining English and American statutory material. Bridging the gap be-
tween Wood and Professor Corman's excellent contemporary study is the frequently
cited 1950 Statute of Limitations study in the Harvard Law Review. See supra note
234. All of these works consider extensively the origin, development, purposes, and
application of statutes of limitations, but none devotes more than a few pages to
criminal statutes. For example, Professor Corman's two-volume work has one five-
page section on criminal statutes of limitations. 1 CORMAN, supra note 215 § 1.6.
Wood's two-volume study has two sections, totalling approximately six pages. 1
WOOD, supra note 233, §§ 13, 28. The Harvard Law Review piece has only scattered
references to criminal limitations. Developments, supra note 234.
242. ANGELL, supra note 233, 12-14; 1 WOOD, supra note 233, § 2.
243. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 233, at 503-05 (giving text of statute); 1 WOOD,
supra note 233, § 2 (citing Limitation of Prescription, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (Eng.)).
244. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 233, 12-21.
245. 21 Jam. 1, ch. 16 (Eng.). For a full text of tlis statute see ANGELL, supra
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ed all others246 and became the (often verbatim) model for stat-
utes of limitations governing civil suits in many of the
colonies. 47 These American versions of the Limitation Act
were often found intact long after the formation of the Repub-
lic.248 With the Limitation Act came many English precedents
interpreting the statute, which were usually followed by Ameri-
can courts.249
At first, statutes limiting the time for bringing civil claims
were resisted and interpreted narrowly by some American courts
because such laws deprived those who failed to pursue their
claims for excusable reasons of their due remedy. The concept of
limitation of civil claims, however, soon gained wide and impas-
sioned acceptance in this country20 Commentators have ex-
plained this acceptance by notions of elemental fairness to the
defendant, 1  natural law, 2  judicial efficiency, 3  and the
note 233, at 505-08. For a textual summary, see 2 WOOD, supra note 233, at 1683-
84. The time periods for these civil actions ranged from one year to six years for
actions regarding personalty, and generally 20 years for actions regarding realty. Id.
Parliament's purpose for this statute apparently was primarily to keep inconsequen-
tial claims from cluttering the King's courts. Developments, supra note 294, at 1178.
In 1589, suits upon penal statutes were limited to short periods of time (one to
three years), depending on whether the actions benefited the informer or the Queen.
An Act Concerning Informers, 1588-89, 31 Eliz., ch.5 (Eng.); see supra note 234.
246. 1 WOOD, supra note 233, § 2.
247. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (stating that most of the Ameri-
can colonies adopted the Limitations Act before the Revolution and that it "has since
been the foundation of nearly all of the like legislation in this country"); see ANGELL,
supra note 233, J 21.
248. ANGELL, supra note 233, 91 21; 1 WOOD, supra note 233, § 2.
249. ANGELL, supra note 233, %9 14-21; 1 WOOD, supra note 233, § 2. Because of
the well-established principle of English law that time did not run against the King,
these statutes did not limit the power of the Crown or American governmental enti-
ties, unless explicitly stated. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 233, %% 34-41; RoSS &
TURNER, supra note 235, at 55; 1 WOOD, supra note 233, §§ 52-52a. Statutes of
limitations had no application to proceedings in equity, in which the judicially creat.
ed doctrine of laches required the court to weigh the reasons for prejudicial delay.
After the merger of law and equity courts, the statute of limitations governed all
civil actions, but laches could still be a defense in an equity-type action before the
statutory period had run. Developments, supra note 234, at 1183-84.
250. ANGELL, supra note 233, %1 23; 1 WOOD, supra note 233, § 4.
251. Largely because of the popularity and continuity of the civil statute of limi-
tations since the Limitations Act of 1623, little legislative debate has arisen about
the statutes' purposes. Developments, supra note 234, at 1185. Commentators have,
of course, had their say about these matters. 1 CORMAN, supra note 215, § 1.1, at
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necessity of stability in a growing commercial societyY4 By the
the close of the nineteenth century, the law clearly held statutes
of limitations in high esteem; the Supreme Court observed:
Statutes of limitations are vital to the welfare of society and
are favored in the law. They are found and approved in all
systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They promote repose
11 ("While the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the general public all
are served by the application of statutes of limitations, the defendant's interests are
defined most often in judicial expression."); 1 WOOD, supra note 233, § 4 ("The un-
derlying purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent the unexpected enforcement
of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard
by want of prosecution."); Developments, supra note 234, at 1185 ("The primary
consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defen-
dant."); see Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIo ST.
L.J. 130 (1955) (discussing the purposes of civil statutes of limitations).
252. JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (Boston, Little
Brown 1856).
It is, for example, a principle of natural justice, that a person who as-
serts against another a right which the latter denies, shall litigate it, if
at all, before the defendant's witnesses are dead, and his documents
wasted by time; yet the precise period within which this must be done,
can only be fixed by a technical rule.
Id.
253. As expressed by Professor Corman:
The general interest of the public also is served by statutes of limita-
tions. Judicial efficiency is the reward when these statutes produce
speedy and fair adjudication of the rights of the parties. Certainty and
finality in the administration of affairs is promoted, and courts are re-
lieved of the burden of trying stale claims when plaintiffs have "slept" on
their rights.
1 CORMAN, supra note 215, § 1.1, at 16 (citations omitted).
254. Developments, supra note 234, at 1185 ("In ordinary private civil litigation,
the public policy of limitations lies in avoiding the disruptive effect that unsettled
claims have on commercial intercourse."). In considering the social purposes implied
in the common statement that statutes of limitations are statutes "of repose," Profes-
sor Callahan stated:
Finally, it is suggested that the "repose" which statutes of limitation are
designed to assure is that of persons other than judges or of defendants
to particular actions .... [It is clear that the interest referred to here is
that of those persons who have dealings with others and, accordingly, are
concerned in the stability of the positions of those with whom they deal.
Without this stability there would be little repose for anyone.
The operation of the social purpose is especially evident in some
instances, such as the transfer of property, but it is difficult to imagine
one to which it does not apply. All business dealings of any kind are apt
to depend on the financial stability of the parties ....
Callahan, supra note 251, at 136.
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by giving security and stability to human affairs. An impor-
tant public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate
activity and punish negligence. 5
Criminal statutes of limitations in the United States fell with-
in the general aura of. approval granted to the limitations stat-
utes that governed civil affairs for many of the same reasons.
Unlike criminal statutes of limitations, civil statutes, even with
their recognized lofty social purposes, were not held to be juris-
dictional restrictions on a court's power. 6 To the contrary, civ-
il limitations statutes consistently have been held to be personal
defenses that extinguish only the plaintiffs remedy, subject to
waiver by the defendant if not appropriately pleaded. 7
The criminal statute of limitations in the United States thus
had a complex history that took from, but also departed from,
the common law. The criminal limitations statute is only partial-
ly similar in form and purpose to its civil counterpart and is
clearly different in its overall place and function in the law. The
history of both statutes provides no substantial argument that
the criminal statute of limitations is a jurisdictional bar to the
power of the trial court.
The nature of the criminal statute of limitations also fails to
support the jurisdictional conclusion. Regardless of the historical
currents that led to the development of our criminal justice sys-
tem,"8 in present-day America, because crimes are seen as of-
fenses against society itself, the state alone prosecutes criminal
perpetrators. 9 The goal of that prosecution is to condemn and
punish publicly an offender who is proven guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt so that both the offender and those who learn of
the prosecution will be deterred from future crimes against soci-
255. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
256. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
257. 1 CORMAN, supra note 215, §§ 3.1-.2; 2 id. § 9.13 ("The statute will be waived
unless it is pleaded, in addition, the statute of limitations defense is merely a proce-
dural bar to recovery, waivable by the parties' express consent or conduct.").
258. See supra note 234.
259. For example, the law punishes unsuccessful attempts to harm because the
mental culpability convincingly demonstrated thereby presents a danger to society
that must be punished in accordance with the goals of the criminal law. JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.04[A] (2d ed. 1995).
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ety and internalize the lessons taught by an efficient criminal
justice system. The offender is punished in a fashion that our
society has legislatively determined is deserved, conferring a
sense of moral closure to the victim, the offender, and society as
a whole.26°
Why should the state be prevented from achieving the law's
significant purposes of social peace and moral balance by a limi-
tations statute that considers only the passage of time, rather
than any of the particular facts and circumstances involved in
the crime and its investigation? Further, why should that time
be measured in years rather than decades for many of our most
serious offenses? Society's criminal justice goals surely go unful-
filled when manslaughters, rapes, robberies, arsons, thefts, and
other crimes go unpunished because the evidence needed to
prosecute is not yet discovered at the moment of the expiration
of the statute of limitations, despite the diligence of the police
and prosecutors.26' Undoubtedly, an offender, at some time and
place, has calmly calculated the statute of limitations' safe-ha-
ven in deciding whether to risk committing a carefully planned
offense. Yet both federal and state legislatures throughout
American history consistently have chosen to limit the reach of
the criminal law in the inflexible manner of the statute of limi-
tations. These statutes both create substantive rights for puta-
tive defendants and express social policy. If the history and the
problematic nature of the statute of limitations do not support
the argument that the statute should be seen as jurisdictional,
perhaps the policy reasons underlying the statute may do so.262
260. For a brief discussion of the theories of punishment, see id. §§ 2.01-.05.
261. The author is not aware of any published data that reports on matters dosed
by law enforcement agencies because the statute of limitations period expired. One
set of statistics indicates that United States Attorneys declined to prosecute 232
cases in 1989 because the, statute of limitations had run. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1989 tbl. 1.3 (May 1992).
262. Criminal statutes of limitations also present factual issues that are not con-
ducive to the adoption of a jurisdictional approach to the statute. Such factual issues
may be presented in two contexts-tolling and the question of when the offense was
completed.
Most criminal statutes of limitations provide that the running of the statute's
time period will be suspended until specified tolling conditions, such as continuous
absence from the jurisdiction, flight, present insanity, or another pending prosecution
in the state, cease to exist. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 202(d). The Model
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2. The Purposes of the Statute
The Supreme Court's rationale for criminal statutes of limita-
Penal Code tolls the running of the statute "during any time when the accused is
continuously absent from the State or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode
or work within the State," but for no longer than three years, or "during any time
when a prosecution against the accused for the same conduct is pending in this
State." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06(6) (1985). The general federal statute of limita-
tions, see supra note 222, tolls if the person is "fleeing from justice." 18 U.S.C. §
3290 (1988).
Because the applicability of a fact-based tolling exception may not be apparent
from the indictment, the Supreme Court held that a demurrer will not lie to a
count of an indictment that appeared, on its face, to be barred by the federal stat-
ute of limitations. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168, 178-79 (1872). Later, the
Court indicated that the federal statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that
must be raised at trial. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135
(1917). Contra State v. Morris, 340 P.2d 447, 449-50 (Idaho 1959) (stating in dicta
that the time period of the statute of limitations presents a "jurisdictional fact," and
that the government must allege a statutory exception in the indictment).
Determining when the statute of limitations began to run is sometimes a dis-
puted factual issue because the time of completion of the criminal offense may be a
disputed matter for the jury to resolve. This issue would not arise, for example, in a
prosecution for perjury, but could arise in a prosecution for a continuing offense such
as conspiracy. 1 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 193, at
708 (2d ed. 1982). Although one may find the criminal statute of limitations to be
jurisdictional as a matter of statutory construction even though factual issues may
arise under the statute, the presence of disputed matters for the jury seems to sup-
port a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 422 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988).
Mhe rule [that the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional] makes
sense in a case of this type, where the defense may be met with a show-
ing by the state that the statute of limitations is tolled for factual rea-
sons. If the defense were jurisdictional, a defendant could raise it for the
first time on appeal .... [The] factual issue would not have been ad-
dressed in the trial court, and this court would be forced to remand for a
determination of the facts.
Id. at 16-17.
Commentators on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure agree that under
Rule 12, the federal statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is thus waived by
the defendant if not raised during or before the trial. See, e.g., 8 ROBERT M. CIPES,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.03[2]" (Feb. 1995) (stating that under Rule 12, the
issue of the statute of limitations is waived by failure to raise it at the proper
time); 1 WRIGHT, supra, § 193 (stating that although Rule 12 itself is silent as to
when defenses such as the statute of limitations must be raised, the "sensible reso-
lution" is that the statute is waived if not raised at trial). A defense based on the
statute of limitations thus may not be raised initially by federal prisoners through
collateral attack. 2 MARK S. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES § 12:86 (2d ed. 1985).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tions involves both the protection of the individual defendant
from a potentially unfair trial and a now perhaps undeserved
punishment, and the protection of society from unprosecuted
offenders, by using the sanction of preclusion to encourage law
enforcement officials to promptly investigate and prosecute
crime.2 3 Any argument that the criminal statute of limitations
is jurisdictional, and thus should not be subject to waiver by a
defendant seeking a time-barred lesser offense instruction or
seeking to plead guilty to a time-barred offense, must be
grounded in the public, rather than the individual, protective
policy of the statute. That public policy must be so strong as to
deprive a defendant of the plea bargain or verdict option that
otherwise would be available to similarly situated defendants,
were it not for the statute of limitations. In other words, before
the personal shield of the criminal statute of limitations becomes
a sword used against the defendant because society has a great-
er need for the limitation doctrine's protection, that need must
be demonstrated.
However, there is no evidence to support that need and a sup-
porting analogy in the criminal justice system does not readily
present itself. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial264
263. As the Court has explained:
Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend
themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become ob-
scured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official
punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit
may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials
promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. For these reasons and
others, we have stated before "the principle that criminal limitations stat-
utes are 'to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.'"
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (citations omitted). These
words are often quoted in whole or in part. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 323 (1971); United States.v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977). Based on congressional intent and the Court's expression
of the purposes of the statute of limitations, Toussie held that failure to register
with the Selective Service was not a continuing offense that prevented the com-
mencement of the running of the federal statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282
(1988). Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122-23.
264. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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certainly protects both society's interest in prompt criminal adju-
dication and the individual defendant's interest,265 yet a defen-
dant may waive that right by not asserting it at the proper
time. 6 Other constitutional rights that protect the defendant,
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial protects a defendant only after
the putative defendant becomes an "accused," Marion, 404 U.S. at 313, either by for-
mal indictment or information or by an arrest leading to formal charge, id. at 320;
see also Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2692 (1992) (same, citing
Marion). Marion contains a lengthy footnote concerning the purposes of the criminal
statute of limitations, which the Court looks to as "the primary guarantee against
bringing overly stale charges." Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 & n.14 (citations omitted).
This footnote relied on language quoted from both the Court's prior civil and crimi-
nal statute of limitations cases. The Court concluded that: "There is no need to
press the Sixth Amendment into service to guard against the mere possibility the
pre-accusation delays will prejudice the defense in a criminal case since statutes of
limitations already perform that function." Id. at 323.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), the Court established four crite-
ria for assessing speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment. In Doggett v.
United States, 20 years later, the Court approved and characterized the Barker for-
mula as follows: "[Wihether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the
government or the defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due
course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered
prejudice as the delay's result." Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2690.
Splitting five to four on the application of the last criterion to the facts of the
case, the majority held that where the government was negligent in apprehending
the defendant for a lengthy period following his indict'ment, the defendant-unaware
of the indictment-was entitled to a presumption of prejudice at trial. Id. at 2694.
265. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519 ("[Tlhere is a societal interest in providing a speedy
trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the rights of the ac-
cused."). In United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1981), the court noted:
Yet statutes of limitations secure rights which run to society as well
as to the accused, and resemble many of the interests guarded by the
Speedy Trial Clause .... Both provisions shield defendants . . . . [T]hey
also afford society protection from unincarcerated offenders . . . as well
as the reduced capacity of the government to prove its case.
Id. at 119. Levine held that an interlocutory appeal does not lie from a denial of
defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss based on the federal statute of limitations. Id.
at 126, 129.
266. Discussing how a defendant's failure to demand his right to a speedy trial fits
within the Court's traditional doctrine of knowing and voluntary waiver of funda-
mental rights (such as the right to plead guilty, to have a jury trial, to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, or to have assistance of counsel), the Court in
Barker stated: "[WMe do not depart from our holdings in other cases concerning the
waiver of fundamental rights, in which we have placed the entire responsibility on
the prosecution to show that the claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily
made." Barker, 407 U.S. at 529; see also United States v. Spaulding, 588 F.2d 669,
670 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a defendant may expressly waive his constitutional
right to a speedy trial if the waiver is knowing and voluntary).
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although not usually seen as having public purposes, also fur-
ther societal interests. For example, both the Fifth Amendment
protection against double jeopardy. 7 and the Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial in the district where the offense was commit-
ted and right to have the assistance of counsel further society's
goals.26 Society gains efficiency by prohibiting costly repeated
prosecutions or additional punishments for the same offense, by
maximizing the deterrent value of the prosecution through pub-
lic trial and sentencing in the community where the social
wrong was done, and by increasing the likelihood of an accurate
result when a defendant is represented by counsel at trial and
sentencing. Although all of these rights have both individual and
public purposes, a defendant may waive them." 9 The social
purposes of the criminal statute of limitations must be evaluated
to determine whether they are so unique and so powerful that
they should be construed inflexibly to bar the jurisdiction of the
court to enter judgment on a time-barred offense, thereby defeat-
ing the defendant's choice to waive the statute's substantive per-
sonal right.
As part of the extensive study and debate that led to the
adoption of the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute
considered the policy reasons for its proposed limitations sec-
tion.27 The Commentary to the limitations section discusses
267. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "[Nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
268. See supra note 264.
269. United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424-25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
916 (1977). Just because there is a capacity to waive a constitutional or statutory
right does not necessarily mean that there is always a corresponding capacity to
defeat the public purpose incorporated in that right. For example, a defendant's
practical ability to waive the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial by failing to
raise that right does not result in the right to insist on a lengthy delay before trial.
Also, the capacity to waive the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not re-
sult in the right to insist on a bench trial. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26
(1965); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) ("Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so
tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the
court and the consent of the government.").
270. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 (1985). Section 1.06 provides for a six-year prose-
cution commencement term for felonies of the first degree (other than murder), three
years for any other felony, two years for misdemeanors, and six months for petty
misdemeanors. Id. § 1.06(1)-(2). Special provisions extend the limitation statute for
offenses involving fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation and for misconduct by pub-
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five justifications for time limits in criminal prosecutions. First,
and foremost, prosecutions should proceed with fresh evidence.
Second, as time increases, the likelihood that the offender has
reformed also increases, and the necessity for punishment di-
minishes (or the likelihood increases that the criminally inclined
will be prosecuted for a more recent offense). Third, after a long
period of time has passed, society's "retributive impulse" is likely
to be replaced by sympathy for a defendant prosecuted for a
long-forgotten offense. Fourth, reduction of the time of possible
prosecution cuts off the ever-present potential for blackmail by
one who is aware of the offense. Finally, criminal limitations
statutes "promote repose by giving security and stability to hu-
man affairs."'
As Professor Robinson points out, the rationale of the Com-
mentary is subject to serious question.72 The criminal trial
process is specifically designed by its rules of evidence, by its
strong commitment to the power of cross examination,273 and,
most importantly, by its requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, to exclude or discredit unreliable evidence.274 When
a defendant chooses to waive the limitations statute to permit a
jury and court to consider an alternative lesser offense or to
plead guilty to a time-barred offense, any argument based upon
protecting the defendant from an unfair result either fades or
disappears. The argument based on the offender's reformation
over time disregards both the general deterrence and retributive
purposes of criminal punishment and, again, would not preclude
a defendant from waiving that policy for his or her own benefit.
lic officers. Id. § 1.06(3). Rules for commencement of the statutory peridd and for
tolling the running of the statute are also provided. Id. § 1.06(4)-(6).
271. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.06 cmt. 1 (1985). The Commen-
tary takes the position, based on case law, that the expiration of the statute of limi-
tations applicable to a lesser-included offense "will act as a bar to a conviction for
the lesser offense" Id. cmt. 2(d).
272. 2 ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 2.02(b).
273. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) ("[Plrobably no one, cer-
tainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-ex-
amination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal
case.").
274. Cf. United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Learned Hand, J.3 (debunking the stale evidence argument in the context of a civil
case).
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Although in some cases a community's impulse for the moral
balance of retribution may weaken with the running of the limi-
tations period, in many others, particularly those involving ho-
micide or lasting physical or psychological damage, no such
weakening occurs. Finally, there is the social stability argument.
In the criminal context, this rationale must be different than
that for civil statutes of limitations.75 In the civil context, the
concern is for stabilizing commercial enterprise and preventing
disruption to the market system that flows from the uncapped
risk of plaintiffs seeking recourse in an untimely fashion.
In support of criminal limitations statutes, there seems to be
some merit to the position that if a long time goes by, the expen-
diture of society's resources in criminal prosecution-in terms of
the costs of the investigation, trial, and (if the burden of proof at
trial is met) punishment-and the costs to the community that
follow from removing a now productive member from its midst
are not warranted. 6 The rebuttal to this argument, however,
is significant. The problem with statutes of limitations in gener-
al, and criminal statutes of limitations in particular, is that they
paint with the broad brush of an inflexible general rule. No
room remains for prosecutorial evaluation of the particular of-
fense or offender or, as in the English system today, for a judi-
cial consideration of a laches-like defense based on the facts of a
particular case.277 Restricted by the Supreme Court's very nar-
row definition of due process in the context of pre-charge
delay,278 the American defendant asserting an untimeliness de-
fense must rely on the statute of limitations, if applicable, or, to
obtain constitutional relief, prove that intentional and improper-
275. See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
276. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 2.02(b).
277. See supra note 237.
278. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977); United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) ("Mhe Due Process Clause . . . would require
dismissal of an indictment if it were shown that delay . . . caused substantial preju-
dice to [the defendant's) rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional
device to gain tactical advantage over the accused."). One recent survey of due pro-
cess cases involving pre-accusation delay does not report a single federal appellate
case in which the defendant was successful. Kathryn M. Keating, Project, Twenty-
Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 597, 908-11 (1994).
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ly motivated delay in either the investigation or initiation of the
prosecution has caused actual prejudice. Perhaps neither the
statutory nor the due process alternative serves the necessary
social purposes as effectively as would a flexible, nonconstitutional
approach that permits the court to weigh the actual prejudice
caused by unjustifiable delay against the reasons for such de-
lay. 9 More importantly, criminal statutes of limitations using
an all-or-nothing approach interfere with the prosecutor's discre-
tion in a way that contradicts the efficient operation of the cur-
rent system. The prosecutor is an executive officer who must
exercise judgment as to whether it is appropriate to proceed
with a particular prosecution or even to continue with a particu-
lar investigation."0 The factors considered in the exercise of
this discretionary decision are myriad and include the serious-
ness of the offense, the personal circumstances of the defendant,
the strength of the available evidence, and the significance of
the prosecution in all its aspects measured against the limited
resources of every prosecutor's office. The time that has passed
since the commission of a particular offense may also be a fac-
tor, as well as the offender's demonstrated rehabilitation and the
victim's call for retribution.2 1
Not only is the time factor significantly removed from the
prosecutor's discretion by the criminal statute of limitations, but
279. The danger of such a course would be excessive judicial interference prior to
the charge in the executive functions of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors.
The inefficiency that such interference creates has made the courts reluctant to un-
dertake judicial review of precharge decisionmaking. See, e.g., Lovasco, 431 U.S. at
790 (stating that a prosecutor's discretionary decision as to timing of the indictment
is not subject to judicial disagreement unless the delay violates "fundamental concep-
tions of justice").
280. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of this discretion and has
refused to interfere with its exercise by federal prosecutors except when an unconsti-
tutional discriminatory effect motivated by a discriminatory purpose is proven. See
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("This broad discretion rests large-
ly on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judi-
cial review.").
281. See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE] (stating that prosecutor should not permit prosecution
in absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction); id. Standard 3-
3.9(b) (stating that prosecutor may, in some circumstances consistent with public in-
terest, decline to prosecute even if there is sufficient evidence to convict).
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the plea bargaining process is decidedly changed as well. The
necessity of plea bargaining in today's criminal justice system is
difficult to deny. 2 If, however, the statute bars lesser offenses
from the charge-bargain dynamic, the prosecutor and the defen-
dant may be forced to a trial that they both wish to avoid. By
default, the defendant may face a greater charge than the prose-
cutor might otherwise believe to be appropriate in the particular
circumstances. The social costs of this result, in terms of ineffi-
ciency, are apparent. Measurable costs, dictated by the statute
of limitations, attach to both a prosecutor's forced decision to
overcharge and to the resultant inappropriate punishment of the
defendant. In law and economic terms, this result artificially
distorts the efficient market decisions of plea bargaining.'
The judicial decision to deny the defendant at trial the option
of waiving the protection of the statute of limitations, which
would permit the jury to consider a verdict on a lesser offense
and the court to enter judgment on such a verdict, involves a
variation of these same costs. The jurisdictional bar may well
prevent the best possible result as determined by the jury in a
particular case-a possibility that, as the next section discusses,
is otherwise acknowledged without exception in this country
through the lesser offense doctrine.
The history, nature, and social purposes of the legislative time
barrier to prosecution thus do not support the conclusion that a
defendant should be precluded from waiving the statute of limi-
tations at trial for his or her own benefit. The trend in the feder-
al and state courts toward permitting the possibility of such a
waiver by disregarding the traditional jurisdictional label is cor-
rect and justifiable. 4 The public purposes of the criminal stat-
ute of limitations do not preclude a defendant's waiver, and they
282. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970) (pointing out the
benefits to both defendants and the state from the guilty pleas that precede over
three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country).
283. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.7 (4th ed.
1992) (discussing how changes in criminal procedure affect economics of plea nego-
tiations); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 289, 289-91, 304-21 (1983) (discussing prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargaining as elements of a well-functioning market system that will yield efficient
results if not defeated by regulation).
284. See 1 CORMAN, supra note 215, § 1.6.
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do not justify rejecting a jury's guilty verdict on a time-barred
offense that has been submitted to them. The social benefits of a
jurisdictional approach to the criminal statute of limitations are,
at best, uncertain in today's criminal justice system.
Legislatures will likely continue to lengthen the periods of
criminal statutes of limitations for particular offenses as the
then current "crime problem" warrants. Perhaps they will
lengthen limitations periods in general or eliminate those peri-
ods entirely for certain serious offenses. It is unlikely, however,
given their long history in this country and the consistently
laudatory description of those provisions in the courts, that
criminal statutes of limitations will be widely repealed. Without
a specific legislative direction, however, a jurisdictional reading
of such statutes that precludes the defendant's choice to waive
the statute or the courts' power to act on that choice is unwar-
ranted.
B. The Doctrine of the Lesser Offense at Trial
1. The History, Nature and Purposes of the Doctrine
The history, nature, and purposes of the doctrine of lesser
offenses at trial must play a significant part in resolving the
conflict between that doctrine and the statute of limitations.
Unlike the criminal statute of limitations, the origin of the less-
er offense doctrine in the United States is not obscure-it was
prominently and deeply imbedded in the common law.' The
285. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 & n.9 (1980) ("At common law the
jury was permitted to find the defendant guilty of any lesser offense necessarily in-
cluded in the offense charged."); Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 799-800 (Md. 1989)
(discussing English cases); 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 301-02 (Savoy, Nutt & Cosling 1736) (listing lesser offenses for which a
defendant could be convicted at common law).
The lesser offense doctrine first developed in the common law as an aid to the
prosecutor who failed to prove an element of the charged offense at trial. Beck, 447
U.S. at 633. Facilitating that practice'were the then common, but now frowned up-
on, special verdicts in criminal cases, which permitted the jury to specify the facts of
the matter, leaving it to the court to enter judgment on the charged or lesser of-
fense. 2 CHIrY, supra note 234, at 636-37, 644-46; 2 HALE, supra, at 302-05; 2
HAWKINS, supra note 234, at 439-40.
Although defendants may have gained some benefit from the application of the
lesser offense doctrine at common law, a large number of felonies, excluding man-
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concept of the lesser offense at trial was predicated upon the fact
that most significant common law criminal offenses were made
up of elements that overlapped other offenses-for example,
murder and manslaughter, robbery and larceny, rape and as-
sault. 8 The evidence at trial might fail to convince a jury of
one or more of the elements necessary for conviction of the
charged offense, yet successfully prove a completely included
"lessee' offense not alleged in the indictmentY
slaughter, were punishable by death. RADIN, supra note 234, § 140; 2 STEPHEN,
supra note 234, at 212, 219; 3 id. at 78-79. Defendants on trial for felonies could
not be convicted of misdemeanors because to do so would unfairly deprive them of
the unique privileges of a misdemeanor trial, such as the assistance of counsel. 2
CHITTY, supra note 234, at 639. In a 1918 text, an American commentator spoke of
.a few states" that still followed the old felony-misdemeanor lesser offense rule, al-
though the original reasons for it were obviously no longer applicable. CLARK, supra
note 31, § 122.
It is unclear when the courts first acknowledged a defendant's right to request
consideration of a lesser offense. In his 1856 text, Bishop stated that the election
was the prosecutor's alone, BISHOP, supra note 252, § 536, but the Supreme Court's
first lesser offense case, Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), concerned the
defendants' request for a lesser-included offense manslaughter instruction in a feder-
al trial court, id. at 59 (noting the instruction was rejected only because there was
no evidentiary support for it).
Finally, at common law, conviction for a lesser offense at the trial on a greater
offense would avoid the necessity of another trial for the lesser offense, if the jury
acquitted the defendant of the greater charged offense. See Mascolo, supra note 92,
at 265 (stating that lesser offense doctrine "originated as a means of implementing
the policy at common law against multiple trials for the same allegation[s]"). This
policy is embodied in the common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict.
Ross & TURNER, supra note 235, at 145-55 (stating that defendant was entitled to
dismissal of indictment charging violation of the same criminal offense for which he
was acquitted or convicted under common law, or indictment based on the same
conduct if a specific statute so provided). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is based on this same concept. See supra note 267 and accompanying
text.
286. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 252, §§ 529-539.
287. The common law approach to the lesser offense doctrine was narrowly focused
on the elements of the offenses involved. 2 CHIrY, supra note 234, at 38; 2
HAWKINS, supra note 234, at 440. This approach, known in today's courts as the
'elements" approach, defines a lesser offense as an offense that is always committed
by committing the greater charged offense, but which has fewer elements than the
greater offense. 5 RHODES, supra note 262, § 31:13; 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 473 (13th ed. 1992); 3 WRIGHT, supra note 262,
§ 515.
Manslaughter, which permits a noncapital punishment for criminal homicide, is
probably the original lesser offense. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 234, at 78-79. Man-
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The federal government and every state jurisdiction consider-
ing lesser offenses at trial has provided, in some manner, for the
possibility of a jury instruction and verdict 5 for a lesser of-
fense than the offense charged in the indictment or informa-
tion. 9 There can also be no question about the significant util-
ity of the lesser offense doctrine. Given the pervasive overlap-
slaughter is one of the most common lesser offenses at trial, but perhaps the most
theoretically complex because it arguably has more elements than murder, not fewer.
If murder is defined to include, inter alia, the intentional killing of a human being
without justification or excuse, and manslaughter is defined to include, inter alia,
such an intentional killing in the heat of passion, then heat of passion manslaughter
has one additional element. Id. at 84-85.
The common law did not have this conceptual difficulty because although mur-
der was "attended by one or more of the states of mind included under the descrip-
tion of malice aforethought," in manslaughter "malice aforethought is absent." Id. at
21; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMIENTARIES *191-92. In other words, man-
slaughter was defined as murder without the element of malice; therefore, common
law manslaughter was a lesser-included offense of murder. Heat of passion, of
course, does not vitiate intent. Rather, it mitigates the punishment for certain pro-
voked but inexcusable and unjustifiable intentional killings. Today, manslaughter is
considered a lesser offense of intentional murder, even under the narrow "elements"
approach. As the cases considered in this Article have demonstrated, a criminal
homicide defendant faces serious consequences when a jury is precluded from consid-
ering a lesser offense option because the statute of limitations has run.
The "elements" approach does not permit the jury to disregard the evidence and
simply substitute a lesser offense for the greater one proven at trial, even if the
elements of the lesser offense were necessarily included in the charged offense. The
evidence at trial must support both an acquittal of the greater offense and a conviction
of the lesser offense. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 n.8 (1989) ("[T]he
evidence at trial must be such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of
the lesser offense, yet acquit him of the greater.") (citing Keeble v. United States, 412
U.S. 205, 208 (1973)); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) ("[D]ue process [in a
capital case] requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the
evidence warrants such an instruction."); 4 TORCIA, supra note 287, § 473.
288. A lesser offen~e conviction is also possible in a bench trial. See 3 WRIGHT,
supra note 262, § 515 (Supp. 1995).
289. The Supreme Court has stated:
In the federal courts, it has been "beyond dispute that the defendant is
entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense . . . ." Similarly,
the state courts that have addressed the issue have unanimously held
that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction where
the evidence warrants it.
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635-37 (1980) (citation and footnote citing cases
from 42 states omitted); see also Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 800-01 & nn.5-6
(Md. 1989) (citing examples of judicial adoption of the lesser offense doctrine, exam-
ples of statutory lesser offense provisions from 29 states, and examples of rules of
procedure from five states providing for lesser offenses at trial).
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ping of today's statutory criminal offenses, a system of criminal
adjudication that permitted only conviction or acquittal of
charged offenses regardless of the evidence developed at trial
would be overly formalistic and inflexible from both the
prosecution's and the defense's perspective. Moreover, according
to the reasoning approved by the Supreme Court in Keeble, Beck,
and Spaziano, such a system would increase the psychological
risk of irrational results at trial because the jury would be pre-
sented only with the all-or-nothing choice between conviction or
acquittal of the charged offense. °
However salutary the general concept appears to be, the less-
er offense doctrine has always been fraught with difficulty in
application,29' resulting in many significant areas of dis-
agreement among the states and among federal appeals courts.
In addition, as discussed in Parts 'II.D and II.E, the Supreme
Court's suggestion that the doctrine of lesser offenses may be a
required component of the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt/due-
process standard has further complicated an understanding of
the law.292
Some commentators, therefore, have concluded that the dic-
tates of the Constitution should play a part in resolving the con-
flict between the statute of limitations and an otherwise appro-
priate lesser offense at trial.293 Such a constitutionally based
solution could not be meaningfully accomplished without im-
posing a uniform federal standard of lesser offenses on the
states in place of the diverse approaches currently in effect. That
choice, reaching far beyond Winship,294 would significantly al-
290. See supra notes 58, 78, 87, 89-90, 102, 114 and accompanying text.
291. See Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1968) (stating that the situation
of the lesser-included offense has "challenged the effective administration of criminal
justice for centuries"); Blair, supra note 30, at 445-46 (stating that whether the pros-
ecutor or defendant invokes the lesser offense doctrine, its application has caused
considerable confusion among courts and commentators); Mascolo, supra note 92, at
271 (stating that the lesser-included offense doctrine "is a source of confusion and
controversy in American jurisprudence").
292. The holdings of these cases cannot be read to require a lesser offense in-
struction in any trial in which the statute of limitations bars conviction on the less-
er offense, even a capital case. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 92.
294. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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ter the balance between local diversity of nonfundamental proce-
dural rights and mandatory constitutional standards that under-
lies our criminal justice system. This Article, however, concludes
that the lesser offense doctrine should not be of constitutional
stature.29 5 Rather, courts or legislatures should, as a matter of
the law of the jurisdiction, permit defendants to waive the pro-
tection that the statute of limitations affords in order to permit
the entry of a judgment upon a jury's guilty verdict for an oth-
erwise proper, time-barred lesser offense.
2. Definition and Application of the Doctrine Within a Federal
System
Although the lesser offense concept appears straightforward,
its application raises extraordinarily complex issues. The scope
of this Article does not include a discussion of all these complexi-
ties. 6 Rather, this Article addresses the extent of the diversi-
ty and the many layers of the lesser offense concept, not the
merits of one choice over another. It is one thing to approve the
lesser offense doctrine in general, and quite another to define its
necessary particulars. American courts, faced with the common-
law concept of the lesser offense and with inconclusive expres-
sions of that doctrine in statutes and rules of procedure, have
had to decide what is and what is not a lesser offense; whether
295. See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Janis L. Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser
Included Offense, 50 BROoK. L. REV. 191 (1984) (reviewing differing federal
definitional standards and evidentiary requirements for the lesser offense doctrine
and criticizing courts for not considering theoretical reasons for their preferences);
Bernard E. Gegan, Lesser Included Crimes Under Felony Murder Indictments in New
York: The Past Speaks to the Present, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329, 368-72 (1992) (crit-
icizing the present statutory definition of "lesser included offense" as an undesirable
"radical break with prior law"); Kyron Huigens, The Doctrine of Lesser Included Of-
fenses, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 185 (1992) (stating that early Washington cases
recognized the subtlety and complexity of the lesser offense doctrine, but that recent
cases have not); Stuart S. Yusem, Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in
Pennsylvania: Uncertainty in the Courts, 84 DICK. L. REV. 125, 126-27 (1979) (stating
that "complex and contradictory proclamations [concerning the lesser offense doctrine]
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and inconsistent application by the Superior
Court" has added confusion to the doctrine); see also Blair, supra note 30, at 445-51
(containing helpful descriptions of the complexities of the lesser offense doctrine and
its application); Mascolo, supra note 92, at 271-85 (same).
273
274 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:199
that definition has an evidentiary component or is simply a
matter of abstract statutory comparison; what quantum of evi-
dence is necessary to satisfy an evidentiary component; whether
the doctrine of lesser offenses is related to, or is a facet of, the
complex constitutional concept of double jeopardy; and whether
both the prosecution and the defense must have mutual access
to invocation of the doctrine, however it is defined.297
Several definitional standards for lesser offenses at trial have
developed in the United States, and many of the application is-
sues left for judicial decision are resolved differently based on
the chosen standard."' These standards are variously denomi-
nated and may partially overlap. They range from narrow to
broad and focus on whether the statutory elements of the lesser
offense are a necessary subset of the elements of the greater
297. See, e.g., State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1993). In Keffer, the Wyoming
Supreme Court recently found itself immersed in all of these issues. In that case,
the trial court refused the state's request to instruct the jury on the lesser offense
of manslaughter because the defendant objected in writing to that instruction and
because the evidence did not support the instruction. Id. at 1121. The jury found the
defendant not guilty of second-degree (nonpremeditated) murder and the state filed
exceptions in the state supreme court. Id. at 1122-23. The Wyoming Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and held that the lesser offense instruction should have been
given as requested by the prosecution. Id. at 1139-40. In so doing, the 'court
switched the standard of lesser offense (its rule of procedure, like the federal rule,
speaking in terms of an offense "necessarily included in the offense charged") from
the much broader "inherent relationship" test to the narrow 'statutory elements"
test. Id. at 1133-34. Along the way, the court found it necessary to consider at
length (1) the bases for those two definitional standards (relying on Blair, supra
note 30), as well as for the different approach of the Model Penal Code, Keffer, 860
P.2d at 1128-29; see infra note 299; (2) the relationship of double jeopardy doctrine
to the various standards, Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1129-31; see infra note 314; (3) the due
process "implications" of Keeble and Beck, Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1131-32; see supra
notes 58, 87 and accompanying text; (4) the constitutional requirement of notice and
the compatibility of that doctrine with the principle of mutuality of access by the
prosecution and the defense to the lesser offense instruction, Keffer, 860 P.2d at
1132-33; see infra note 313; (5) the corollary issue of the ability of the defendant to
"veto" an instruction requested by the government, Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1134; (6)
whether only "some evidence," which "ought to be perceived as minimal," (the "jury
theory") is enough to justify a lesser offense instruction, or whether a factual dispute
is necessary regarding one of the differentiating elements between the greater and
lesser offense that requires the court to evaluate the evidence ("the court theory"),
id. at 1134-36; see infra notes 321-22; and (7) whether the appropriate standard of
appellate review of the trial court's decision regarding lesser offenses is de novo,
Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1137.
298. See, e.g., Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1118.
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offense (the "elements" approach), whether the evidence pro-
duced at trial supports an inference that the defendant commit-
ted an offense related to the charged offense (the "inherent rela-
tionship" approach), or whether the factual allegations of the
indictment or information implicate a lesser offense (the
"pleadings" approach). 9
The federal statutory embodiment of the lesser offense doc-
trine was originally enacted in 1872... and was recast with lit-
tle change in 1944 as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
31(c).3 ' It was not until 1989, however, that the Supreme
Court settled on a lesser offense standard through its interpre-
299. For discussions of these definitional standards, see Blair, supra note 30, at
447-50; Ettinger, supra note .296, at 198-209; Mascolo, supra note 92, at 273-80;
Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Lesser-Related State Offense Instructions: Modem
Status, 50 A.L.R.4TH 1081 (1986); David E. Rigney, Annotation, Propriety of Lesser-
Included-Offense Charge to Jury in Federal Criminal Case-General Principles, 100
A.L.1 FED. 481 (1990).
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code takes yet another approach to
defining a lesser offense. It incorporates the "statutory elements" standard and also
.breaks new ground beyond the "inherent relationship" standard. The Code provides
as follows:
(4) Conviction of Included Offense Permitted. A defendant may be convict-
ed of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment [or the
info-mation]. An offense is so included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts re-
quired to establish the commission of the offense charged, or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged
or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public
interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commis-
sion.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4) (1985).
The Code's liberal approach to the lesser offense definition has not been widely
adopted. Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1129.
300. An Act to Further the Administration of Justice, ch. 255, § 9, 17 Stat. 196,
198 (1872) ("[n all criminal causes the defendant may be found guilty of any of-
fence the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is
charged in the indictment. .. ").
301. Rule 31(c) was intended to restate the law of lesser offenses existing at the
time of its adoption; the rule has not been amended since its enactment. Schmuck v.
United States, 489 U.S. 705, 718-19 (1989). Rule 31(c) states: "The defendant may
be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an at-
tempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included there-
in if the attempt is an offense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
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tation of Rule 31(c), thereby resolving many of the issues that
had divided the federal courts."2 In Schmuck v. United
States,"3 the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's en banc de-
cision adopting the traditional, narrow "elements" standard' 4
and rejected the significantly broader "inherent relationship"
test formulated by the District of Columbia Circuit in 1971'05
and adopted by the Ninth Circuit in 1986.306
Schmuck was a used car distributor who rolled back the
odometer readings of used cars before selling them at elevated
prices to retail dealers. °7 He was convicted for mail fraud, a
felony, after the district court refused to give a lesser offense
instruction for odometer tampering, then a federal misdemean-
or.3"' In making its decision, the Court first looked to the text
of Rule 31(c), which suggested that the statutory elements of the
offenses should govern.0 9 Second, because the Rule had not
302. The Supreme Court decided nine significant 'cases involving the lesser offense
doctrine before 1989. Four of those cases were in the context of state capital cases.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
see supra part 1I.E. The remaining cases, dating back from Keeble v. United States,
412 U.S. 205 (1973); see supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text, to Sparf v. Unit-
ed States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); see infra notes 316-20 and accompanying text, all
involved federal trials and the interpretation of Rule 31(c) and its predecessor stat-
ute. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); Berra v. United States, 351
U.S. 131 (1956); Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896).
303. 489 U.S. at 705. Schmuck was a five-to-four decision in which the dissenters
addressed only the "mailing" requirement of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1988). Id. at 722-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. United States v. Schmuck, 840 F.2d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), affd,
489 U.S. 705 (1989). A panel of the Seventh Circuit had ruled that odometer tam-
pering was a lesser-included offense under Rule 31(c) because the evidence at trial
supported the inference that Schmuck committed the less serious crime, and both
the indicted offense and the lesser offense related to the protection of the same
interests (the "inherent relationship" test). United States v. Schmuck, 776 F.2d 1368
(7th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 840 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), affd, 489 U.S. 705
(1989).
305. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
306. United States v. Martin, 783 F.2d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980).
307. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 707, 711.
308. Id. at 707-08.
309. Id. at 716-17. The Court emphasized that Rule 31(c) provided that "[tihe de-
fendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense
charged." Id. at 708.
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been amended since its passage, the Court examined the prevail-
ing federal and state practice at the time of the adoption of the
Rule in 1944.310 Finally, the Court noted the greater certainty
and predictability of the elements test. 1'
The Court did not discuss the extensive justification given by
the two federal circuits and several state high courts for a
broader approach based on the evidence at trial rather than on
abstract statutory analysis."' Rather, the Court expressed con-
cern that under the "inherent relationship" standard the pros-
ecution would be unable to seek a lesser offense conviction. The
doctrine's requirement of mutuality 13 would thus be destroyed
because the defendant may not have constitutionally sufficient
notice of the lesser offense if the elements of that offense were
not a subset of the indicted offense.314
310. Id. at 718-20.
311. Id. at 720-21.
312. In addition to the Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit opinions
already cited, see supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text, the Court ignored the
rationale for the "inherent relationship" standard set forth in 1984 by the Supreme
Court of California in People v.- Geiger, 674 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) (holding
that failure to give defendant's requested instruction on related, but not included,
offense of vandalism for second-degree burglary was prejudicial error because funda-
mental fairness mandates the broader "inherent relationship" rule). The California
Supreme Court looked to the District of Columbia Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, as
well as to opinions from the Supreme Courts of Montana, State v. Gopher, 633 P.2d
1195 (Mont. 1981); Idaho, State v. Boyenger, 509 P.2d 1317 (Idaho 1973); and Michi-
gan, a series of decisions beginning with People v. Chamblis, 236 N.W.2d 473 (Mich.
1975), as well as to the Hawaiian legislature, which had adopted a lesser offense
statute with a provision based on § 7.01(c) of the Model Penal Code, HAw. REV.
STAT. § 701-109(4)(c) (1985); see supra note 299; Geiger, 674 P.2d at 1309-10;
Donaldson, supra note 299.
313. The concept of "mutuality" requires that both the prosecutor and the defense
have equal access to a lesser offense at trial, and that neither party can block that
access if otherwise proper under the law. Under this doctrine, the defendant is not
entitled to a lesser offense instruction if the government is not entitled to such an
instruction. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 718; Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 214
n.14 (1973). The requirement of mutuality recognizes that the lesser offense doctrine
"'developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases in which the proof failed to estab-
lish some element of the crime charged.'" Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 717 n.9 (quoting
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980)). States that have adopted the "inherent
relationship" standard of lesser offenses at trial have necessarily dispensed with the
requirement of mutuality. See, e.g., Geiger, 674 P.2d at 1312 ("That the prosecutor is
not entitled to obtain a conviction on a charge of which the defendant lacks notice
provides no basis, in logic or justice, for depriving a defendant of instructions on a
charge at his request.").
314. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 718. It is interesting to note that Justice Blackmun,
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The tension between a narrow and broad approach to the defi-
nition of a proper lesser offense can be expected to continue in
the state courts even after the Supreme Court's expression of
the federal rule in Schmuck.315 The different definitional stan-
dards and the subsidiary issues that arise in applying them
inevitably reflect the adopting jurisdiction's view of the proper
role of the jury in a criminal trial. A narrow view of the jury's
decisionmaking power would favor the narrow definition of less-
er offenses expressed in the "elements" test. A broader view of
the jury's discretion in a criminal case would be more compatible
with the standard that permits the jury, if the defendant so
chooses, to convict for any lesser offense demonstrated by the
evidence at trial.
In addition to the definitional choice, two other significant
components of lesser offense law are the subjects of diverse opin-
ion-the evidentiary component and the transitional instruction.
who wrote the majority opinion in Schmuck, did not discuss the fact that the nar-
row "elements" approach to lesser offenses was the most compatible with the then-
applicable standard for identifying the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, as expressed in the Blockburger rule. See Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 304 (1932) ("The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."); see also State v.
Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1130 (Wyo. 1993) ("It is clear that the Blockburger analysis
parallels the statutory elements test for lesser included offenses."). In 1990, a bare
majority of the Court supplemented the Blockburger test, which is essentially an
elements test that bars re-prosecution for a lesser-included offense, Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977), with a broader test based on "conduct that constitutes an
offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted," Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 521 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
Grady was overruled only three years later, and the Blockburger elements test was
reinstated, over Justice Blackmun's dissent, as the double jeopardy standard by a
different majority. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863-64; id. at 2879-81 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
315. See People v. Whitfield, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
that filing of information charging forcible rape tolled limitations period for offense
of prostitution, which, because it was based on the same conduct as the charged
offense, was a lesser offense upon which defendant was entitled to have jury in-
structed at trial). Compare Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1123-24, 1133-34 (abandoning the "in-
herent relationship" definition of lesser offense at trial for "statutory elements" defi-
nition stated in Schmuck) with State v. Yates, 571 A.2d 575, 576-77 (R.I. 1990)
(rejecting "statutory elements" definition of lesser offense for "inherent relationship"
standard already in place, despite Supreme Court's holding in Schmuck).
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Again, the choices necessarily reflect a view of jury function in a
criminal case. The definition of the lesser offense standard is a
necessary, but not sufficient, step in the trial court's decision
whether to give a lesser offense instruction and verdict option to
the jury. Regardless of the definition of the standard, the court
must also decide what quantum of evidence must be presented
at trial in order to justify a lesser offense instruction. The Su-
preme Court stated in Sparf v. United States,316 the Court's
first lesser offense case, that a defendant was not entitled to a
lesser offense instruction 17 if there was no basis in the evi-
dence at trial for the jury to conclude that the defendant was
innocent of the charged greater offense and guilty instead of the
lesser offense. 18 Otherwise, contrary to the intent of Congress
and to sound policy, juries would be invested "in criminal cases
with power arbitrarily to disregard the evidence and the princi-
ples of law applicable to the case on trial."319 Consistent with
316. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
317. Id. at 52, 59 (involving a manslaughter instruction in a federal trial for capi-
tal murder on the high seas).
318. Id. at 63-64.
319. Id. at 63. The Sparf opinion is notable for its extensive discussion of the doc-
trine of jury nullification. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, approved the trial
judge's instructions (in response to direct questions from the jury) that even though
manslaughter was a lesser offense of murder under common law, a manslaughter
verdict was not appropriate in the case at bar under federal-law because the facts
in evidence could not support a finding of homicide without malice. Id. at 59-61,
106. The issue of nullification arose because the trial judge acknowledged to the jury
that "even in this case [where a lesser offense verdict was not supported by the evi-
dence] you have the physical power to [return a noncapital verdict of manslaughter];
but as one of the tribunals of the country, a jury is expected to be governed by law,
and the law it should receive from the court." Id. at 62 n.1 (emphasis deleted). This
position was strongly approved by the Court, which stated:
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United
States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the
court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the
evidence.... Under any other system . . . our government will cease to
be a government of laws, and become a government of men.
Id. at 102-03.
One need not go back to the end of the last century to find another demonstra-
tion that the evidentiary component of the lesser offense doctrine is at the core of
the state's view of proper jury fimetion in a criminal case. In People v. Fernandez,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), the jury asked the trial judge whether
they could find the defendant guilty of the lesser misdemeanor of assault, rather
than the felony of battery with serious bodily injury, because even though California
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the notion that the lesser offense doctrine is not intended as a
mercy-dispensing device for the jury, 2 ' the Court has referred
several times to the necessity for an evidentiary component to
the standard used in the federal courts. 1 Many state courts
law required them to find the injuries to be serious based on the evidence at trial,
"our feelings don't follow this." Id. at 678-79. The appellate court upheld the trial
judge's simple answer to the jury-no'--because the defendant was not entitled to
an instruction telling the jury that it had the power to nullify the law, even if it
may, in fact, have had such power. Id. at 679-80; see also United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that to give every jury
the option of disregarding the law risks caprice, if not chaos).
320. See, e.g., Sparf, 156 U.S. at 64 (finding that lesser offense doctrine should not
be used as a vehicle for the jury to "commute the punishment for an offence actual-
ly committed, and thus impose a punishment different from that prescribed by law");
Kelly v. United States, 370 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (stating that lesser-includ-
ed offense instruction may not be used as a device to encourage the "mercy-dispens-
ing power" of the jury), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967); Donaldson, supra note 299,
at 1091 (stating that even under broad "related offense" standard for lesser offenses
at trial, the jury should not be encouraged to convict of a lesser offense out of "mere
sympathy or reluctance to impose a severe penalty, but shouldT only be given a
choice where there is actually a fact issue as to guilt").
321. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 n.8 (1989) ('Our de-
cision in no way alters the independent prerequisite for a lesser included offense
instruction that the evidence at trial must be such that a jury could rationally find
the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, yet acquit him of the greater.") (citing
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605,
611-12 (1982) (finding that lesser offense instruction is required 'only when the evi-
dence warrants such an instruction") (emphasis omitted); Sansone v. United States,
380 U.S. 343, 350 (1965) ("A lesser-included offense instruction is only proper where
the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element
which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included offense.").
The Supreme Court established the federal rule concerning the quantity of evi-
dence necessary to justify a lesser offense instruction and verdict in 1896: "The evi-
dence . . . need not be uncontradicted or in any way conclusive upon the question;
so long as there is some evidence upon the subject, the proper weight to be given it
is for the jury to determine." Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 314 (1896);
see also 5 RHODES, supra note 262, § 31:12 (stating that "there must be some evi-
dence which would justify conviction of the lesser offense"). This rule is also com-
monly followed in the states. See, e.g., Fulghum v. State, 277 So. 2d 886, 890 (Ala.
1973) (stating that a lesser-included offense instruction should be given if "there is
any reasonable theory from the evidence which would support the position"); Ewish
v. State, 871 P.2d 306, 310 (Nev. 1994) (finding that for a trial judge to give a less-
er offense instruction, there must be evidence that reasonably supports guilt of the
lesser crime); Mascolo, supra note 92, at 280 (stating that any quantum of evidence
that permits the jury rationally to acquit the defendant of the charged offense and
convict on the lesser offense is sufficient to justify the instruction and citing state
cases). But see, e.g., People v. Scarborough, 402 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (N.Y. 1980) (find-
ing that test is not whether "any view" of the evidence would support jury's verdict
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have also required an evidentiary component.3 2
Some state courts have taken the view that, in general, a
defendant's not guilty plea to the greater charged offense puts in
issue any lesser offense qualifying under the statutory "ele-
ments" standard and that "[trial courts should not be in the
business of reviewing the record and weighing the evidence to
determine when a lesser-included offense instruction should be
given."3 ' In part, this broad view of the jury's role in a crimi-
nal trial can be justified by the argument that if the jury choos-
es to reject one element of the government's proof (for example,
the inference of premeditation necessary for first-degree mur-
der), it should be able to find the defendant guilty of the statuto-
ry lesser offense established by the absence of the failed ele-
ment, even if there has been no evidence specifically presented
at trial to support that alternative result.
What if, as in State v. Short, 2 the accused supports a de-
on lesser offense, but whether "a reasonable view" of the evidence would support
such a verdict).
322. See, e.g., Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 803 n.10 (Md. 1989) (referring to rule
that when there is no evidence to support a conviction on the lesser offense, there
should be no instruction on that offense); O'Bryan v. State, 876 P.2d 688, 689 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1994) ("We have consistently held it is the duty of the trial court to
determine as a matter of law whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the sub-
mission of instructions on a lesser included offense."); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632,
637 (Vt. 1994) (deciding that a requested lesser offense instruction will be given only
if the facts in evidence reasonably support such an instruction); State v. Keffer, 860
P.2d 1118, 1136 (Wyo. 1993) ("[W]e adhere to the view that the giving of a lesser
included offense instruction is appropriate if there are in dispute factual issues that
would permit a jury rationally to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and
acquit the defendant of the greater.").
323. State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 738 (Iowa 1988). In Jeffries, the Iowa Su-
preme Court carefully reviewed the doctrine of lesser offenses at trial and, while
maintaining the strict "elements" standard for lesser offenses, abandoned any eviden-
tiary qualification by the trial court (the "court function test") and instead found
screening to be an infringement on the proper role of the jury. Id. at 736-38. The
court held that the submission of a lesser offense to the jury should be "automatic,"
once the requirements of the "elements" standard were met as a matter of law (the
"jury function test"). Id. at 737. The Iowa court followed People v. Beach, 418
N.W.2d 861, 868 (Mich. 1988) (stating that jury instruction should be given automat-
ically for lesser-included offenses that meet the strict "elements" test). See James
Benzoni, Note, Courts Must Instruct on Lesser-Included Offenses That Fit Within the
Elements of the Greater Charged Offekse, Regardless of the Evidence-State v.
Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1988), 39 DRAKE L. REV. 549 (1989-1990).
324. 618 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1993).
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fensive theory of complete innocence with alibi testimony?3"
Should that defensive posture defeat the defendant's request for
a lesser offense instruction for manslaughter based on the
state's proof at trial that the defendant was seen in a violent
argument with the victim shortly before the homicide?3 26 How-
ever such questions are answered by the courts, the answers
will surely reflect the jurisdiction's view of how much the law
should restrict the jury's role in a criminal trial.
Definitional and evidentiary issues aside, there is also a sig-
nificant divergence of judicial opinion as to the proper method
for submitting a lesser offense instruction to the jury once the
trial court has decided that such an instruction is appropriate
(the "transitional instruction"). The issue is whether the jury
should be told that they must first reach a unanimous verdict of
acquittal on the charged greater offense before they proceed to
consider the lesser offense (the "acquittal first" option), or
whether they may proceed to a verdict upon the lesser offense if
they are unable to agree on a verdict on the greater offense (the
"unable to agree" option). The "unable to agree" option would
seem to have the effect of encouraging jury compromise in favor
of a verdict on the lesser offense, thus reducing the number of
hung juries. This compromise, however, is not necessarily more
beneficial to the defendant in every case. Similarly, the "acquit-
tal first" option may have a tactical advantage for either side,
depending upon the development of the evidence at trial.
At the time of Judge Friendly's opinion in United States v.
Tsnas,32" neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court had
considered the proper transitional instruction in the federal
325. Id. at 319 (stating that defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction for
manslaughter even though he presented an alibi defense); see supra note 9 and ac-
companying text; see also Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 322 (1896) (re-
jecting the government's argument that because defendant's evidentiary theory at
trial was self-defense, defendant was not also entitled to a contradictory lesser of-
fense manslaughter instruction); State v. Wilson, 440 N.W.2d 534, 542-43 (Wis. 1989)
(finding that because the jury could disbelieve the defendant, he was entitled to a
lesser offense instruction that directly contradicted his defensive theory if the lesser
offense were supported by a reasonable view of the evidence).
326. See, e.g., Short, 618 A.2d at 318.
327. 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
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courts.3" The Supreme Court still has not done so. Judge
Friendly resolved the matter by stating that because neither law
nor policy led him to the conclusion that either option was right
or wrong, "[t]he court may give the one that it prefers if the
defendant expresses no choice. If he does, the court should give
the form of instruction which the defendant seasonably
elects."329 This Solomon-like approach has satisfied some other
jurisdictions," but the surface neutrality toward proper jury
function implicit in Judge Friendly's "defendant's option" ap-
proach was recently rejected strongly by the Supreme Court of
North Dakota in State v. Daulton."' The court found the "ac-
quittal first" rule as it was adopted by twelve states332 to be
both better reasoned and supported by the traditional view thA
juries should not be led to abandon the law for the sake of com-
promise-a result it found unacceptably encouraged by both the
Second Circuit's "optional" approach and the "unable to agree"
approach.3" Consequently, significant policy issues concerning
the jury's role in a criminal trial arise even in respect to the
seemingly minor and technical issue of the method of submission
of a lesser offense instruction to the jury.
Thus, even though, as the Court stated in Beck,334 the basic
concept of the lesser offense option at trial is well-established in
the historical and modern practice of this country, the definition
and application of that concept in its significant particulars is
far from uniform. That lack of uniformity, at least in part, re-
328. Id. at 342.
329. Id. at 346.
330. See United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984); Catches v.
United States, 582 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 1978); Jones v. United States, 620 A.2d
249, 252 (D.C. 1993); State v. Powell, 608 A.2d 45, 47 (Vt. 1992).
331. 518 N.W.2d 719 (N.D. 1994).
332. The court cited opinions from Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin as approving the "acquittal first" instruction. Id. at 721. The court
also identified two states-Alaska and California-that have adopted a modification
of the "acquittal first" rule and four states-Hawaii, Michigan, Ohio, and Ore-
gon-that have adopted the "unable to agree" instruction. Id.
333. Id. at 722 ("The primary difficulty with the unable to agree instruction is it
dilutes the requirement of unanimity and encourages the jury to bypass the charged
offense on its way to a compromise verdict.").
334. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 635-36 (1980).
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flects divergent views on the role of the jury. Beyond the defini-
tion and application of the lesser offense doctrine at trial is the
foundation of lesser offense law itself-as found in the substan-
tive criminal law of each jurisdiction. The vast diversity of that
law often results in divergent applications of the lesser offense
doctrine, even in states with similar standards for lesser offens-
es at trial."3 5
Despite the Supreme Court's repeated references to the due
process language found in Keeble," the majority of federal ap-
peals courts have correctly treated the application of the lesser
offense doctrine as a matter of state law.337 To elevate the less-
er offense doctrine to constitutional status as a corollary of
Winship's due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is both unwise and unworkable. The lesser offense doc-
335. See, e.g., State v. Long, 675 P.2d 832, 839-41 (Kan. 1984). In Kansas, robbery
requires only the taking of property from the person or presence of another by
threat or use of force, but theft requires a specific intent to permanently deprive the
owner of property. In Long, the Kansas Court of Appeals had held that theft was
not a lesser-included offense of robbery under state law. Id. at 838. The Kansas
Supreme Court, however, held that, under Kansas law, theft was "a 'lesser degree of
the same crime' which embraces robbery" and, therefore, a defendant indicted for
robbery was entitled to a lesser offense instruction for theft, if evidence at trial sup-
ported that instruction. Id. at 841 (citation to lesser offense statute omitted).
336. 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973); see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 454 (1984);
Beck, 447 U.S. at 634-35.
337. Most federal courts of appeals have refused the habeas petitions of state
noncapital prisoners that were based on the assertion that a lesser offense instruc-
tion was refused at trial in violation of state law. See Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031,
1036 (10th Cir. 1993) ('ITihis circuit has agreed with a majority of those circuits
addressing the issue and held that a petitioner in a noncapital case is not entitled to
habeas relief for the failure to give a lesser-included offense instruction 'even if in
our view there was sufficient evidence to warrant the giving of an instruction .... '")
(quoting Chavez v. Kerby, 848 F.2d 1101, 1103 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1074 (1994)); Tata v. Carver, 917 F.2d 670, 671-72 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that
the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that a state trial
court's failure to give a lesser offense instruction raises no federal issue, whereas the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have considered whether the failure to give a
lesser offense instruction was 'so fundamental a defect as to cause 'a complete mis-
carriage of justice," and the Third Circuit alone has extended the reasoning of Beck
to noncapital cases) (quoting Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 797 (6th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 929 (1990)); see also Bagby, 894 F.2d at 797 (stating
that Beck is grounded upon Eighth Amendment concerns rather than due process,
and that the majority of circuits share the view that a state court's failure to in-
struct on lesser offenses at trial is "not an error of such character and magnitude to
be cognizable in federal habeas corpus review") (citations omitted).
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trine is not merely a matter of definition that can be readily
incorporated as part of the requirement of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, even if the narrow "elements" 'standard of Schmuck
were imposed on the states as a minimal constitutional "floor."
Rather, the lesser offense doctrine is a multifaceted body of law,
with each part having significance for the state's own vision of
the jury's role at trial. Any imposed standard, even a minimal
one, would have profound effects upon the many subsidiary
issues involved in the application of the doctrine and upon the
jury's process and scope of decisionmaking. The imposition of a
federal lesser offense standard is an unlikely leap for a Court
that has yet to define what the fundamental doctrine of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt minimally requires from the state
courts."3 Therefore, the states have not defined or applied the
lesser offense doctrine in 'a uniform manner, and the federal
courts, considering the doctrine of lesser offense within the con-
text of Rule 31(c), have not suggested that their decisions consti-
tutionally prohibit alternative approaches in the states to the
doctrine's definition or application.
Certainly, fairness to the defendant is an important policy
justification for the lesser offense concept in general. That poli-
cy, however, does not carry with it a constitutional mandate. 39
Just as the substantive criminal law and its judicial administra-
338. As fundamental as the reasonable doubt standard is, the Court has yet to
define it fully. Rather, the Court has discussed what the standard does or does not
permit. In fact, the Court has not held, under either the Due Process Clause or the
Sixth Amendment, that the reasonable doubt standard must be defined to the jury
at all. See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994) (stating that the Consti-
tution does not require trial courts to define reasonable doubt and, when defined,
does not require that any particular form of words be used to advise the jury of the
government's burden; rather, taken as a whole, the instructions must properly con-
vey the concept); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1993) (stating that
Sixth Amendment requires that the jury apply the reasonable doubt standard and
that improper definition of that standard cannot be harmless error); see also United
States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 43-46 (4th Cir.) (holding that it was not error for trial
court to refuse to give a definition of reasonable doubt, even when a definition was
requested by the jury, and discussing the split among both circuit courts and state
courts about if, when, and how the concept of reasonable doubt should be defined),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994).
339. Cf. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (1992) ("The Due Process
Clauge does not, however, require a State to adopt one procedure over another on
the basis that it may produce results more favorable to the accused.").
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tion are so often intertwined, and just as both substantive and
procedural criminal law in America are best left to state legisla-
tures and state courts unless there is a strong compulsion to do
otherwise under the Constitution,34 the doctrine of lesser of-
fenses should not be controlled by a federally imposed standard.
Yet, without a constitutional standard of lesser offenses, it is
problematic to maintain that the Due Process Clause requires a
lesser offense instruction and verdict option in any particular
case when a state court has held otherwise as a matter of state
law.
Nonetheless, the lesser offense doctrine, however it is defined
and applied, does serve an important role in a criminal trial.
The concept contributes significantly to adjudicative efficiency,
including achieving the most appropriate result at trial. Consti-
tutional requirements aside, sound policy demands that the
lesser offense doctrine be available to the prosecution and de-
fense as a primary component of plea bargaining and to both
parties at trial as a flexible response to the unpredictable reali-
ties of proof in the courtroom. In contrast, the criminal statute
of limitations is an inflexible concept to control the time allowed
for the initiation of prosecution that should not be used, either
before or at trial, as a sword against the defendant by prohibit-
ing waiver of the statute's protection.
Even if the American system of criminal adjudication were not
historically endowed with the concept of lesser offenses at trial,
the necessity for efficiency in criminal trials would likely compel
the creation of the concept. One wonders if the same institution-
al inevitability is true for criminal statutes of limitations. In any
event, the doctrine of lesser offenses, in each of its trial as-
pects-instruction, verdict option, and judgment--is of too much
340. The Supreme Court has stated:
"It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much
more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government,
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion), and that
we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the
administration of justice by the individual States."
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 638 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977)).
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utility to society and of too great a benefit to both sides of a
criminal case to be sacrificed for the sake of a statute of limita-
tions unjustifiably construed as jurisdictional. That decision is a
matter of policy choice, however, and inappropriate for national
constitutional control.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT
A. In Summary
Characterizing the criminal statute of limitations as an abso-
lute barrier to judicial authority is unjustified by the statute's
history and purpose; the constitutional description of the role of
lesser offenses at trial ignores the significant implications of
that doctrine's variety of definitions and applications. The legal
labels of 'jurisdiction" and "due process" have thus failed to shed
light on the conflict between the criminal statute of limitations
and lesser offenses at trial. Judicial attempts to resolve the
conflict have been confused, inconsistent, and inadequate be-
cause the history, nature, and purposes of the two doctrines in
conflict have not been adequately considered.
The broader social purposes of the criminal statute of limita-
tions are debatable and uncertain. The statute, however, surely
grants a substantive right to a defendant prosecuted beyond the
time limit. That personal right should be subject to an informed
waiver by the defendant, as are most other rights, unless a pub-
lic purpose to the contrary is clearly demonstrated. In contrast,
there is no such tension between the public and personal pur-
poses of the doctrine of lesser offenses. The doctrine of lesser
offenses allows the criminal justice system to operate efficiently,
benefiting both the state and the accused before and during
trial. From both the prosecution's and defense's point of view,
the most appropriate result is more likely to be achieved when a
statute of limitations does not remove the possibility of a lesser
offense from either a plea bargain or verdict. Each state, howev-
er, has made its own choices about how to define and apply the
many facets of the lesser offense doctrine, and those choices re-
flect the particular jurisdiction's view of the proper role of the
criminal jury. The lesser offense doctrine is not suitable for con-
stitutional uniformity, even on the minimum level represented
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by the federal "elements" test. The Supreme Court's capital
cases dealing with lesser offenses at trial do not lead to a con-
trary conclusion.341  Nevertheless, courts and legislatures
should seek to ensure that the salutary purposes of the lesser
offenses doctrine are not frustrated by a criminal statute of
limitations that a defendant has chosen to waive.
B. The Role of the Jury
From the early days of the criminal jury trial law in England,
when jury members occasionally were subjected to penalties for
disobedience, 42 to the present, when the American jury is ac-
knowledged to have the power to nullify the law by its general
verdict (but is not instructed of its right to do so),343 lawyers
and judges have been ambivalent about the level of trust to give
these randomly summoned decisionmakers in criminal trials.
Devices to keep the jury within the role of fact finder in a crimi-
nal case-such as the once common special verdict and today's
often numbingly complex instructions to the jury on the law that
binds it-are in part an expression of this ambivalence. The Su-
preme Court has often referred to the trust the judicial system
places in the jury to reach the appropriate result, 44 but also
341. Although cases with capital charges often result in lesser offense issues at
trial, the remaining discussion in part IV of this Article does not distinguish be-
tween capital and noncapital cases. It does not distinguish between these cases be-
cause the Court's holdings in its capital lesser offense cases are narrow and do not
signify that either federal or state statutes of limitations are superseded by a gener-
al constitutional requirement of lesser offenses at trial, even in capital cases. See
supra part Il.E. A fair reading of these cases is that a state may not constitutional-
ly distort its lesser offense law, which is generally applicable to all offenses, in order
to deprive a capital defendant of at least one noncapital verdict option at trial. A
state need not, however, disregard its own generally applicable lesser offense law
(which would include the definitional standard, the evidentiary standard for applica-
tion, and the proper transitional instruction, see supra notes 297-333 and accompany-
ing text) or its criminal statute of limitations (including whether the statute may be
waived), even in capital cases.
342. The last, and perhaps the most famous example of judicial punishment of a
jury for disobedience, arose in the trial of William Penn and William Mead in 1670,
in which the jury was fined and imprisoned for contempt after their refusal to re-
turn a guilty verdict. That punishment was eventually found to be unlawful and was
overturned in Bushell's Case. See 1 STEPHEN, supra note 234, at 373-75 & n.3.
343. See supra notes 319-20.
344. The Court has stated:
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has spoken often of the many rules of criminal procedure and
evidence deemed necessary to prevent the jury from being mis-
led in its decisionmaking. 5
This significant theme of trust and distrust is central to the
issue of the conflict between the statute of limitations and the
doctrine of the lesser offense at trial. The Court's statement of
the important role of the "third option" lesser offense in jury
deliberations is an expression of that distrust.46 This view is
based on a psychological assumption that when the evidence re-
veals that the accused has committed some offense, particularly
a serious or violent offense such as manslaughter or aggravated
assault, the jury cannot be trusted to follow the trial court's in-
structions to acquit the defendant, even if the government has
not proven all the elements of the charged greater offense to the
jury's satisfaction.
Beyond this assumption is the notion expressed by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Short347 that if the jury is in-
structed on the elements of a time-barred, but otherwise appro-
priate, lesser offense, but is told that the statute of limitations
We are aware of the long debate, especially, in this century, among those
who write about the administration of justice, as to the wisdom of per-
mitting untrained laymen to determine the facts in civil and criminal
proceedings .... [Alt the heart of the dispute have been express or im-
plicit assertions that juries are incapable of adequately understanding
evidence or determining issues of fact, and that they are unpredictable,
quixotic, and a little better than a roll of dice. Yet, the most recent and
exhaustive study of the jury in criminal cases concluded that juries do
understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in most of the
cases presented to them ....
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1968) (citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans
Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)); see also Alan L. Adlestein, A Corporation's Right
to a Jury Trial Under the Sixth Amendment, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 394-95
(1994) (discussing the debate over the efficacy of the criminal jury).
345. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (1994) ("While
juries ordinarily are presumed to follow the court's instructions, we have recognized
that in some circumstances 'the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instruc-
tions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored") (quoting
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)) (internal citations omitted).
346. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647 (1991); Spaziano v. Florida, 486 U.S.
447, 455 (1984); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); Keeble v. United
States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973); supra parts lI.B, II.C.
347. 618 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1993).
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will prevent judgment or punishment by the court on that of-
fense, the jury will refuse to consider that verdict option.3 48
Spaziano v. Florida nonetheless concluded that if the court does
not tell the jury that a lesser offense verdict option will be
barred from the court's judgment by the statute of limitations,
the jury will feel "tricked," and its role as the responsible voice
of the community in a criminal case will be discredited. 9 The
contrary argument is that the jury is not "tricked" in such cir-
cumstances because the jury's role is to decide the facts of the
case, whereas it is the court's sole duty to onsider whether a
defendant should be punished or whether there are other legal
obstacles to an entry of judgment of conviction.Y
In light of these jury issues, as well as the nature and purpos-
es of the criminal statute of limitations and the doctrine of less-
er offenses,35' this Article proposes the following solution to the
348. Id. at 322; see supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
349. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 455-56; see also State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 638-39
(Vt. 1994) (N1]t is one thing to withhold from the jury unnecessary information, and
quite another to mislead jurors by instructing them that they may find a defendant
guilty of an offense for which there can be no judgment of conviction.").
350. Short, 618 A.2d at 324. See generally Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
2419, 2428 (1994) (holding that a federal district court is not required to instruct
the jury regarding the consequences to the defendant of a "not guilty but insane"
verdict option under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984). Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority in Shannon, stated:
The principle that juries are not to consider the consequences of their
verdicts is a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system
between judge and jury. The jury's function is to find the facts and to
decide whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged. . . . Information regarding the consequences of a verdict is
therefore irrelevant to the jury's task.
Id. at 2424; see also Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of
Fact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123 (1985) (stating that informing the jury of the legal conse-
quences of its verdict impairs the efficiency and integrity of the trial process).
A return to the once accepted concept of the special verdict in a criminal tri-
al-which would permit the jury to answer specific factual questions without concern
for the legal consequences of its answers-in some cases might offer a solution to
the conflict between the statute of limitations and an otherwise appropriate lesser
offense instruction at trial. Such factual verdicts, however, while still permissible in
some criminal trials with the consent of the defendant, are fraught with the poten-
tial for reversible error because of the danger to the accused that the jury's still-
required general verdict will be somehow prejudiced or undermined. See, e.g.,
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 30, § 23.7(d).
351. See supra part III.
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conflict between the statute and the doctrine.
C. A Three-Part Solution: Waiver, Judicial Authority, and
Defensive Theory
(1) THE DEFENDANT CAN WAIVE THE CRIMINAL STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS. Defendants should be permitted to
waive the criminal statute of limitations because protection of
the accused is the most significant policy reason for these stat-
utes."2 Waiver should be possible in the plea bargaining pro-
cess and during trial. In particular, access to the socially ben-
eficial doctrine of lesser offenses should not be denied to a defen-
dant because the statute of limitations has been seen as a juris-
dictional limitation on the power of the court in the past.3
The statute of limitations, regardless of whether it is a wise
policy choice, creates significant substantive legal rights for the
accused in a criminal setting. A waiver of that statute, therefore,
should not be inferred from the defendant's actions, but should
be founded only upon an explicit waiver with the advice of coun-
sel.' To prevent unnecessary appellate challenges, and to as-
sist in the resolution of those that might occur, a pre-indictment
waiver should be required to be in writing. In addition, either a
guilty plea or a request for a lesser offense instruction involving
a time-barred offense should require an informed waiver of the
statute of limitations by the defendant on the record. 55 No mu-
352. See supra notes 263, 270-74 and accompanying text.
353. See supra part 1IA.
354. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stat-
ing that United States v. Wild requires an inquiry into whether a written waiver of
statute of limitations was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently); United
States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that absent explicit
agreement, defendant's waiver of the statute of limitations cannot be inferred); Unit-
ed States v. Caldwell, 859 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding counseled open-
ended written agreement to waive statute of limitations because it was entered into
knowingly and voluntarily), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1039 (1989); United States v. Wild,
551 F.2d 418, 425 (D.C. Cir.) (finding that defendant, with advice of counsel, may
make written waiver of unexpired statute of limitations before indictment), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977); Comment, Waiver of the Statute of Limitations in Crim-
inal Prosecutions: United States v. Wild, 90 IIARV. L. REV. 1550, 1555-56 (1977)
(stating that courts should require defendant's waiver of statute of limitations to be
counseled, voluntary, informed, and explicit); see supra notes 140, 208 and accompa-
nying text.
355. The question arises whether a trial court should have the duty to inform the
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tuality remains, however, in the lesser offense doctrine for time-
barred offenses under this proposal.356 This result is appropri-
ate because even though the reasons for the delay might have
been excusable or even commendable, the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations is in the sole control of the government.
(2) IF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS PROPERLY
WAIVED, THE TRIAL COURT IS PERMITTED TO ENTER
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE FOR A CONVICTION OF A
TIME-BARRED OFFENSE. The defendant's waiver of the stat-
ute of limitations, as permitted in paragraph (1) above, should
enable the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction upon an
otherwise appropriate guilty plea to a time-barred offense or
upon the jury's guilty verdict on a time-barred, but otherwise
appropriate, lesser offense. The public policy reasons for the
statute of limitations, as well as the history and nature of that
statute, do not justify interpreting the statute of limitations as a
legislative prohibition of the court's otherwise appropriate juris-
diction in a criminal case.357
(3) A DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO WAIVE THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE A MODIFIED
JURY INSTRUCTION BASED ON AN OTHERWISE APPRO-
PRIATE TIME-BARRED LESSER OFFENSE. Having made the
choice not to waive the statute of limitations for an otherwise
defendant of the possibility of waiver of the statute of limitations in order to obtain
the option of a time-barred lesser offense at trial, particularly in light of the gen-
erally accepted notion that a trial judge can instruct the jury sua sponte on a lesser
offense it deems appropriate to the case. See, e.g., State v. Kupau, 879 P.2d 492,
500 (Haw. 1994) (recognizing the established law that the court may give a lesser
offense instruction over the objection of both parties, and finding that such an in-
struction is not mandatory, but within trial court's discretion). Of course, the court
has the power to inform the defendant of the possibility of such a waiver. It should
not, however, have the responsibility to do so because the choice is usually one of
trial strategy, best left to defense counsel in consultation with the defendant. See
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 281, Standard 4-5.2 commentary
(noting the importance of defense counsers consulting fully with the defendant about
any lesser offenses the court may be willing to submit to the jury). In contrast,
active judicial participation in raising the possibility of waiver, as the trial judge did
in Spaziano, see supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text, could be seen as coer-
cive for much the same reason as is the judge's participation in plea bargaining, cf.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1).
356. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
357. See supra part I]I.A.
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appropriate time-barred lesser offense at trial, a defendant is
still entitled to have the jury instructed on the elements of that
lesser offense-but as a defensive theory only. The court, howev-
er, should not give the jury a verdict option for that lesser of-
fense or explain that the statute of limitations bars such a ver-
dict or judgment upon it.
This concept is simple in design, but somewhat complex in
execution. The facts and circumstances of the particular case are
necessarily involved in such an instruction, and thus it is for the
court, with suggestions of counsel, to appropriately craft the
instruction in light of the evidence and the defendant's theory of
the case." The court in State v. Delisle"9 approved such a
defensive lesser offense instruction as a solution to the conflict
between the statute of limitations and lesser offenses at tri-
al.360 The Vermont Supreme Court, however, required that the
jury be informed that the statute of limitations had run on the
lesser offense that underlay the instruction."' Although this
author does not subscribe to a solution that has deception of the
jury as one of its components, when the jury does not have a
verdict option to convict on the lesser-included offense, there is
no reason why the jury should be informed about the statute of
limitations, and there is no need to take the risk that such infor-
mation would confuse or prejudice the jury.
The facts of State v. Short"' can seve as the basis for a hy-
pothetical example in which such a defensive instruction would
be appropriate, if the defendant requested a lesser offense in-
struction, but refused to waive his substantive rights under the
statute of limitations. In this hypothetical, under state law, the
defendant would have been entitled to a lesser offense man-
slaughter verdict option were it not for the statute of limitations.
358. For an example of such a defensive instruction, given in a case in which the
court found the statute of limitations to preclude the defendant's request for a lesser
offense instruction and verdict option because the statute was jurisdictional, see
Padie v. State, 557 P.2d 1138, 1141-42 (Alaska 1976) (Padie 1); supra note 196 and
accompanying text.
359. 648 A.2d 632 (Vt. 1994).
360. Id. at 640-41.
361. Id.; see supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. The court in Delisle did
not decide that the defendant had an option to waive the statute in Vermont.
362. 618 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1993); see supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
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The court, therefore, should grant defense counsel's request for
an instruction that informs the jury that, if they decide that the
defendant caused the death of his wife, but did so in the heat of
passion following a violent argument with her, then the govern-
ment has failed to meet its burden of proof for the murder
charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt and the
defendant must be found not guilty.
A similar hypothetical can be based on the facts of Spaziano
v. Florida.63 If the defendant refused to waive the statute of
limitations on noncapital murder, but argued that the inference
of premeditated murder arising from the state's evidence should
be rejected, the jury should be instructed that even if it finds
that the defendant killed the victim, they cannot find the defen-
dant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment if
they do not believe the state proved the defendant's premedita-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a case that involves an indicted felony with an otherwise
appropriate, but time-barred, lesser misdemeanor option (for
example, State v. Muentner364), the appropriate instruction
would inform the jury that if they believe that the defendant's
conduct (in Muentner, the making of false entries in bank re-
cords) was not done with the defined intent of the charged of-
fense (to deceive bank examiners), then they must find the de-
fendant not guilty of the offense specified in the indictment. This
outcome must result even if the jury finds that the defendant
engaged in the conduct specified in the indictment because the
government did not prove the necessary intent beyond a reason-
able doubt.
Such an approach to a defensive instruction would seem to be
feasible for every type of lesser offense regardless of whether a
narrow or broad definitional standard has been adopted for that
doctrine in the jurisdiction or what quantum of evidence is re-
quired to activate the doctrine. The purpose of this instruction is
to inform the jury fully and accurately as to the law and to
guide it appropriately in its consideration of the facts. The in-
struction does so without deception and with the faith that the
363. 468 U.S. 447 (1984); see supra notes 99, 103-04 and accompanying text.
364. 406 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. 1987); see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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jury can be trusted to follow the law if it is carefully explained
by the court. Although a jury should not be concerned with pun-
ishment, a jury does have a right to expect that if it reaches a
verdict option submitted to it, that verdict will be the judgment
of the court. Of course, this result does not always occur-for
example, the court's entry of a judgment of acquittal notwith-
standing the verdict-but those occasions are qualitatively dif-
ferent than permitting a jury to deliberate to a verdict that the
law specifically prohibits if the defendant does not waive the
statute of limitations.
An instruction on the time-barred offense characterized as a
defense, rather than as a separate verdict option, is still subject
to attack based on the Keeble rationale. 65 Lacking a "third op-
tion" to an acquittal or guilty verdict on the greater offense, the
jury-learning of the lesser criminal conduct or intent underly-
ing the defense (less an element needed to -prove the charged
greater offense)-will convict of the charged offense by de-
fault. 66 Under paragraph (1) of this proposal, however, the de-
fendant is entitled to choose to strengthen the jury's consider-
ation of the lesser offense by a verdict option in addition to a
defensive instruction. That strategic choice is for the defendant
to make, not for the court to force as a Hobson's choice.
D. In Support
None of the appellate opinions discussed in this Article, and
none of which this author is aware, has adopted this proposed
approach to resolve the conflict between the statute of limita-
tions and the lesser offense doctrine at trial. In each case, the
appellate courts have chosen to emphasize one aspect of a pro-
cess that should be carefully separated into three parts-the
instruction to the'jury, the verdict options for the jury, and the
court's power to enter judgment and sentence upon the verdict.
Each facet of this process has different significance for the de-
fendant, the prosecutor, the jury, and the court.
The criminal statute of limitations has debatable social utility
365. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973).
366. Id.; see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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and is subject to the political whim of the legislature. A direct
legislative solution to the conflict between the statute and the
lesser offense doctrine could arise by the adoption of a provision
that permits a defendant to waive the statute of limitations, as
suggested in paragraph (1) of this proposal, and permits the
court to enter a judgment and sentence on a guilty plea or a
guilty verdict on the time-barred lesser offense, as suggested in
paragraph (2). An indirect legislative solution to the conflict is
possible, at least in part, if the legislature either significantly
lengthens or eliminates the limitations period for all forms of
homicide (the most fertile ground for lesser offenses) or for all
serious felonies.367
As long as the statute of limitations is applicable, however, it
creates undeniably significant personal rights for a defendant
accused of a time-barred offense. That shield should not be
turned into a sword by prohibiting defendants to waive the stat-
ute of limitations for their own benefit. At the same time, the
doctrine of lesser offenses is of demonstrable value to both the
parties and is necessary for an efficient criminal justice system.
If a defendant chooses to waive the statute of limitations to gain
the option of a jury verdict for a time-barred lesser offense, the
benefits of the lesser offense doctrine should be fully available. If
a defendant does not choose to waive the statute of limitations,
then that accused should not have the benefit of a verdict upon
which judgment may not be entered under the law of the juris-
diction. The defendant, however, should have the option of a
defensive instruction based upon the elements of the time-
barred offense. The purpose of the lesser offense doctrine,
achieving the most desirable result with adjudicative efficiency,
will thus be accomplished in significant part without forcing the
defendant to waive the right granted by the statute of limita-
tions in order to achieve an appropriate jury instruction on the
substantive criminal law.
367. For examples of state statutes of limitations that so provide, see supra notes
223, 230 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
When faced with a conflict between the criminal statute of
limitations and the doctrine of lesser offenses at trial, courts and
commentators have failed to consider the history, nature, and
policies of these two legal concepts, and have looked inappropri-
ately to the legal labels of jurisdiction and federal due process.
A defendant should be permitted to knowingly waive the per-
sonal benefits of the statute of limitations in order to obtain the
option of the jury's verdict on a time-barred, but otherwise ap-
propriate, lesser offense. The questionable social utility of the
criminal statute of limitations should not provide policy support
for precluding such a waiver. That waiver having been made,
the court should not degrade the jury's role in the criminal jus-
tice system by disregarding that verdict and refusing to enter
judgment because the statute of limitations has run on the of-
fense of conviction.
However, if an informed waiver of the statute of limitations is
not explicitly made, and the defendant is therefore not entitled
to a jury verdict on the lesser offense and to the court's judg-
ment on that verdict, the defendant still should not be precluded
from an appropriate instruction based upon the elements of a
lesser offense that happens to be time-barred. We should expect
our trial judges, as advised by trial counsel, to craft instructions
that present the theory of the defense to the jury-including the
place of the elements of the lesser offense within that defensive
theory-without mention of the statute of limitations. And,
when such a defensive instruction is given, the jurors should be
trusted to follow it, without assuming that they will refuse to
acquit because the evidence indicates that some crime has been
committed, even though the charged offense has not been proven
to their satisfaction.
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